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The goal of my dissertation is to give an account of our capacity for a priori knowledge in terms of 
fundamental features of conceptual thought.  In a nutshell, the claim is that a priori knowledge is 
possible because thinkers are able to recognize the norms that their thinking is subject to.   But, as I 
argue, the contents of our propositional attitudes are themselves individuated in terms of the norms 
that fix their place in our thinking.  Since contents — Fregean thoughts — are what may be the case, 
it follows that knowledge of the norms of thinking can be substantive knowledge of the possible 
shapes reality can take. 
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 INTRODUCTION
 
 
 
 
1. THE AIM OF THE PROJECT 
 
 
We have knowledge of the world from many different sources and of many different kinds.  Most 
obviously, a lot of our knowledge about the world can be traced back to some particular causal 
interaction between us and things in our environment: we know things through perceiving them, for 
example, or through remembering having perceived them, or through other people’s telling us about 
them.  Regardless of the details of the epistemology of perception, memory, or testimony, the fact 
that we can acquire knowledge in these ways is naturally taken to point to a deep fact about us: 
whatever else might be true of the human mind, it is the sort of thing that is open to the causal 
influence of the world in a special way — radically unlike, say, the way in which a stone or even a 
plant is open to the causal influence of the world.   
It is not, however, evident that all of our knowledge can be traced back to such causal 
interactions — not, at least, in the relevant sense.  Even though for each one of us there was a 
particular process through which we learned enough basic arithmetic to know that 5+7=12, for 
instance, it would appear that our grounds for that knowledge do not consist in the authority of the 
person or the book responsible for this learning (even if, plausibly, the learning was necessary for the 
real grounds of that knowledge to become available to us).   
Moreover, it is also arguable that the first kind of knowledge — the knowledge that we have 
through experience, or our causal openness to the world — would be either impoverished beyond 
1 
 recognition or even altogether impossible, if we did not also possess abilities of a sort explicable only 
by the attribution of knowledge which (on pain of circularity) would have to be grounded otherwise.  
Even to pick out an object in one’s visual field as “that thing over there”, for instance, one arguably 
needs to have some knowledge of the identity conditions of spatially extended objects, and so on.  
This is not to deny that experience may, again, play an enabling role in having this kind of 
knowledge.  But if there is indeed some knowledge that has to be in place in order for one to 
possess the most basic ability for cognitively significant experience, then it is hard to see how such 
knowledge could itself be grounded in experience.1   
Any purported example of the relevant kind of non-empirical knowledge is bound to be 
controversial.  It is not the aim of this dissertation — much less this introduction — to sort out 
particular such controversies.  I am assuming that, despite the controversies, there is an intuitive case 
to be made for some attributions of such knowledge — to give it a name, a priori knowledge.2  The 
aim of this dissertation is to address the following question: what facts about us would the possibility 
of a priori knowledge point to?   
 
 
 
 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE COMING CHAPTERS 
 
 
1.  If a priori knowledge is not grounded in interactions with the world, then how is it grounded?  
One traditional answer — the one I will defend in this dissertation — is that it is grounded in the 
                                                 
1 This kind of argument has its origin in Kant, and it is characteristic of the Kantian tradition (Kant (1998), 
Strawson (1999; 2002), Evans (1982; 2002a)).        
2 I cannot here demarcate the kind of knowledge that is the topic of this dissertation otherwise than just by 
alluding to purported examples and to the negative characterization “non-empirical”.  However, I do not 
think that this negative characterization suffices to pick out a principled epistemological category, and the 
examples — as I already admitted — may be contested.  This seems inevitable at the outset of a project such 
as this.  The positive account I arrive at by the end should help demarcate a genuine kind of knowledge. 
 2 
 
 
 nature of thinking itself.  This is the view Kant develops at great length, and also the view Frege 
expresses in the following famous pronouncement: 
What if beings were even found whose laws of thought directly contradicted our 
own, and therefore frequently led to contrary results even in practice?  I would say: 
here we have a hitherto unknown kind of madness.3 
 
Inability to recognize the laws of thought — that is, for Frege, at least the laws of logic and 
(therefore) arithmetic — must be a sign of “madness”, of defective mentality.  Contraposing, it is a 
requirement of non-defective mentality that one be able to recognize the laws of thought. 
 Now, it seems clear that, if we wish to maintain that there is a connection between a priori 
knowledge — and knowledge of logic in particular — and non-defective mentality, we will have to 
qualify Frege’s pronouncement in some way: even assuming classical logic to be correct, for 
example, it is not at all obvious that non-classical logicians must either suffer from some form of 
madness, or else fail to reject the classical laws of logic they take themselves to be rejecting.  I 
discuss such points in Chapter 2.  But, before getting to this, there seems to be something more 
immediately surprising about the very idea that a priori knowledge is grounded in the nature of 
thought — for why should it be that the nature of thought is a good guide to the way the world is?  
Why should even non-defective mentality entail any access to facts about the world, other than the 
access to the world that consists in the mind’s openness to causal influence? 
 As I argue in Chapter 1, Russell for one found this idea unintelligible, except perhaps within 
the context of an objectionably idealistic framework.  Russell’s commitment to rejecting internal 
relations in general, and — more specifically — internal relations between thought and its objects, 
led him to reject the Kantian and Fregean approach to the epistemology of the a priori as well.4  For, 
Russell seems to have thought, how could the nature of thought provide access to facts about the 
                                                 
3 Frege (1997: 203).  The passage makes more sense if we imagine scare-quotes around “laws of thought” in 
the first sentence. 
4 Russell (1997: 86-89). 
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 world, unless the world were somehow bound up with the nature of thought?  For this reason, 
Russell prefers to postulate a separate faculty of a priori intuition, over and above our capacity for 
thought itself.5  On Russell’s view, we might say, inability to recognize the truths of logic would be a 
kind of blindness, rather than a kind of madness — it would be, that is, a cognitive defect compatible 
with a perfectly developed capacity for thought.6 
 Russell’s positive account of a priori knowledge is not satisfying, not least because he does 
not have anything to say about that supposed faculty of a priori intuition.  But the question he raises 
is, I think, a legitimate and important one: how are we to understand the relation between thinking 
and its objects, if a priori knowledge is to be grounded in the nature of thought?   
Naturally, the question is pressing only on the assumption that there really is such a thing as 
a priori knowledge of facts about the world.  There are various views, ranging from old-fashioned 
conventionalism to contemporary non-factualism, which may be seen as attempting to neutralize 
Russell’s question by denying precisely this.  According to conventionalism, the subject-matter of a 
priori knowledge is not the world, but, rather, the way we represent the world in thought or language.  
If we can make sense of this suggestion, then Russell’s question loses its bite — since there would 
be nothing surprising in taking the way we represent the world not to be independent of the nature 
of our minds.  According to non-factualism, a priori disciplines — such as logic and mathematics — 
have no subject matter at all: they merely express some of the dispositions that collectively make up 
our cognitive or linguistic faculty.  Again, if we can make sense of this suggestion, the effect would 
be to neutralize Russell’s question — since to say that logic and mathematics have their source in the 
nature of our minds in this sense does not require that our minds be related to any objects at all.7 
                                                 
5 A priori intuition, in Russell’s sense, is of course not related to Kantian a priori intuition. 
6 The analogy with blindness was suggested to me by Cian Dorr. 
7 For a historical discussion of conventionalism, see Coffa (1993).  For a non-factualist view, see (for 
example) Field (2001).  There is also, of course, the radical empiricism of Quine and others, which rejects the 
idea of a priori knowledge altogether.  I briefly address some aspects of this position in the Appendix, but 
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 I do not directly discuss conventionalist or non-factualist views in this dissertation.  On the 
contrary, in Chapter 1 — and in the Appendix that supplements it — I offer a straight answer to 
Russell’s question.  In particular, I argue for the Fregean view that thoughts — that is, the objects of 
propositional attitudes — are individuated in terms of the norms of thinking that govern individual 
subjects (or even entire practices, such as — to use Frege’s own example — arithmetic).  But 
thoughts are what may be the case; thus, knowledge of the norms that govern our thinking is, at the 
same time, knowledge of the possible shapes reality can take.  Insofar as we can explain our capacity 
to know the norms that govern our thinking, therefore, there is (in principle) no difficulty in taking 
this to be a capacity for knowledge about the world. 
 
2.  The idea that a priori knowledge is to be explained in terms of the conditions of individuation of 
thoughts is currently a popular one.  But it is an idea that needs to be handled with care.  In 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 I criticize recent accounts of a priori knowledge which — in one way or another 
— start out from this idea, and I propose an alternative. 
 More specifically, Chapter 2 criticizes an assumption about concept-possession that is the 
starting-point of many contemporary authors.  This is the assumption that possessing a concept 
must be a matter of possessing a fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer in accordance with certain 
rules, which are constitutive of the concept in question.  A subject’s capacity for a priori knowledge, 
in turn, is to be explained in terms of such dispositions. 
In fact, it often seems to be taken for granted that a Fregean approach to a priori knowledge 
— that is, an approach that ties the individuation of contents to the norms of thinking, and a priori 
knowledge to knowledge of the norms of thinking — requires this assumption (Timothy 
Williamson, for example, in attacking this assumption takes himself to be attacking the Fregean 
                                                                                                                                                             
otherwise it does not figure in this dissertation.  This is not simply a matter of economy of resources: the 
Quinean position is motivated by a conception of the questions of epistemology and philosophy of mind that 
is quite alien to the one adopted here, so that a common ground for a fair discussion would be hard to find. 
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 approach in general).8  But, as I argue in that chapter, this is not correct.  The Fregean strategy can 
— and should — be pursued without this assumption. 
 This is not to say that possessing a concept makes no difference to the thinking of the 
subject who possesses the concept, and neither is it to say that the difference it makes is not crucial 
in understanding our capacity for a priori knowledge.  But, as I argue in Chapter 2, we should not 
think of concept-possession atomistically.  As I suggest, to possess a concept is a matter of 
participating in a conceptual practice.  Membership in such a practice, in turn, does not require that 
one conform perfectly to all of the norms constitutive of the practice, but only that one be reliable 
in conforming to enough of the norms of the practice.  Even deeply entrenched and widespread a 
priori mistakes are possible on this view, as long as we can make sense of the subject as a member of 
the relevant conceptual practice.  
Chapter 3 expands the criticism of existing views of conceptual thought along the same lines, 
but it is to some extent parenthetical.  More specifically, in this chapter I criticize another recent 
attempt to carry out a version of the Fregean strategy, namely, the two-dimensionalist approach of 
Frank Jackson and especially David Chalmers.  Although the two-dimensionalist view also makes 
the assumption I criticize in Chapter 2, and so would be subject to the objections discussed there 
anyway, it also seems to be crucially mistaken about a further aspect of conceptual thought — in 
particular, it seems to require a very implausible view of the recognitional capacities we bring to bear 
in applying concepts in experience.  But the point of the chapter is not just negative: although the 
nature of the recognitional capacities involved in experience is not a central topic in this dissertation, 
the discussion helps round out the picture of conceptual thought that underlies my account of a 
priori knowledge. 
                                                 
8 Williamson (2006). 
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 In the fourth and final chapter of this dissertation I complete my account of the nature of 
our capacity for a priori knowledge.  The holistic constraint on concept-possession proposed in 
Chapter 2 helps explain why we are, in general, reliable in conforming to enough of the norms 
governing our conceptual practices; but it does not, so far, explain why that conformity counts as a 
capacity for knowledge.  For all that has been argued so far, a subject might possess the relevant 
reliable dispositions and yet still be in the dark about why she is disposed to conform to the patterns 
she actually conforms to, or even about what patterns she conforms to.  Such “blind” dispositions 
would not, I take it, count as expressions of a capacity to know.  As I argue, however, they are not 
even recognizable as the kind of disposition that constitutes our capacity for conceptual thought at 
all; thus they do not pose a threat to the idea that a priori knowledge is grounded in the nature of 
conceptual thought. 
 The problem here, I believe, is that we have so far failed to take into account the self-
awareness characteristic of conceptual thought.  This failure is another important shortcoming of 
recent accounts of a priori knowledge.  As I explain in Chapter 4, judgment and belief are essentially 
“reflexive” — that is, they essentially involve a kind of self-awareness.  In this respect, our cognitive 
capacities are radically unlike the blind dispositions described above.  Combining this point with the 
holistic constraint on concept-possession argued for in Chapter 2, I argue that our most basic 
capacity for a priori knowledge consists in our reflexive ability to reliably conform our thinking to 
enough of the norms constitutive of our conceptual practice. 
*** 
 
This finally completes my account of how a priori knowledge is possible.  But to what extent is the 
end product an epistemology of the a priori? 
 I certainly make no attempt to formulate a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a 
state of a subject to count as a state of a priori knowledge.  This is not what this dissertation 
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purports to offer.  However, I think that this is not a reasonable request to make: as has forcefully 
been pointed out, the prospects of giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge 
— hence, a fortiori, for a priori knowledge — are extremely dim.9  Attributions of mental states in 
general, and of states of knowledge in particular, are made in the context of attempting to make 
sense of human subjects and their interactions with their environment.  We should not expect to be 
able to capture the conditions for such attributions in a set of informative necessary and sufficient 
conditions. 
 Giving a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a priori knowledge, however, is not 
the only intelligible goal of an epistemology of the a priori.  I am assuming here that, even lacking an 
analysis of the concept of knowledge, we still have enough of a grip on it to be capable of consistent 
and confident enough attributions of knowledge, and even of making distinctions among different 
kinds and sources of knowledge.  As I pointed out at the beginning of this introduction, we can take 
these intuitive judgments and distinctions as starting points of an investigation into the nature of the 
mind.  What I try to offer in this dissertation is an account of  aspects of our capacity for thought 
that make some of our intuitive attributions of knowledge intelligible.
 
9 For example, McDowell (1998a), Williamson (2000). 
 Chapter 1 
THINKING AND THOUGHTS
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.  The overarching goal of this dissertation is to develop an account of our capacity for a priori 
knowledge.  It is natural to think that, if such an account is possible, then it must be intimately 
related to an account of thinking.  If that were not so — if our capacity for a priori knowledge, that 
is, were simply independent of our faculty of thought or understanding — then it would appear to 
be a pretty mysterious capacity indeed.  Perhaps that appearance of mystery is no more than just an 
appearance — I have no explicit argument to rule out the possibility that an account of a priori 
knowledge in terms of an independent faculty could be given.  Nevertheless, this dissertation will 
only focus on the prospects of grounding an epistemology of the a priori on an account of thinking. 
 This chapter will focus on sketching an account of thought with a view to preparing the 
ground for the more explicitly epistemological tasks undertaken in the rest of the dissertation.  
Broadly speaking, there are two main questions this dissertation aims to address.  On the one hand, 
if there is any plausibility to the idea that a priori knowledge is grounded in the nature of thought, 
then that must be because there is some intuitive plausibility to the idea that being a thinker gives 
one some sort of epistemic access to facts about the structure of thought.  I think this is true; but we 
need to get clear on which facts these are, and why they should be accessible to thinking subjects 
just in virtue of their capacity to think.  This task is undertaken in Chapters 2 to 4.  The present 
chapter addresses a more fundamental question about the nature of thought. 
9 
 Even granted that some account can be given of why being a thinker should entail some sort 
of access to facts about the structure of thought, why should we take such knowledge to be anything 
other than just knowledge of facts about us, and the way we happen to represent the world?  Why 
should we, in other words, take it to be substantive knowledge of mind-independent reality?  My 
fundamental goal in this chapter is to suggest a view of thinking and its objects that addresses this 
question (the suggestion is refined and supplemented in the Appendix to this dissertation). 
 For reasons that will become clearer as the argument proceeds, I approach the issue through 
a discussion of two different conceptions of thinking and its objects which, historically, have shaped 
the debate in the analytic tradition.  These are the views of the logical atomists and especially Russell, 
on the one hand, and of Frege on the other. 
 
2.  What is the relationship between the nature of the objects of thought (and the semantic contents 
of sayings) and the nature of the activity of thinking?1  According to both Frege and the logical 
atomists, whatever that relation turns out to be, it is crucial to avoid a reduction of the objects of 
thought to subjective items, items that properly belong to the subject-matter of empirical 
psychology.  According to both, the main point is to “always separate sharply the psychological from 
the logical”, to use Frege’s own phrase.2  One might find in the Kantian tradition still prevalent in 
Frege’s time a tendency to assume that an account of the nature of the acts of thinking is at the same 
time an account of thoughts.  From the perspective of Frege, however, the assumption that the two 
accounts can be simply collapsed rests on some sort of act/object ambiguity: the objects of thinking 
— “thoughts”, in one sense of the term, or Gedanken in Frege’s German terminology — are not 
                                                 
1 I will throughout simply assume that the contents of sayings and the objects of intentional states or acts are 
things of the same sort.  I will use the verb ‘to think’ as the most generic term for a mental relation between a 
subject and an object of the appropriate sort: thus to entertain, to judge, to question, to hope are all in the 
terminology here adopted kinds of thinking. 
2 Frege (1980: x).  This is the first of the three maxims Frege announces in the introduction to the book will 
be guiding his work.  For my conception of the form in which the Kantian tradition was handed down to 
Moore and Russell I rely on Hylton (2002). 
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 themselves mental entities, although our acts of thinking them are dateable events taking place in 
each person’s individual mental life.   
The anti-psychologistic stance adopted by Frege is quite intuitive.  That more than one 
person can have the same thought at the same or at different times seems to be a truism; but, far 
from being a truism, it would actually be trivially false if it entailed a multiplicity of occurrences of 
the same dateable and localizable mental event.  It is therefore reasonable to explicitly draw a 
distinction where the tradition Frege was responding to did not (or, at least, did not seem to Frege 
to do so).  The obvious way to draw such a distinction is to introduce terminology to talk about 
entities distinct from the dateable events that are our acts of thinking, and which serve as their 
objects.  Thus Moore and Russell talk about propositions, and Frege talks about thoughts.3   
Now this distinction, even at this completely abstract level, appears to raise two questions.  
The first question concerns the nature of the relation between these new entities and our minds.  To 
say that these entities are the objects of our acts of thinking is, at best, to give a suggestive metaphor, 
and substantive work may be required in order to get beyond that.  The second question concerns 
the relation between thought and the world.  The proposed entities are what we think when we 
think and what we express in language when we speak.  But one of the essential characteristics of 
thought and speech is that they are often intended to be responsible to the way things are.  How are 
we to account for the responsibility of thought and speech to the world — that is, how are we to 
account for the possibility of truth and falsehood — on this picture?   
                                                 
3 See, for example, Russell (1996) and Frege (1997b; c).  The motivation I mention in the text is clearly visible 
in Frege (1997c).  Frege (1997b) is perhaps more famous for putting thoughts to use in Frege’s account of 
indirect contexts.  Dealing with such contexts, however, means confronting the problem posed by statements 
such as ‘I believe the same thing as Jones’, or ‘I always believe what Jones says’.  Thus indirect contexts 
provide just another way in which the non-psychological nature of the objects of thinking and the contents of 
sayings emerges. 
    I will ignore throughout worries about the ontological status of abstract entities in general. 
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 Frege and the logical atomists diverge in their respective responses to these questions in 
quite crucial ways.  In what follows I want to trace some of these divergences.   
In §2 I discuss the distinctive approach to these questions developed by the logical atomists, 
and especially Russell.  Russell famously dismisses the idea that a priori knowledge can be grounded 
in an account of our capacity for thought.  This is how he puts it, while discussing the apriority of 
the law of contradiction: 
The law of contradiction is about things, and not merely about thoughts […].  If this, 
which we believe when we believe the law of contradiction were not true of the 
things in the world, the fact that we were compelled to think it true would not save 
the law of contradiction from being false; and this shows that the law is not a law of 
thought.4 
   
As I will suggest, Russell’s dismissal of the possibility of grounding an epistemology of the a priori in 
an account of the “laws of thought” is very closely connected to certain central features of the 
logical atomist framework (features that survive as late as The Problems of Philosophy, where the quote 
comes from).   
In §3 I will sketch the alternative, Fregean view.  The Fregean view, in contrast to the 
Russellian one, makes it intelligible that a capacity to know facts about the structure of our own 
capacity for thought — the “laws of thought” — could in principle also be a capacity to know facts 
about the world.  Frege himself exploited this possibility in his own work on logic and the 
foundations of mathematics — work that is in large measure epistemological, and not only 
metaphysical.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Russell (1997: 89). 
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 2. RUSSELL AND LOGICAL ATOMISM 
 
 
1.  According to the well-known view of the logical atomists, a proposition is a special kind of 
complex of simple entities.5  These simple entities are conceived of atomistically, that is, as 
completely independent of each other.  The constituents of propositions include, in Russell’s 
terminology, “things” and “concepts”.  These two categories are distinguished by the role items 
belonging to each of them can play in propositional complexes: things can only occur in a 
proposition non-predicatively, while concepts can occur either predicatively or non-predicatively.  
The structure of propositions is analogous to the grammatical structure of sentences.  Thus, an 
atomic proposition will consist of one or more items — either things or concepts — in non-
predicative occurrence joined by a concept functioning predicatively, to yield a whole capable of 
truth or falsehood.  For instance, to the sentence “Desdemona loves Othello” corresponds a 
complex consisting of Desdemona and Othello, joined by the relation of love.6  It is natural to speak 
of an object that figures only non-predicatively in a proposition as what the proposition is about; and 
this is an expression I will sometimes use in what follows. 
According to logical atomism, therefore, the fundamental constituents of propositions are at 
the same time the fundamental constituents of reality: particular things, properties, and relations.  
This opens up the prospect of dealing straightforwardly with the second of the two problems 
mentioned near the end of the previous section: there is no ontological gulf between the things that 
we think or say and what is the case in the world.  Propositions, if true, just are what the case is.  
Regardless of the details of a coherent account of truth consistent with logical atomism, the present 
                                                 
5 The account of the view I am presenting here derives mostly from Russell (1996), as amended by the 
elimination of non-propositional complexity by means of the theory of descriptions presented in Russell 
(1905) (this is what allows me to straightforwardly say that propositions are composed of simples).  I will not 
consider the changes in Russell’s views that culminate in the multiple-relation theory of judgment, and the 
concomitant excision of propositions from his ontology.  The early Russell’s conception of proposition has, 
in any case, survived its author’s change of mind and plays an important role in contemporary debate. 
6 Russell (1996: 45-48). 
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 account of the nature of propositions makes it intelligible that propositions are the sort of thing that 
gets a grip on reality.7  This might make logical atomism seem like an attractive view about the 
objects of thinking.  There are, however, problems with it that I believe show that it is deeply 
flawed. 
Logical atomism gives a clear theoretical priority to the mind-independent constituents of 
reality.  In accounting for the nature of propositions Russell relies on a prior, and perhaps intuitive, 
understanding of the basic ontology of the world.  Propositions are then understood as a special 
kind of composite object, built up in a special way from particular objects, properties and relations.  
This is Russell’s way of ensuring a consistent anti-psychologism: there is nothing due to the mind in 
the proposition as Russell conceives of it.8  But this characterization of the nature of propositions 
obviously makes pressing the first of the two problems I raised at the end of the last section: how 
are minds related to things of that sort?   
In a sense, if it has no satisfactory answer to this question logical atomism only appears to 
avoid the traditional difficulties concerning the possibility of thought’s being related to reality.  By 
construing the objects of thought as built up from the constituents of reality, logical atomism only 
succeeds in pushing the problem back to the question of what it is for a proposition to be the object 
of an act of thinking.  As I will argue, no satisfactory solution is available within the framework of 
                                                 
7 My formulation in the text has to be cagey, because Russell himself did not think it an easy matter to give a 
precise and technically adequate account of truth within logical atomism (Russell (1996: 48-49)).  It is a bit 
hard to see exactly what Russell’s problem is, but it clearly arises from the combination of the view that facts 
are true propositions with the view that truth is a property of propositions.  The combination of these two 
views certainly has results that Russell may have found difficult to swallow.  From this combination it follows 
that the circumstance of p’s having the property of being true consists in the truth of the proposition that p is 
true, while the truth of that proposition consists in the truth of the proposition that it is true that p is true — 
and so on.  The problem here is not really the infinity of the ensuing regress, since that is arguably not 
vicious; it is, rather, that this account does not make explicit the nature of truth (see Hylton (2002: 178-179); 
Ricketts (2001: 105)).  If this is the problem Russell has in mind, then there are obvious ways around it — 
one could, in fact, simply drop the demand for further explanation at this point.  As a matter of historical 
fact, Ricketts argues that this problem played a major role in Russell’s own later abandonment of the ontology 
of propositions — but I am not here going to consider this change in Russell’s views. 
8 See, for example, Russell (1906). 
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 logical atomism.  In particular, it is atomism that makes the problem so acute: if one assumes, as 
Russell does, that simple things cannot stand in internal relations to each other, and complex things 
can stand in such relations only insofar as they share some of their constituents, it is very difficult to 
make sense of the idea that propositions are the objects of acts of thinking.9 
  
2.  To think a proposition is to stand in an epistemic relation to it.  The one constraint Russell 
throughout his career imposes on this relation is encapsulated in his famous principle of 
acquaintance: in order for a proposition to be available to a subject to think, the subject must be 
acquainted with all of the proposition’s constituents.10  The principle of acquaintance itself states 
only a necessary condition for thinkability; but it is quite clear that Russell would be willing to regard 
acquaintance with all of its constituents as a sufficient condition of being able to think a proposition 
as well.11 
Thus Russell’s notion of acquaintance, a notion notoriously hard to precisely pin down, lies 
at the center of his account of thinking.  Russell never presents an analysis of the relation of 
acquaintance: it is, according to him, a primitive relation, which admits of no further analysis.  But 
he does provide a theoretical constraint on it, as well as a number of examples he considers self-
explanatory.  The constraint is that acquaintance is a form of knowledge of objects (both particular 
things and concepts), independent of knowledge of propositions.  Acquaintance is a form of 
immediate presence to the mind of an object: 
                                                 
9 It is often thought that logical atomism prohibits any kind of internal relation.  Even though Moore and 
Russell may have been prone to use this slogan themselves, it seems clear that their real view must be closer 
to the one I present in the text.  For example, a proposition essentially has the constituents that it has: if a 
proposition p is about an object a, then it is essentially about that object.  By the same token, if another 
proposition q is also about a, then it too will be essentially about a.  It seems to follow from these two 
premises that p and q essentially stand in the relation of being about the same thing. 
10 Russell (1997: 58; 1905: 456-457).   
11 For an argument that Russell is committed to this see Levine (1998: 417-419). 
 15 
 
 
 We shall say that we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly aware, 
without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths.12 
 
It is not clear from this formulation how this independence from inference and from propositional 
knowledge should be understood.  However, the background of Russell’s thought shows that it has 
to be understood in very strong terms.  In fact, as I will suggest, the constraint is so strong that it is 
quite implausible that there is any relation answering to Russell’s conception of acquaintance — at 
least not one that could plausibly serve as a foundation of our capacity to think most of the thoughts 
that we take ourselves to think. 
First of all, it is important to keep in mind that acquaintance is a form of knowledge.  Thus 
Russell does not offer a causal theory of reference: even though causal relations might be necessary 
in order for a subject to be acquainted with a perceptible thing, they are surely not sufficient.  It is 
not always the case that a state or act caused by a perceptible object can have as its content a 
proposition with that object as a constituent: in order for that to be possible, the subject must 
moreover know the object in an appropriate way.  The question is how to spell out what the required 
sort of knowledge is. 
The crucial point is that the notion of immediacy or directness that Russell employs in 
discussing this sort of knowledge has to be understood in especially strong terms.  The context from 
which I extracted the quotation above may suggest that the contrast he has foremost in mind is that 
between a kind of non-inferential knowledge of an object and the kind of knowledge of an object 
one has in virtue of possessing a description uniquely satisfied by it.  This contrast is certainly there, 
for the latter kind of knowledge evidently consists in knowledge of truths about the object, and may 
moreover require a process of inference to figure out which object satisfies the description.  But in 
fact I believe Russell intends to state a thesis significantly stronger than that.  I believe Russell is 
                                                 
12 Russell (1997: 47-48). 
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 committed to denying not only that acquaintance is equivalent to knowledge of an individuating 
description, but also that it relies in any way on propositional knowledge.13 
 The reason why Russell is committed to this view has to do with the way in which he 
understands the relations between the objects of thought, on the one hand, and minds on the other.  
Propositions and their constituents are, as we have seen, totally mind-independent items.  
Nevertheless, they are supposed to be the objects of mental acts.  On a certain understanding of 
mind-independence, these two theses entail that, whatever it takes for an entity to be the object of a 
mental act, it must not entail any non-trivial condition on what that entity is.  This view is explicitly 
stated by Moore:  
[Propositions and their constituents] are possible objects of thought; but that is no 
definition of them.  It merely states that they may come into relation with a thinker; 
and in order that they may do anything, they must already be something. 14 
 
The context makes it clear that by the term ‘definition’ Moore here means something like ‘real 
definition’, or an account of what something is; and his claim is that what propositions and their 
constituents are is independent of the fact that they are possible objects of thinking. 
 I suggest that it is this feature of logical atomism that leads Russell to maintain that 
acquaintance cannot have any propositional knowledge as a necessary condition.  For, suppose that 
acquaintance with a certain object has propositional knowledge about that object as a  necessary 
                                                 
13 One might be led to accept this stronger thesis by means of an inference from the principle of 
acquaintance.  The principle of acquaintance requires that in order to understand a proposition p one must be 
acquainted with p’s constituents.  If this is so, then it might appear problematic if it turned out that in order to 
be acquainted with p’s constituents one had to know further propositions about these objects — for in order 
to know these further propositions, one would once again have to be acquainted with the very same objects; 
but it was precisely acquaintance with these objects that we supposed required knowledge of these 
propositions in the first place.  Thus, one might think, we are led into what looks like a potentially vicious 
circle.  But in fact it is not at all clear that there is a vicious circularity here.  If one already believed that 
thinking a proposition must, at the bottom level, rest on a non-propositional epistemic relation with its 
constituents, then it evidently follows that the circularity ought to be ruled out.  But this is precisely the point 
under question here: why should we agree that thinking a proposition requires a prior, non-propositional 
epistemic relation with its constituents?  If one rejects that assumption, then taking our fundamental 
epistemic relation to objects to consist in knowing some propositions about them does not seem problematic 
at all. 
14 Moore (1899: 179).   
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 condition.  Then it would seem that one could know some facts about an object, not by collecting 
evidence about how things happen to stand with that object (after all, in order to do that, one would 
already need to be acquainted with the object), but simply on the basis of one’s ability to think about 
it.  But then, it seems that the mere fact that the object is a possible object of thought has non-trivial 
consequences about its nature — for otherwise how could we come to know things about it simply 
by reflecting on our own ability to think?  The possibility of such knowledge, therefore, seems to 
violate the atomist thesis articulated in the passage from Moore above. 
This is not to say that logical atomism has to deny that, as a matter of contingent fact, our 
minds are such that we have to think in accordance with certain patterns.  What is not compatible 
with logical atomism is only that there are patterns that could constitute a source of propositional 
knowledge about the objects of thought — that there are, as Russell puts it, “laws of thought”.15  To 
admit the possibility of such knowledge would appear to undermine the Russellian conception of the 
mind-independence of propositions and their constituents, for such knowledge, instead of tracking 
the way things are, seems to anticipate it.  Acquaintance must not presuppose any propositional 
knowledge: it must be, in this sense, presuppositionless.16 
 
3.  The problem, of course, is that such a presuppositionless way of relating to the constituents of 
the propositions one thinks about is hard to make sense of.  Merely causal contact would be 
presuppositionless in the relevant sense; but, as we have seen, Russell’s acquaintance is more than 
just causal contact — it is a form of knowledge.  At the very least, it would seem that being 
acquainted with an object in Russell’s sense requires being able to single it out.  But it seems clear 
                                                 
15 Russell (1997: 86-89). 
16  It should be noted here that Russell’s descriptivism does make room for a kind of knowledge that 
anticipates, rather than tracks, certain facts about objects.  But, of course, on the present reading of Russell 
this is one way of explaining why knowledge by description cannot be the fundamental way we relate 
epistemically to objects of thought. 
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 that — at least in the most salient, intuitive cases — this is not a non-propositional, 
presuppositionless ability. 
 Consider, for example, the case of perceptual reference.  It is natural to think that one can 
think of an object in virtue of focusing one’s visual attention on it — picking it out, at the very least, 
as that thing over there.  But it is also natural to think that the ability to pick out things by means of 
perceptual demonstratives is not the sort of presuppositionless ability it would have to be to satisfy 
Russell’s conception of acquaintance: in picking out something by means of a perceptual 
demonstrative, one plausibly needs to bring to bear a prior conception of spatially extended things 
that persist through time.17   
Thus, from this point of view, it is not surprising that when Russell gives examples of the 
things we are acquainted with, he does not talk of such things: the things he includes within the 
domain of acquaintance are sense-data and other introspectible items like memories, and universals 
he supposes we can abstract from those.18  If there were anything we can know in the required 
presuppositionless way, then we should expect to know these things in this way.   
Of course, it is in fact quite doubtful whether even introspectible items of this sort can be 
known in the way Russell supposes: it would appear that even in order to pick out a sensation that 
one has, for example, one needs to bring to bear a prior conception of a subjective history 
constituted by a sequence of distinct events.  But even if we do not press this objection for the 
moment, it is clear that Russell’s conception of acquaintance leads to very implausible consequences 
about our account of thinking.  What I have tried to show in the last few sections is that Russell’s 
conception of acquaintance is itself closely related to fundamental features of the logical atomist 
framework.  As I will suggest in what follows, an alternative account of thinking, which is not 
                                                 
17 See Evans (1982: ch. 5). 
18 Russell (1997: 47-52).  The abstractionist story about universals is given in pages 101-105. 
 19 
 
 
 committed to that framework, is both more plausible and more congenial to the project of giving an 
account of a priori knowledge. 
 
 
   
 
3. FREGE 
 
 
1.  Now, there may be ways to fix the logical atomist picture in order to avoid the problems sketched 
above.  The more recent idea of direct reference, for instance, may perhaps provide a way to cut 
through them.  Theories of direct reference weaken the characteristic Russellian principle that our 
attitudes towards propositions have a foundation in an epistemic relation between us and the 
constituents of these propositions, while retaining Russell’s conception of propositions as 
constructed out of ontological materials independent of the nature of thinking. 19  The form of 
contact with its constituents required for thinking a proposition is, on these views, not subject to the 
exceedingly strong constraints that Russell’s notion of acquaintance was.   
What I am interested in here, however, is not so much a fix of the Russellian picture, but 
rather the significantly different view Frege develops on the same issues.  According to Frege, the 
objects of thought are independent of all individual minds.  Nevertheless, this does not entail that 
being an object of thought is intelligible independently of the principles of rationality that determine 
what it is to be a thinker: the nature of the objects of thought and the nature of the act of thinking 
are not independent of each other. 
Frege’s account of thoughts — the objects of acts of thinking — as the senses of sentences 
is meant to capture precisely this idea.  In the first instance, the question that puzzled Frege had to 
                                                 
19  See, for instance Kaplan (1989).  Such views also draw on some of the themes in Kripke (1999).  In light 
of their abandonment of Russell’s strong notion of acquaintance, the relation between such views and 
Russell’s is not as close as it might be assumed.  Such views are typically developed with linguistic reference 
foremost in mind, generally addressing questions about thought less directly than Russell does.  It is, 
therefore, not always clear how they would respond to Russell’s motivation for his notion of acquaintance. 
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 do with identity sentences: how can a subject, without any failure of understanding or rationality, 
assent to “a=a” while refusing to assent to “a=b”, even though a and b are one and the same object?  
To the extent that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are genuinely referring terms, and not definite descriptions, it seems 
clear that Russell would have difficulties accommodating this case.  But it seems evident that cases 
like this must be possible, for sentences of the form “a=b” often express significant empirical 
discoveries.20  According to Frege, this phenomenon is possible just in case “a=a” and “a=b” can be 
used to express different thoughts — or, equivalently, have different senses.  Generalizing the point, 
we can say that for Frege a fundamental principle is the following (in a formulation adapted from 
Evans) :21  
The Intuitive Criterion of Difference: A thought T is different from the thought T’ if 
it is possible for someone to understand both at a given time while coherently taking 
mutually exclusive attitudes towards them, i.e. accepting one while rejecting, or being 
agnostic about, the other.  
 
Some qualifications are required.  For one thing, the criterion as stated does not address the 
possibility of thoughts that cannot be thought by one subject at the same time, but not because of 
constraints of rationality.  First-personal thoughts provide one such example for Frege.  I will not 
address such cases in this dissertation.   
Moreover, it is not in general to be expected that in each case the identity of the thought a 
subject is thinking will be transparent to her: a subject may not be in a position to recognize a 
thought as the same again on different occasions of its being occurrently present in her 
consciousness, even assuming no intervening lapses of memory, lack of attention, or other failures 
of this sort on her part.  We are often able to make much better overall sense of a subject’s total 
                                                 
20 Frege (1997b: 151).  To be precise, the question Frege asks in this essay is this: how can learning the truth 
of an identity sentence one already understands be a cognitive achievement over and above the derivation of 
a trivial consequence of the law of identity? 
21 Evans (1982: 21).  This principle is explicitly appealed to by Frege in a number of places.  See, for example, 
Frege (1997b: 156; 1997c: 332-333; d: 128).   
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 psychological state by admitting the opacity to her of the objects of some of her attitudes.22  But if 
one is in such a situation, then one might rationally hold mutually exclusive attitudes towards the 
same thought, simply because one does not know it is the same thought.  Thus ordinary 
understanding cannot in general be sufficient for our criterion, for such understanding is intuitively 
compatible with failure to re-identify a thought. 
Further, the Intuitive Criterion as here stated only offers a sufficient condition of difference, 
or, equivalently, a necessary condition of sameness.  The general shape of a necessary condition of 
difference is, I think, quite clear: one has to look into the constituent structure of thoughts, and 
require that thoughts that are distinct must differ somewhere in that structure.   
I offer some more detailed suggestions concerning these two issues in the Appendix to this 
dissertation.  What is important, for now, is that this approach to the individuation of the objects of 
thought marks a crucial difference between Frege and Russell.  For one thing, Fregean thoughts 
evidently are more finely individuated than Russellian propositions.  But this is just a symptom of an 
even deeper difference.  For Russell, as we saw, the objectivity and the non-psychological nature of 
propositions were supposed to be secured by taking them to have in general no necessary relation to 
anything mental.  For Frege this is evidently not the case: the principles of identity and distinctness 
of thoughts are intimately connected with the principles of rationality we use (together with 
pragmatic principles governing communication) in order to make sense of each other.  For him the 
objectivity and the non-psychological nature of thoughts are, rather, secured by the fact that the 
principles of rationality are not empirical generalizations, but principles concerning what it is to have 
a mind at all.  This is how he puts it, in a striking formulation: 
                                                 
22 Cf. Evans (1982: 21).  The possibility of such cases (and Frege’s apparent willingness to embrace them: see 
Frege (1979)) contradicts a thesis traditionally attributed to Frege, according to which sense is transparent, in 
being necessarily re-identifiable in just the way denied in the text.  See, for example, Dummett (1975: 131); 
Levine (1998: 433).  A notable exception is Burge (1990).  I discuss this point further in Appendix A.   
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 Logic [does not have] the task of investigating minds and the contents of 
consciousness owned by individual men.  [Its] task could perhaps be represented 
rather as the investigation of the mind; of the mind, not of minds.23 
 
It is not of course to be expected that the principles of individuation of thoughts, which are at the 
same time the principles governing “the mind”, will be immediately available to any individual 
thinker.  Perhaps some thinkers are not even capable of acquiring explicit knowledge of these 
principles.  This should not, however, detract from the basic point: the nature of mind and the 
nature of the contents of thinking are not independent of each other in the way in which they were 
for Russell. 
 This raises, now, the question of how contents, as conceived by Frege, are supposed to relate 
to the world — it raises, that is, the question of the possibility of truth and falsehood.  I discuss this 
in the next section.  In the sections that follow I discuss how the Fregean conception of content 
forms the basis for his approach to a priori knowledge. 
 
2.  Thus Fregean thoughts are individuated in a way that is sensitive to the considerations of 
rationality that guide our practice of psychological attributions.  This by itself, as we saw, is enough 
to contradict Russell’s atomistic conception of the mind-independence of propositions.  But the 
tight connection between the nature of Fregean thoughts and principles of rationality is not an 
unargued-for assumption: it is rather the product of an even more fundamental characterization of 
thoughts, as those items “for which the question of truth and falsity can arise at all”.24  This point 
needs some spelling out, because it seems on the face of it that the question of truth and falsehood, 
and the extensional logic that Frege claims provides the “laws of truth”, do not require the fineness 
of grain that the principles of individuation for thoughts provide us with.  In the context of Frege’s 
                                                 
23 Frege (1997c: 342). 
24 Frege (1997c: 327-328).  Frege says that he does not intend this as a definition of thought, that is, as a non-
circular account of what thought is.  This, as I will suggest later on in the text, is because Frege does not think 
that truth itself has a definition in this sense.  We can perhaps give an explanation of what truth is, but that 
explanation will depend on our grasp of what a thought is. 
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 logic all we are interested in is the relation of an object’s falling under a concept; thus it can make no 
difference to that logic how one refers to that object or concept.  Getting clear on what the 
connection is between Frege’s conception of thoughts as essentially truth-evaluable and the fine-
grained principle of individuation he adopts for them is quite crucial for my purposes in this chapter, 
because (as will become evident as the argument proceeds) it is here that the possibility of a priori 
knowledge begins to take shape. 
What connection is there, then, between the question of truth and the fine-grained 
distinctions that questions of rationality bring in?   
The point here is, in a nutshell, that for Frege the concept of truth belongs in a tight circle of 
concepts, including those of thought, judgment and assertion, whose relations to each other are in 
part constituted by the principles of rationality that give rise to the fineness of grain that questions 
of truth by themselves do not seem to require.  These relations are encapsulated in Frege’s 
characterization of thought as that concerning which the question of truth arises, of the act of 
judgment as the act of acknowledging a thought as true, of assertion as the manifestation of a 
judgment.25  That the concepts of thought, judgment and assertion are connected through principles 
of rationality is I think clear from the discussion in the previous section.  Nevertheless, one might 
think that truth is a different matter, since the concept of truth intuitively relates the intentional or 
the linguistic with the extra-intentional and the extra-linguistic.  In fact, insofar as the concept of 
truth bears connections to the concepts of thought, judgment and assertion it might be hoped that 
an independent account of the concept of truth would allow us to crack open the circle these 
concepts form. 
This, however, is not at all how Frege thinks of the matter: according to him, there is no 
account of the nature of truth to be given — for example, as a kind of correspondence with reality 
                                                 
25 Cf. Ricketts (1986: 71).  My discussion here is heavily indebted to this paper and to Ricketts (1996) — 
although I diverge from his interpretation in some important respects (as noted below). 
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 — other than what we get by its interrelations with the other concepts in the circle.  For Frege, any 
attempt at formulating non-circular necessary and sufficient conditions for truth — a definition, in 
Frege’s strict sense of the term — is bound to fail.  From this he concludes that “the content of the 
word true is sui generis and indefinable”.26  It is not to my purpose here to examine in detail Frege’s 
arguments for this view; I will, however, try to indicate what sorts of reasons one might have for 
holding it. 
 For Frege, as we saw, a thought is that for which the question of truth arises.  To entertain a 
thought is to consider whether things are thus-and-so.  To judge a thought is to take the thought to be 
true.  But this only means that to judge a thought is to take things to be thus-and-so.  Taking a thought 
to be true — that is, judging a thought — is not a further ‘taking’ with a thought as its subject 
matter, over and above ordinary takings whose subject-matter (for the most part) consists in the 
things around us.  This seems to be Frege’s point in the following passage: 
It is something worth thinking about that we cannot recognize a property of a thing 
without at the same time finding the thought this thing has this property to be true. […]  
It is also worth noticing that the sentence “I smell the scent of violets” has just the 
                                                 
26 Frege (1997c: 327).  This is a place where I diverge from Ricketts (1986).  According to Ricketts, the proper 
conclusion to draw from Frege’s argument (together with his conception of judgment) is that the expression 
‘is true’ is not a predicate of thoughts at all, in the sense that it does not signify a Fregean concept.  Ricketts 
focuses on Frege’s regress argument, according to which defining truth in terms of some other property or 
properties (say, as being F) would lead us to a vicious regress.  The regress gets going, according to Frege, 
because since judgment is the recognition of the truth of a thought, in order to judge that p one would first 
have to determine whether the thought that p is F.  But determining this will itself be a judgment — namely, 
the judgment that the thought that p is F.  Thus we embark on a vicious regress.   
    Now, Ricketts claims that this argument does not require the detour through being F at all: the mere 
assumption that truth is a property of thoughts ensures that judging anything will involve judging that a 
thought has a certain property, and hence will get us going on the regress.  I have no space here to explore 
this issue in the detail it deserves, but I will briefly indicate why I think Ricketts’s argument is not convincing.  
The reason is that Frege’s claim that judgment is the recognition of the truth of a thought cuts both ways.  
Thus, emphasizing one direction, it says that recognizing the truth of a thought is simply to judge that thought 
(Frege’s examples of redundant uses of ‘is true’ may be taken to illustrate precisely this point).  If this is right, 
then the supposedly distinct cognitive act of recognizing a thought as true — the act that gets us going on the 
regress — will simply collapse into judging the thought.  Thus the regress cannot get started.  This point, I 
believe, effectively blocks any attempt to analytically define truth — for then we would have to determine 
separately whether a thought has the defining properties (see the main text for a more precise formulation of 
this point) — but it does not tell against the idea that truth is a sui generis property, which we can grasp only 
through our acquaintance with the concepts of judgment, assertion, and thought. 
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 same content as the sentence “it is true that I smell the scent of violets”.  […] 
Nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth.27 
 
Frege’s claim, now, is that this would not work unless the concept of truth is given only through its 
interrelations with the notions of judgment, thought, and so forth.  If truth were to be identified 
with some independently specified property or set of properties, then it would be an open question 
whether taking a thought to be true — that is, to have this independently specified property or set of 
properties — could be just the same act as taking the things that are the subject-matter of the 
thought to be one way rather than another.  For any independently specified property, it would be 
an open question whether taking a thought to have it would simply amount to judging the thought.28 
 All this suggests that Frege has no need for coarse-grained entities such as Russellian 
propositions.  One might perhaps think that entities of that sort, built up as they are supposed to be 
from building-blocks available independently of anything pertaining to thought, would be required 
in order to explain truth.  As we saw, however, Frege does not think that truth admits of any such 
explanation.  Of course to deny that truth admits of any such explanation is not to suggest that for 
Frege thought is in any way cut off from reality.  Truth is to be understood together with concepts 
such as that of taking things to be thus-and-so, and specifically in terms of successful such takings.  
But takings are successful only if things really are as  they are taken to be.  It is, therefore, natural for 
Frege to simply identify true thoughts with facts, with what the case is.29 
                                                 
27 Frege (1997c: 328). 
28 Cf. Ricketts (1996: 77).  One might legitimately question whether this “open question” style of argument 
really blocks all candidate reductions of truth, and in particular reductions that do not purport to give an 
analysis or definition of the concept.  The question of such reductions, in the guise of a posteriori semantic 
naturalism, is very much a live issue.  A proponent of such a project may agree that truth cannot be 
understood independently of the other concepts in the circle, but still hope that all of these concepts may 
turn out to refer to a system of physical properties (perhaps via a system of higher-level functional properties).  
I agree that the open question argument does not tell against this possibility.  For Frege it was probably not in 
view at all.  Thus everything I say here is strictly independent of the question of a posteriori reduction, insofar 
as such a reduction leaves in place the conceptual connections here outlined. 
29 Frege (1997c: 342).  See also McDowell (2005: 56).  It might seem that the fineness of grain this 
identification induces in the individuation of facts is counter-intuitive: how can the fact that Afla is at least 
5000 meters high be distinct from the fact that Ateb is at least 5000 meters high?  Yet it is clear that these 
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 There is here a superficial similarity with Russell’s view of propositions: Fregean thoughts, 
just like Russellian propositions, not only are truth-evaluable, but are — if true — facts, or what the 
case is.  But the similarity is only superficial.  For Russell this result is obtained because propositions 
are complexes whose components and unity have nothing to do with the mind.  His claim that true 
propositions are facts, therefore, only serves to make problematic the accessibility of facts to mental 
acts such as judgment.  For Frege, on the contrary, the identification of true thoughts with facts is 
the result of his interlocking understanding of the concepts of thought, judgment, truth and so forth.  
Facts, as true thoughts, are individuated in accordance with principles of rationality, with the 
principles that govern the mind — although, of course, they are independent of any individual mind, 
or even of there actually being any minds at all. 
Frege’s claim that thoughts belong in a “third realm”, neither that of “things in the external 
world” nor that of “ideas”,30 is actually liable to obscure the real force of his own position here.  
Talk about a third realm distinct from that of ideas and that of things in the external world may 
suggest that the inhabitants of that realm are intermediaries of some sort, mediating our epistemic 
contact with the external world.  But it is quite clear that Fregean thoughts are not in any sense 
intermediaries: they are the things we think, and also the things that, if true, are what the case is.  
They are of course not material things, because they are things only in a sense which includes abstract 
— unwirklich — entities as well as tables and stones; but the facts about concrete things in both the 
external world and the realm of ideas are true thoughts, and so inhabitants of the third realm.31 
                                                                                                                                                             
thoughts may be distinct by Frege’s lights.  Frege does not address this issue directly, but it should be 
remembered that, for many purposes, thoughts and their constituents matter only insofar as they determine 
reference.  But since reference is coarsely individuated for Frege, it follows that for many purposes distinct but 
related thoughts — for example, thoughts related in the way that the thought that Afla is at least 5000 meters 
high is related to the thought that Ateb is at least 5000 meters high — can be lumped together.  Such lumping 
together, however, does not bring us closer to anything more “real” than the thoughts we started out with. 
30 Frege (1997c: 337). 
31 This is not to say that the “third realm” thoughts inhabit is to be identified with the realm of abstracta, such 
as redness or the number one, as suggested in Burge (1992: 300).  Thoughts are significantly different from 
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 Seeing the connection between rationality and truth in Frege’s thinking suggests that 
requirements of reason can be a perfectly adequate source of knowledge about the world.  From this 
perspective there are no grounds for denying the possibility of substantive a priori knowledge arising 
from the “laws of thought” — a view that for Russell was completely out of the question, as we saw 
above.   Russell was thus forced to adopt a quasi-perceptual epistemology of a priori knowledge: all 
he could offer on that score was an insistence that, among the things we are acquainted with, there 
are relations between concepts, and that it is this acquaintance that enables us to know non-
empirical propositions.32  On the Fregean view, on the contrary, there is in principle room for a 
quite different epistemology of the a priori: a priori knowledge can, on this view, be acquired 
through reflection on the requirements of thinking itself.  In closing this chapter I want to give an 
initial sketch of what such an epistemology of a priori knowledge might look like. 
 
3.  The most straightforward way to approach Frege’s epistemology of the a priori is through a brief 
consideration of his conception of logic.  This, in turn, requires taking account of his views on the 
structure of thoughts and of the sentences that express them. 
Fregean thoughts are individuated, one might say, from the top down, unlike Russellian 
propositions which are individuated in terms of their composition out of independently available 
                                                                                                                                                             
Fregean functions (including concepts) and abstract particulars such as the number one, precisely because 
thoughts are things that may be the case.  Redness and the number one are among the things we think about; 
what we think when we think about them are thoughts, inhabitants of the third realm.  In that respect 
functions and abstract particulars are closer to tables and stones than to Fregean thoughts, although — like 
thoughts — they lack spatiotemporal and causal properties.  (Of course we can also think thoughts about 
thoughts; but that is not what is distinctive about them.) 
    Burge does not even consider the reading I am here proposing.  He suggests a threefold classification of 
readings of Frege: one that construes Frege as an idealist who took facts to be the products of thinking, one 
that construes him as a deflationist who took metaphysical issues to be issues about language or thinking, and 
his own preferred Platonist reading (Burge (1992: 303-304)).  My reading does not fit in this classification at 
all: for, unlike the Platonist, I do claim that there is a constitutive link between thinking and fact; but, unlike 
either the idealist or Burge’s deflationist, I deny that this gives any priority, either metaphysical or analytic, to 
thinking.  In fact I believe that my reading is better suited to the rationalist epistemology Burge finds in Frege 
than his own Platonist one — although of course I cannot argue for this here. 
32 Russell (1997: 86-9).  See also the discussion of “intuitive knowledge” in chapter XI. 
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 building-blocks.  This is not to say that Fregean thoughts are not essentially complex — as I already 
suggested (and as is argued more explicitly in Appendix A), we cannot give a full account of the 
individuation of thoughts without considering their internal structure.  The crucial difference 
between Frege’s account of the composition of thoughts and Russell’s account of propositions is 
that, for Frege, the constituents of thoughts are not independent atoms, but essentially such as to 
combine in determinate ways.  In Foundations of Arithmetic — that is, before explicitly developing the 
apparatus of sense and meaning, and hence before introducing his technical notion of a thought — 
Frege announces his famous context principle: “only in a [sentence] do words really have a 
meaning”.33  It is natural to think that, once he developed his characteristic view of thoughts as the 
senses of sentences, he would have held the analogous thesis concerning thoughts and their 
constituents. 
The context principle in the first instance only seems to concern sub-sentential expressions 
and their senses.  But it should be noted that the principle should extend as well to compound 
sentences and thoughts, with other sentences or thoughts as constituents.34  This extension could 
not of course be correctly expressed by saying that sentences express thoughts only in larger 
sentences.  The point is rather that the possibilities of combination sentences or thoughts have are 
                                                 
33 Frege (1980: §60).  I have altered the translation by replacing the word ‘proposition’ by the word ‘sentence’, 
in order to avoid ambiguity.  Approaching Fregean thoughts and sub-sentential senses from the top-down 
allows us to take a charitable approach to Frege’s assimilation of sentences to complex proper names.  
Whatever the formal similarities that motivated this view, it is widely acknowledged that from a philosophical 
perspective it is a bad idea, since it obscures the deep difference between the sense of a sentence (a thought, 
capable of truth and falsity) and that of an ordinary name.  (See, for example, Dummett (1981: 196)).  
According to Ricketts (2002), this assimilation is the main confusion Wittgenstein accuses Frege of in the 
Tractatus and in the writings that precede it.  Taking the top-down approach, however, allows one to 
recognize that sentential senses — thoughts — are fundamental, since these are the points where the 
connections with both rationality and reality (via truth) are made.  The sense of sub-sentential expressions is 
to be understood as the contribution they make to the sense of the sentence.  From this perspective, 
therefore, we can restrict Frege’s assimilation of sentences to names to something like an awkwardness in his 
formalism, which does an injustice to his own thinking.   
34 In fact something stronger is true on Frege’s official view.  Construing sentences as names of truth values, 
he also construes sentential connectives as first level concept-expressions.  Thus there is in Frege’s symbolism 
no distinction corresponding to the intuitive one between atomic and compound sentences.  This is an 
awkward result of Frege’s formalism, and one that has naturally drawn fire from his readers. 
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 essential to them: it is, for example, essential to any sentence p that it can combine with any other 
sentence q in a way such that they compose a new sentence, expressing a new thought, which is true 
if and only if the thought expressed by q is true or the thought expressed by p is false.35  In the same 
way, Prior’s pseudo-connective ‘tonk’ does not represent a way thoughts can combine with each 
other.36  The laws of these combinations — the propositional part of logic — are then partly 
constitutive of Fregean thoughts.   
Similarly, the quantificational part of logic spells out some of the internal structural 
possibilities of sentences and thoughts.  The logical relations between a generalization and its 
instances, as well as those between sentences or thoughts that share sub-sentential components, 
correspond to the object/concept distinction Frege takes as fundamental in his analysis: what it is 
for a linguistic expression to stand for an object, or for a thought-component to be a mode of 
presentation of an object, is in part spelled out in the patterns of valid (truth-preserving) 
quantificational inference.  The same is true, mutatis mutandis, for Fregean concepts and predicates, 
and the thought-components corresponding to them.37 
From all this, together with the thesis that facts are simply true thoughts, it follows that if 
one has a priori knowledge of logic one thereby has a priori knowledge concerning the nature of 
things.  In that sense, then, logical knowledge is substantive knowledge.  That Frege thought so, of 
course, is evident from his writings on logicism, and especially from the way in which he presents his 
                                                 
35 Frege (1967: 13-4). 
36 ‘Tonk’ is defined in terms of its introduction and elimination rules, as follows: from P infer ‘P tonk Q’, and 
from ‘P tonk Q ’ infer Q.  It can easily be seen that there is no truth-function that can satisfy these rules. 
37 Notice that neither the claims of this paragraph nor those of the previous one provide a basis for a 
reduction of semantic or ontological notions to syntactic ones: the claims of both involve semantic 
vocabulary (in particular the notions of truth and truth-preservation).  I do not believe that Frege’s context 
principle licenses any kind of “syntactic priority thesis”, according to which semantic relations and the 
corresponding ontological categories are to be reduced in terms of syntactic categories and our responses to 
syntactically individuated bits of language.  This sort of reductive view is adopted by some neo-logicists — 
see, for example, Wright (1983).  It is hard to see how this brand of neo-logicism can respect one of Frege’s 
fundamental aims — namely, to show that logical knowledge is substantive a priori knowledge.  If truths of 
logic simply reflect the structure of our own syntactic manipulations, then logical knowledge would seem not 
to be substantive in Frege’s sense.   
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 disagreement with Kant over the fruitfulness of pure general logic.  But it remains to be seen how 
such a priori knowledge is possible.  Frege does not say very much directly concerning this question.  
He does, however, say enough for us to be able to attribute to him a quite interesting epistemology 
of the a priori. 
 First of all it is important to make the question at issue more precise.  On the one hand, 
Frege’s question — as should be expected — is not about the mechanism through which we 
recognize a priori truths.  As he puts it: 
Leaving aside logic, one can say: we are forced to make judgments by our nature and 
external circumstances, and if we make judgments, we cannot reject this law — of 
identity, for example […].  I do not wish to either dispute or endorse this view […].38 
 
How it comes about that we actually do judge in accordance with the law of identity is of no interest 
to Frege, because he takes it to be a merely psychological matter.  But neither can we take the 
question at issue here to be merely metaphysical: the question is not what makes the laws of logic 
true — if, indeed, such a question makes sense in the context of Frege’s thinking — but what 
justifies us in taking them to be true.39 
 It is important to see that on certain views of these matters, and in particular on the 
Russellian view, this question can prove extremely embarrassing.  According to Russell laws of logic 
are, in the most general sense, laws concerning relations among concepts (or “universals”, in 
Russell’s later terminology) and, accordingly, among the propositions that contain them as 
constituents.  But propositions and their constituents have no internal relation to our minds.  If this 
is so, then it seems that the way to acquire knowledge about them would have to be based on a 
contingent relation between them and our minds.  But what could that contingent relation be?  
                                                 
38 Frege (1997a: 204). 
39 Burge (1992: 312-313) gives a very clear and convincing account of this point.  Apart from the passage just 
quoted in the text, Burge discusses a passage from Frege (1980: §3) where Frege explicitly describes his 
project of showing arithmetic to be analytic as an investigation into the “ultimate ground upon which rests 
the justification for holding it to be true”.  
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 Propositions and concepts are, after all, supposed to be non-spatiotemporal, causally inert objects.  
A Platonism of this sort can only posit such a contingent relation without much hope of explaining 
its nature any further: thus Russell must simply insist that acquaintance — a relation modeled on our 
knowledge of our own sensations — also relates us to non-spatiotemporal and causally inert 
objects.40 
 Fregean thoughts and thought-components are not similarly constitutively independent of 
minds, however, and thus Frege does not have to appeal to an unexplained quasi-perceptual capacity 
to recognize a priori truths.  As we have seen, the principles of rationality (including the laws of 
logic, Frege’s main concern) are at the same time both the principles of individuation of thoughts 
and the principles with reference to which what it is to be a thinker is to be understood.  It follows 
that, to the extent that we are able to have knowledge of the structure of our own capacity for 
thinking, that is a means for acquiring knowledge of logic as well.   
More carefully, according to Frege to imagine mental activity that goes on in violation the 
laws of logic is to imagine a defective form of mindedness — “a kind of madness”, as Frege puts it 
in a famous passage: 
What if beings were even found whose laws of [thinking] directly contradicted our 
own and therefore frequently led to contrary results even in practice?  I would say: 
here we have a hitherto unknown kind of madness.41 
 
Thus the justification we have for our logical practices — for our conformity to the “laws of thought” 
— consists simply in their being the laws of thought, norms constitutive of what it is to be a thinker 
                                                 
40 Russell (1997:86-9).  Burge (1992) is motivated by a question of this sort as well. 
41 Frege (1997a: 203).  I have substituted “laws of thinking” for “laws of thought” in the translation, since it is 
clear that Frege here is talking about the process of thinking, not its object.  The passage is clearer if we 
imagine scare quotes around “laws of thinking” in the first sentence, since what Frege is saying in that passage 
is that this so-called “thinking” would not be thinking at all: it would be some sort of mental activity that fails 
to connect with thoughts. 
    This point needs to be handled with some care: even assuming classical logic to be correct, for example, it 
is not at all obvious that logicians who take themselves to be rejecting some of the principles of classical logic 
must either suffer from some form of madness, or else fail to actually reject the principles they take 
themselves to be rejecting.  I discuss this in Chapter 2. 
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 at all.  But the norms that determine what it is to be a thinker also determine the nature of thoughts, 
and therefore, by the same token, principles determining what the case is or can be.  Thus if thinkers 
as such have a capacity for recognizing the principles that their thinking is subject to (as Frege seems 
to suppose they do), then that would also be a capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. 
 
4.  This, I think, is about as much of an epistemology of basic logical knowledge as Frege has to 
offer (he has more to say about knowledge of logic as a whole, of course).  The fundamental idea is, 
I think, quite attractive.  The rest of this dissertation will be devoted to exploring approaches to the 
epistemology of the a priori that follow roughly this idea.  In closing this chapter I want to briefly 
indicate how I plan to proceed. 
For one thing, a lot more than what Frege gives us needs to be said to flesh out his 
fundamental idea into a substantive account.  At the core of Frege’s account clearly lies the 
assumption that we can recognize the principles our thinking is subject to, just in virtue of being 
subject to them.  But how exactly is that supposed to work?  If the grip the laws of thought have on 
us is just normative — and Frege gives us no grounds to assert anything other than that — then it is 
a serious question how we are supposed to find out about them.  This question will take center-stage 
in much of what follows in this dissertation. 
Moreover, and unlike Frege, my goal is to explore the prospects of an epistemology of the a 
priori in general, not just of logic.  Frege does not explicitly deal with such matters.  Nevertheless, I 
think the fundamental idea of his epistemology of logic can be extended to areas outside of logic.  
The leading idea of such an extended Fregean account of a priori knowledge is that thoughts — thus 
what may be the case — and the capacity to think are internally related to each other.  On these 
grounds, it is plausible that reflecting on one’s capacity to think can be a source of substantive 
knowledge.  In the most general case, where reflection only concerns thinking as such (as opposed 
to thinking this or that more determinate kind of thought), the resulting knowledge will have the 
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universal applicability of logic.  It is not, however, implausible to hold that more determinate kinds 
of thought will be similarly connected to more determinate kinds of constraint on our thinking.  
Thus it is not implausible that there can be substantive a priori knowledge, attainable in a way 
analogous to the one Frege envisages for logic, but which goes beyond logic. 
I attempt to sketch a more general account of the individuation of thoughts that would 
substantiate precisely this sort of generalization of Frege’s fundamental idea in an Appendix to this 
dissertation.  From the next chapter, and to the end of this dissertation, I turn to consider explicitly 
how we should go about constructing an account of a priori knowledge, within this broadly Fregean 
conception of thinking and thoughts. 
 Chapter 2 
CONCEPT-POSSESSION AND A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to what I argued in my first chapter, a Fregean account of content — “thoughts”, in 
Fregean terminology1 — makes it possible to see how an account of a priori knowledge could, in 
principle, be given.  On the Fregean account, the individuation of contents is determined by the 
norms that govern thinking.  But since thoughts are what may be the case — those items “for which 
the question of truth and falsity can arise at all”2 — knowledge about their nature is knowledge 
about the shapes reality can take.  Thus knowledge of the norms of thinking can lead to substantive 
knowledge — knowledge about what is or may be the case, and not just knowledge about how we 
happen to represent the world in thought or language.  This is the core idea of the epistemology of 
the a priori I defend in this dissertation. 
In this chapter I will begin to develop and defend my approach, although a complete picture 
will not emerge until later.  My approach to the a priori falls within the broad category of views 
Christopher Peacocke has called “moderate rationalism”.3  According to moderate rationalism, the a 
priori is to be explained in terms of the nature of conceptual thought.  This seems like a reasonable 
starting point — for, according to an alternative, “immoderate” rationalism, our capacity for a priori 
                                                 
1 In what follows, I will be using the term ‘proposition’ interchangeably with Frege’s ‘thought’, since the 
former has become the standard in contemporary debates.  But it should always be remembered that, on the 
view proposed in this dissertation, contents are understood in Fregean, rather than Russellian, manner. 
2 Frege (1997c: 327-328). 
3 Peacocke (2000: 255-8; 2004: 152-6). 
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 knowledge would have to be an optional extra, not consequent upon anything already required by 
the nature of conceptual thought.  But, unless we have an independent account of that capacity, 
what light could be shed by merely invoking it? 4   
It will be helpful to develop my approach by comparing it to that of recent writers on the a 
priori who also fall within the category of moderate rationalism.  In particular, I will argue in §2 of 
this chapter that many of the attempts to explain the a priori in terms of an account of conceptual 
thought fail, as they presuppose an account of concept-possession which is problematic and should 
be abandoned.  In §3 I will suggest a different way of thinking about concept-possession.  Although 
this different account of concept-possession can indeed serve as a starting point for an epistemology 
of the a priori, it is not the whole story; I will close by suggesting what more is needed. 
 
 
 
2.  THE ANALYTICITY STRATEGY 
 
 
1.  Let us begin by making the issue at hand more precise.  Consider, for example, how one could 
come to know a priori the law of double negation, the classical elimination rule for negation 
(assuming, for the sake of the argument, that classical logic is correct).  Consider, that is, how one 
could come to know that A follows from ~~A (where A is schematic). 
 As has been widely noted, an account of this ability that takes as its starting point one’s 
knowledge of some explicit specification of the semantics of negation — such as a truth-table, or a 
                                                 
4 As we saw in Chapter 1, Russell held such an immoderate view.  More recently, BonJour (1998) defends an 
immoderate view as well.  Understanding (or conceptual competence) is, according to Bonjour, a necessary 
condition for ‘rational insight’ (BonJour’s term for the faculty of a priori knowledge).  But it is not at all clear 
that any amount of rational insight is, conversely, required by understanding. Thus it seems that, on BonJour’s 
view, a conceptually competent subject could nevertheless suffer from blindness of rational insight.  Such 
blindness would, no doubt, be massively debilitating; but, it is not strictly incompatible with conceptual 
thought.  If this is an accurate account of BonJour’s view, then indeed it does not belong in the 
epistemological tradition discussed in this chapter. 
 36 
 
 
 Tarski-style recursive clause — is not satisfying.5  For one thing, an epistemology of the a priori 
presumably would have to explain how one comes to recognize the correctness of the Tarski-style 
clause or the truth-table, just as much as it would have to explain how one comes to recognize the 
law of double negation as a valid rule of inference.  But, perhaps even more seriously, even if we 
assume that one knows — for example — the Tarski clause for negation, in order to derive from it 
the validity of the law of double negation one would need to infer in accordance with the law of 
double negation itself.  But it is clear that that inference is not based on one’s having derived the law 
of double negation from one’s knowledge of the Tarski clause for negation.  It must be based on 
some capacity more primitive than that. 
Something along the lines of the following two-stage picture seems intuitively correct.  In the 
first stage, a subject recognizes that, for particular instances of A, the inference from ~~A to A is a 
good one.  This, I take it, is a manifestation of a distinctive ability to conform one’s thinking to the 
epistemic norms governing the relations between two belief-types: the subject recognizes that a 
commitment to ~~A would be, other things being equal, a conclusive reason to commit to A.6  
Now, in the most primitive case, this ability will be manifested in the subject’s dispositions to 
perform, expect, and assent to particular transitions in practice, rather than any explicit beliefs about 
the validity of any inferences.  Once, however, our subject becomes more articulate, and if she is 
equipped with sufficient competence in the relevant logical concepts, she can recognize that the 
validity of the inference in any particular case is due to the characteristic contribution of negation to 
a proposition.  But then, she is in a position to know that the validity of the inference depends only 
                                                 
5 See Boghossian (2000: 245-254), Peacocke (2003: 117-119). 
6 It is, perhaps, controversial on my part to put the point in terms of the rational relations between belief-
types, rather than relations between propositions.  I do not have the space to expand on this choice.  But, 
given the normative formulations that will follow, it is a natural one.  To the extent, however, that one thinks 
that propositions themselves stand in normative epistemic relations to each other, which are not simply parasitic 
on normative relations among beliefs, I think one could reformulate everything I have to say in those terms.  
(I thank Cian Dorr and Tom Ricketts for urging me to clarify this point.) 
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 on the form of the premise and of the conclusion, rather than the particular choice of A.  Thus, she 
is in a position to know the law of double negation. 
 A similar two-stage picture seems correct even in cases where norms of inference are not 
explicitly in view.  Consider, for example, how one could come to know a priori that everything 
colored is extended (assuming that this is indeed something we can know a priori).  A subject in a 
first stage recognizes that a commitment to an instance of “x is colored” is, other things being equal, 
conclusive reason for “x is extended”.  Given enough sophistication and reflection, she can 
recognize that these inferences are independent of any particular choice of x, and thereby come to 
recognize them as instances of a valid schema.  But, once our subject is in a position to know that 
the inference from “x is colored” to “x is extended” is valid for all x, she is also in a position to 
know that everything colored is extended.7 
Given this two-stage picture, the pressing question is to explain the type of knowledge 
exemplified in the first stage of our examples — to explain, for instance, how a subject can recognize 
that an instance of the law of double negation is correct, even though she is not yet able to identify it 
as an instance of a valid schema.  The idea to explore here is that this knowledge is to be explained 
                                                 
7  One feature of this account is that knowledge of a non-modal, non-normative proposition such as 
“everything colored is extended” may depend on much richer knowledge, namely knowledge of the validity 
of the inference from “x is colored” to “x is extended”.  But shouldn’t a sparer piece of knowledge be — in 
some sense — easier to acquire than a related, but richer one?  (I thank Cian Dorr from bringing this 
question to my attention.)  
On the present view, however, there is a sense in which the sparer knowledge may be easier to acquire 
than the richer one, even if the latter is epistemically more basic.  That a piece of knowledge is epistemically 
more basic does not entail that it must be more readily available to us, from a subjective point of view (for 
example, as a premise in further conscious reasoning).  Consider the following analogy.  On every occasion of 
perception, we acquire a mass of non-inferential knowledge, and, based on that, a bunch of inferential 
knowledge as well.  Now, the point to notice is that this inferential knowledge may be much more readily 
available to us than the non-inferential knowledge it derives from.  Suppose I’m attending a soccer match, 
and I see a goal being scored.  My knowledge that a goal has been scored is, no doubt, inferential, and it is 
partly based on non-inferential perceptual knowledge concerning the visual scene before me.  It is clear, 
however, that a large part of that non-inferential knowledge is nowhere near as readily available to me as my 
inferential knowledge that a goal has been scored.  In the case of a priori knowledge, just as in the case of 
perceptual knowledge, the epistemically more basic piece of knowledge may sometimes be the less readily 
available to us. 
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 in terms of the role the law of double negation has in our thinking.  Supposing that classical logic is 
correct, I take it as uncontroversial that our thinking is, in a normative sense, bound by that law.  If I 
am committed to ~~A then rationality requires either that I also be disposed to commit to A, or, if 
I have compelling reason not to commit to A, that I revise my commitment to ~~A.  Thus, the 
pressing question is to give an account of a subject’s capacity to recognize a priori particular 
instances of the norms governing her thinking. 
Now, the normative characterization of the role the law of double negation has in our 
thinking is not, by itself, going to answer that question: being normatively bound by a rule does not 
even explain a subject’s conforming to that rule, let alone her doing so because she recognizes the 
correctness of its instances.  What we need to focus on, therefore, is an account of thought that can 
answer such questions.   
 
2.  The approach I will discuss and criticize in this chapter has been proposed in different versions 
by different authors, among them George Bealer, Paul Boghossian, David Chalmers, Frank Jackson 
and Christopher Peacocke.8  The views of these authors of course differ in significant details; 
however, they all share a bunch of central commitments which constitute what I will call the 
“analyticity strategy”.  These commitments can be illustrated by considering how they would answer 
the question about our knowledge of the law of double negation left unanswered above. 
Suppose that in order to possess the concept of negation one needs to have certain 
dispositions to infer in accordance with its classical introduction and elimination rules, including the 
law of double negation.  One way in which these dispositions will manifest themselves, presumably, 
will be in our subject’s judging particular instances of inferences that follow these rules to be correct.  
Moreover, given sufficient reflection and a general background sophistication, our subject may then 
                                                 
8 Bealer (1999); Boghossian (1996, 2000, 2003); Chalmers (1996, 2002a); Jackson (2000); Peacocke (2000, 
2003, 2004).  
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 come to recognize that these inferences are correct because of their form, rather than the specific 
contents of the premises and conclusions.  She may, therefore, come to explicitly judge the law of 
double negation to be a valid rule of inference.  Since the subject’s judgments in both stages are 
expressions of her dispositions to infer in accordance with the introduction and elimination rules of 
negation, and these dispositions are constitutive of possessing the concept of negation, they deserve 
to count as knowledge. 
 There is an obvious affinity between this strategy and the idea of analyticity as it has been 
understood since Kant.  According to Kant’s definition, a subject-predicate judgment is analytic if 
the predicate-concept is “already thought in” the subject-concept.9  Of course much of the detail of 
the Kantian formulation is dated, and would not be used today.  The main idea, however, seems to 
be to delineate a class of judgments such that, if one grasps the concepts involved, then one is 
necessarily led to endorse them.  Clearly, it is the same idea that motivates the strategy under 
question here.  We can say, then, that the proposed strategy is to reduce the a priori to the analytic.10 
Although there is a lot that makes the analyticity strategy attractive, I do not think it can 
ultimately succeed.  The problem is with the account of concept-possession it presupposes.  To put 
                                                 
9 Kant (1998: A6-7/B10-11). 
10  I think the analyticity strategy fails, for reasons I will explain in what follows.  This shows only that not all 
of our a priori knowledge is analytic.  Of course possessing a concept normally does entail being in a position 
to know some trivial propositions involving the concept itself.  Possessing the concept chair entails being in a 
position to know that it applies to all and only chairs, for example (throughout, I use italics to refer to 
concepts).  Thus our knowledge of this proposition may be analytic.  But this is not the kind of a priori 
knowledge the analyticity strategy hopes to explain.  What would be interesting to explain, rather, is the 
connection between possessing the concept chair and knowing some non-trivial specification of what it is to 
be a chair, or between possessing the concept of negation and knowing its introduction and elimination rules. 
     Note that the analyticity strategy can be carried out in ways that avoid the familiar Quinean arguments 
against analyticity, which were in any case directed against a much narrower notion, characteristic of logical 
empiricism (see Quine (1935; 1954; 1980)).  The most convincing of these arguments target a metaphysical 
distinction between truths made true by the way the world is, and some other truths which are, purportedly, 
made true simply by convention or stipulation — simply because of the ways in which we decide to think or 
talk.  But there is nothing in the analyticity strategy itself that dictates such a distinction: the strategy concerns 
the way we come to know certain truths, not what makes them true.  It is, in particular, perfectly natural for a 
proponent of this strategy to insist that what makes a priori truths true is simply that their homophonic truth-
conditions obtain (see Boghossian (1996)). 
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 the point in a nutshell, in order for the strategy to work, a certain residual “individualism” or 
“internalism” about concept-possession is required.  The analyticity strategy, of course, does not 
need the extremely controversial thesis that possessing a concept in general supervenes on states 
internal to a subject.  It does, however, need the weaker thesis that possessing a concept entails a 
fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer.  But, as I will argue, even this weaker thesis is not a 
compulsory, or even plausible, requirement of concept-possession.   
 
3.  We can bring the problem out by considering how proponents of the analyticity strategy would 
interpret cases of difficult a priori disputes.11  Since, on their view, a priori knowledge is a matter of 
dispositions necessary for possessing the relevant concepts, it seems that in every such case a 
proponent of the analyticity strategy will face significant pressure to ascribe a failure to grasp the 
relevant concepts to one or the other party in the dispute.  This, however, is in many cases too 
quick.  Ascribing failure to understand the terms of a dispute to one or the other party should be a 
substantive interpretative decision, motivated — if at all — by an analysis of the details of the case 
and its historical context.  It should not be mandated by a philosophical theory of concept-
possession.   
We can make all this more precise by considering a specific example.  Take a classical logical 
theorem — for example, an instance of the law of excluded middle: the thought that it is either 
raining or not raining in Pittsburgh on April 20, 2020.  Suppose (for the sake of the argument) that 
classical logic is correct, and therefore that every instance of the law of excluded middle is true.  
Now, on this supposition, it is safe to say that if anything remotely interesting is knowable a priori, 
then any instance of the law of excluded middle is knowable a priori (excluding, if required, 
instances unthinkable by beings with our limited brain capacity).  It can, for example, be proven as a 
                                                 
11 Williamson (2006) also discusses examples of a priori disputes in a similar spirit, although Williamson’s 
argument differs from mine in significant details. 
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 theorem in a natural deduction system.  According to the analyticity strategy, adequately grasping the 
concepts of disjunction and negation must be sufficient for one to be in a position to know basic 
logical principles from which to produce or recognize a valid derivation with the law as its 
conclusion (given sufficient background knowledge, attention, and the like).  Contraposing, if one is 
not in a position to produce or recognize such a derivation, then — other things being equal — one 
lacks the classical concepts of negation and disjunction.12 
 But this is way too quick.  As is well known, there are people who reject the law of excluded 
middle (and, by implication, some or all of the principles that can be used to derive it) on 
philosophical grounds.  Since knowing a proposition requires believing it, those who reject the law 
of excluded middle do not know the law of excluded middle.  And it seems possible that one may 
not only reject the law of excluded middle, but also lack any disposition at all to come around; thus, 
one may fail to be in a position to know the law of excluded middle.  According to the analyticity 
strategy, however, it appears that this can only result from a failure to fully grasp the concepts of 
negation or disjunction.  Yet it is not at all clear that this must always be the case: on the contrary, it 
seems possible that some of those who reject the law of excluded middle may understand perfectly 
well what it is they are rejecting: they reject it precisely because they understand it.   
 An intuitionist rejecting the law of excluded middle, for example, would argue in the 
following way.  Any deductive argument for a disjunction must be an argument for one of its two 
disjuncts: we can have no proof of ‘A or B’ that is not a proof of either A or B.  But sometimes it is 
impossible for us to have any deductive argument either for a proposition or for its negation — and 
any proposition about the weather in a specific place at a specific time years in the future is a case in 
                                                 
12 One may be tempted to object here that competence in deductive reasoning does not require explicit 
knowledge of all the principles presupposed by it.  In particular, one does not need to have established the 
soundness of the rules of inference one uses in order to be able to acquire knowledge by their use.  This is 
clearly true, but my argument only requires something much weaker, namely, that such reflective logical 
knowledge, when present, can be completely accounted for by reference to capacities for deductive reasoning 
entailed by possession of the relevant logical concepts. 
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 point.  Since any deductive argument for a disjunction must be an argument for one of its disjuncts, 
it follows that we can have no argument that either it rains on April 20, 2020 or it does not.  
Arguably, the intuitionist’s argument, far from resting on a misunderstanding of the logical 
constants, trades on just their ordinary meanings for whatever power to persuade it may have.  On 
such an interpretation, intuitionists and classical logicians share the same concepts of the logical 
constants, and their disagreement lies elsewhere — perhaps in the classical logician’s insistence that 
only models that respect bivalence are admissible and the intuitionist’s failure to endorse this 
restriction, for example. 
 The point here is not to defend this interpretation against alternatives.  For all I know, the 
best way to interpret intuitionism might indeed involve the claim that intuitionists do not use the 
same concepts of the logical constants as their classical opponents.  The point is, simply, that a 
philosophical theory of content and a priori knowledge should not force the issue.  Intuitively, such 
issues should be decided by studying the history of logic and mathematics, not by a philosophical 
theory of content and a priori knowledge.  But the analyticity strategy does not seem to leave room 
for that. 
 
4.  One might protest that there is a certain sense in which the dispute just described is not 
meteorological.  There is, for example, no disagreement over how much water is pouring out of the 
sky on a certain date.  Thus, it may be claimed that the dispute must be over concepts or language, 
not over mind-independent or language-independent fact.  On these grounds, one might attempt to 
define a notion of understanding such that any dispute that fits this loose characterization will always 
involve the attribution of defective understanding. 
I think there are several things that are suspect in this line of thought; I will not, however, 
attempt to disentangle it here.  I simply want to point out that such a notion of understanding will 
beg the question in favor of the analyticity strategy, by simply stipulating that a priori error is 
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 incompatible with understanding.  This, in effect, is how Bealer’s notion of “determinate 
understanding” works.  Here is the relevant part of Bealer’s definition: 
Determinateness = the mode m of understanding such that, necessarily, for all x and 
all p understood m-ly by x: 
 
(a) p is true if it is possible for x to settle with a priori stability that p is true.13 
 
To “settle with a priori stability” on a proposition understood m-ly is to believe the proposition in 
such a way that no improvement of one’s cognitive situation or of one’s cognitive capacities can 
shake one’s belief without also changing one’s mode of understanding.14   
 Given the assumption that classical logic is correct, this definition entails that our intuitionist 
fails to determinately understand the law of excluded middle, since, as we may suppose, the 
intuitionist has settled upon her mistaken views with a priori stability.  But the conclusion to draw 
from this, I suggest, is simply that the definition is inadmissible in a debate over the validity of the 
analyticity strategy.  What we still lack is an independent argument to the effect that full 
understanding entails a fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer, not a stipulation that makes such a 
set a condition of understanding. 
 
5.  Given the difficulty of providing such a sweeping argument, a proponent of the analyticity 
strategy might concede that stable a priori error may be compatible with full understanding, while 
                                                 
13 Bealer (1999: 45).  I omitted two further conditions Bealer imposes in order to deal with a posteriori 
property identities and cases of deference.  Since our concern here is with logical concepts and subjects who 
do not defer to anyone else, these conditions are irrelevant.  Nevertheless, the kind of objection I raise in the 
text could be raised against at least the second one of them as well.  That condition in effect says that, for 
every (relevant) truth the subject is capable of believing, she must be able to believe it without thereby 
switching out of her current mode of understanding.  The modalities here are crucial.  As I have set the case 
up, there is a certain sense in which our subjects cannot believe the law of excluded middle.  If that’s the 
relevant sense of ‘can’, then our subjects satisfy this clause (which is as it should be, since their understanding 
is not deferential).  But if the ‘can’ is supposed to be weaker than that, then this clause stipulates against a 
priori error, thereby begging the question. 
14 Bealer (1999: 42).  The sorts of improvement we are here envisaging involve enhancement of memory,  
clear-headedness, or acquisition of further relevant concepts.  They cannot involve the outright acquisition of 
further propositional knowledge. 
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 attempting to mitigate the damage by appeal to a notion of implicit knowledge.  The notion of 
implicit knowledge used by philosophers is notoriously slippery, but for our purposes I think the 
following points capture a serviceable core idea: 
(i) Attributing to a subject S implicit knowledge that p must explain her mental 
state and her behavior in a way that no weaker state (e.g., mere belief or 
justified belief) could. 
(ii) If S implicitly knows that p, she need not explicitly believe that p.  What this 
means is roughly captured by the following subjunctive conditional: other 
things being equal, if asked to consider the question whether p, she might 
either not understand the question or decline to assent to p.   
 
Now, to return to our example, a proponent of the analyticity strategy might hope to help herself to 
this notion of implicit knowledge and claim that the intuitionist does, after all, know the classical 
principles from which the law of excluded middle follows — it is just that she knows them implicitly, 
rather than explicitly.  The difference between intuitionists and classical logicians is that, while a 
classical logician can make explicit her knowledge of the classical principles, an intuitionist cannot: 
her knowledge remains merely implicit, and thus it does not enable her to either give or recognize a 
proof of the law of excluded middle. 
 Such an account is clearly suggested by Peacocke (2003).  According to Peacocke, our 
understanding of many concepts, including those of the logical constants, is constituted by implicit 
knowledge of rules determining their contribution to the truth-conditions of whole thoughts.  For 
example, our understanding of the concept chair consists in our implicit knowledge that something is 
a chair if and only if it is an artifact with a seat and a back that is meant to seat no more than one 
person, and so on.  The implicit knowledge in which a subject’s understanding of a certain concept 
consists is her “implicit conception” of that concept.15 
 Implicit conceptions might seem to help with the issues raised by a priori disputes.  As long 
as there is, for example, a clear distinction at the level of implicit conceptions between possessing 
                                                 
15 Peacocke (2003: 119 and passim.). 
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 the classical concepts of the logical constants and failing to possess them, the proponents of the 
analyticity strategy may appeal to it to formulate a substantive interpretative question that is not 
forced by their account of content and a priori knowledge.16  Peacocke expresses the point as 
follows: 
Since it can be hard to make explicit the content of one’s own implicit conceptions, 
we should equally not be surprised if thinkers sometimes mischaracterize the content 
of their implicit conceptions.  A thinker’s explicit endorsement of an incorrect 
definition does not mean that he does not have an implicit conception whose 
content is the correct definition.17 
 
The intuitionist, as we have been assuming, explicitly adopts deviant rules for some logical constants.  
According to the present line of thought, however, this does not mean that she misunderstands 
them: she may have the correct (classical) implicit conceptions, simply failing to make them explicit.  
The question whether she does possess them is, then, a substantive interpretative question which is 
not forced by the analyticity strategy.   
 I believe the appearance that implicit conceptions offer a way out of the problem is an 
illusion, however.  Implicit conceptions are attributed for explanatory purposes.  Presumably, we 
would have reason to attribute a classical implicit conception to an intuitionist, if she were disposed to 
judge about particular cases in a classical way, regardless of what general principles she went on to 
endorse explicitly.  But we have no reason to believe that the intuitionist will have classical 
dispositions to judge about particular cases, and so no reason to attribute to her a classical implicit 
conception of negation.  For one thing, an intuitionist will most likely have arrived at her logical 
deviance precisely through her intuitive judgments about particular cases: she will have first found it 
wrong, for example, to judge that either Goldbach’s conjecture or its negation is true, and only then 
                                                 
16 Peacocke’s own suggestion of the content of an implicit conception for disjunction is not capable of 
distinguishing between intuitionism and classical logic (see Peacocke (2003: 119)).  However, given 
Peacocke’s account of logical knowledge, it is very pertinent to ask where, if not at the level of implicit 
conceptions, the difference between intuitionists and classical logicians will show up.   
17 Peacocke (2003: 123). 
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 adopted her deviant logic.  But even if we consider the case of a subject who came to adopt 
intuitionism directly through explicit instruction in general principles, it seems wrong to think that 
her adoption of intuitionism will not have affected her dispositions to make particular judgments.  
But if it has affected them, then again we lack any reason to attribute to her now a classical implicit 
conception of negation. 
 In the absence of any disposition to judge classically, I can see only one way to maintain that 
the intuitionist still has a classical implicit conception of negation.  This is to say that the classical 
implicit conception is the content of a subpersonal state of her reasoning system, whose effect on 
her personal-level mental activity is for various reasons systematically overridden.  This, of course, 
does not answer the request for positive reasons to attribute classical implicit conceptions to a subject 
who is not disposed to judge classically.  But we can waive this objection for a moment, because I 
think there is another important point to be made in connection with this response. 
 If this is what having an implicit conception of negation comes down to, then the implicit 
conception cannot be a source of a priori knowledge, even in cases where its effect on the subject’s 
personal-level mental activity is not overridden.  A subject’s epistemic access to the workings of her 
own subpersonal systems is epistemically no different from the access another subject — perhaps a 
cognitive psychologist who uses her as an experimental subject — has to them.  Since the latter is 
evidently a posteriori, so is the former. 
 Consider what the case would look like from the perspective of the subject.  The subject 
would find herself inclined to respond to certain kinds of input in ways that follow certain patterns, 
but she would have no access to these patterns except through inductive reasoning on the data-set 
of her own responses.  Since the implicit conception operates only at a level to which she has no 
direct access, she would have no direct access to what prompts any one of her responses, nor could 
she see any reason behind them.  Whatever rationality she might find to her responses will be 
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 retrospective, based on the patterns she inductively recognizes in them.  This, however, is no way to 
acquire a priori knowledge; it is, at most, a way to acquire empirical knowledge of one’s habits of 
thinking. 
 This point is perhaps even more relevant in cases of concepts such as chair which, unlike 
logical concepts, are frequently associated with capacities to perceptually recognize objects as 
belonging to a certain kind.  On certain views on these matters, a subject who possesses such a 
concept in virtue of having the corresponding recognitional capacity may gain a priori knowledge of 
the corresponding kind by reflection on her recognitional capacity.  In the terms employed in this 
section, the idea would be roughly as follows.  A subject has an implicit conception of the concept 
chair, for instance.  This conception guides her application of the concept in particular cases.  By 
reflecting on these particular dispositions to judge, then, the subject comes to know a priori that 
chairs are artifacts with seats and backs, and so on. 
 I do not want to deny that this might be a way to figure out what it is to be a chair.  Still, we 
need to be careful here, for although it is obviously true that a recognitional capacity must operate 
on the basis of stored information about the relevant kind, this information may be available only to 
the subject’s subpersonal perceptual systems, and not to the subject herself.  The phenomenology of 
perceptual recognition seems to support this idea: recognizing an object as belonging to a certain 
kind is coming to know it belongs to that kind, even in the absence both of an account of what it is 
to belong to that kind and of any reasonably detailed mental images of exemplars of that kind.  If 
this is the case, then the subject is not able to derive any a priori knowledge from her subpersonal 
implicit conception.  Perhaps she may still be able to derive some kind of knowledge about the 
relevant kind, by inductive reasoning on the data-set of her own dispositions to classify particular 
objects as belonging to it.  But this is not a priori knowledge of what it is to belong to that kind.  In 
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 effect, the subject is simply using herself as an instrument for the detection of instances of the kind 
in her environment. 
 We can put the problem with the appeal to implicit conceptions in the form of a dilemma.  
Implicit conceptions are either wholly subpersonal, or not.  But they cannot be wholly subpersonal if 
they are to play any role in the epistemology of a priori knowledge.  If they are not, however, then it 
is extremely implausible that an intuitionist will have classical implicit conceptions of any of the 
logical concepts that play a role in the disputed principles.  Therefore, it appears that the analyticity 
strategy still entails that the intuitionist and the classical logician cannot share the same logical 
concepts.  If, as I have been suggesting, it is bad interpretational practice to prejudge this issue on 
the basis of abstract philosophical theory, this gives us reason to doubt the analyticity strategy. 
 
6.  Throughout, I have been assuming that the dispute between classical and intuitionist logicians is a 
priori — just as the participants in the dispute take it to be.  It may be suggested, however, that the 
(seeming) intractability of the dispute, together with the lack of independent arguments that some of 
the participants must lack the relevant concepts, provides us with enough evidence to conclude that 
the dispute is not, after all, a priori.  If this were right, then the debate between intuitionists and 
classical logicians would no longer pose a threat to the analyticity strategy: it would now be possible 
to claim that both intuitionists and classical logicians possess the same dispositions to judge and 
infer, which, however, are insufficient to resolve the dispute.18 
                                                 
18 The possibility of this move was pointed out to me by John McDowell.  This move would, in effect, 
constitute a vindication of the intuitionist position.  The intuitionist claims that we have no right to assign a 
truth value to an instance of the law of excluded middle, unless we know the truth-value of its disjuncts; and 
in many cases (such as our earlier example about the weather on a particular day in Pittsburgh), this will only 
be possible on the basis of empirical evidence.  It may therefore be suggested that sound interpretational 
practice tells against this suggestion, since it tells against forcing a resolution on an apparently substantive 
debate in such a high-handed manner.  I think this is a good point; yet given the problems with the previous 
attempts to defend the analyticity strategy, the present suggestion deserves to be considered in more detail. 
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  I think the present suggestion is problematic, because it introduces an ad hoc interpretational 
principle that creates many more difficulties than it solves.  The principle that seemingly intractable 
disputes cannot be a priori is far too sweeping.  This is of course not to say that we may never in 
practice take the appearance of intractability as one kind of evidence that a certain dispute may not, 
in fact, be a priori.  The objection is only against the claim that such considerations are sufficient to 
show a dispute not to be a priori. 
   We can begin to see the problems by returning to the example of the law of excluded 
middle.  Consider an instance of the law of excluded middle ‘p v ~p’, where p is empirical, and the 
question whether this particular instance can be known a priori or not.  According to our principle it 
cannot be known a priori, since it is a thought disputed by subjects who suffer from no relevant 
misunderstanding.  Nevertheless — again according to the same principle — it cannot be known a 
priori that it is not knowable a priori, for the classical logician believes that it is knowable a priori, 
without misunderstanding any of the relevant concepts.   
 More precisely, the classical logician believes the following (for some empirical p): 
(KA) It is knowable a priori that (p v ~p). 
According to the current proposal (KA) is false, and so of course not knowable by any means.  Yet 
the classical logician need not be guilty of any misunderstanding: we have assumed she does not 
misunderstand the logical concepts, and we can also stipulate that she misunderstands none of the 
epistemic concepts involved either.  The intuitionist, on the other hand, disputes (KA), claiming that 
it is false (name this (~KA)).  We can again stipulate that the intuitionist does not misunderstand any 
relevant concepts.  Now, the true thought (~KA) is disputed by subjects none of whom 
misunderstand any of the relevant concepts.  Thus, again according to the current proposal, it is not 
knowable a priori. 
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  The conclusion generalizes to every case that shares the same structure.  This by itself should 
be uncomfortable for one who chooses to defend the analyticity strategy in this way.  Even worse, 
however, it seems that the proposal leads to incoherence.  For it seems that we do not need actual 
disputants in order to generate the conflict that forces the conclusion that the thought at issue is not 
knowable a priori.  Imagine the epistemic situation of a subject who has never had any empirical 
evidence for the existence of people who reject the law of excluded middle.  It seems possible for 
such a subject to go through the relevant reasoning in her armchair, thereby concluding that (KA) is 
false.  Such a subject may imagine a character producing the intuitionist arguments against the law of 
excluded middle, and rationally conclude that such a character need not misunderstand any logical 
concepts.  Supposing that she herself believes in classical logic, and that she does not feel persuaded 
by the imagined intuitionist’s arguments, she would reasonably conclude that the law of excluded 
middle is not knowable a priori.  Would the proponent of the present strategy then say that she 
knows that the relevant instance of the law of excluded middle is not knowable a priori?  This cannot 
be right, because then she would know (~KA) a priori: her reasoning nowhere relied on empirical 
evidence.  As we have seen, however, (~KA) is not knowable a priori.  Yet what independent 
grounds do we have to deny she knows (~KA) just in virtue of her reasoning? 
 Even if there is a way to avoid this apparent incoherence, it seems clear that adopting the 
present interpretation gets us into difficulties we could avoid, if only we took the disputed thoughts 
to be knowable a priori — just as all the parties in the dispute have taken them to be all along.  The 
present interpretation has nothing to recommend it other than that it helps shield the analyticity 
strategy from a certain objection.  It should, therefore, be rejected as ad hoc. 
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 3.  A HOLISTIC CONSTRAINT ON CONCEPT-POSSESSION 
 
 
1.  I have so far argued that the analyticity strategy fails because it presupposes an implausible view 
of concept-possession.  According to that view, possessing a concept is a matter of having a fixed 
set of dispositions to judge or infer in accordance with certain norms.  My argument was that 
principles of sound interpretation tell against this view: whether or not a subject possesses a given 
concept should be decided on the basis of an interpretation of her total cognitive state that makes 
best sense of her interactions with her physical and social environment, rather than by looking at a 
narrow segment of her psychological dispositions.  If we reject this premise of the analyticity 
strategy, there is no difficulty in accepting that whether deviant logicians share the same concepts as 
their classical opponents is a substantive interpretative question, not to be settled by a philosophical 
theory of content and a priori knowledge.  This is so even if our deviant logicians do not have 
classical dispositions to judge or infer, and therefore fail to be in a position to know some of the 
classical principles governing these connectives. 
 None of the above points is inconsistent with an explicitly normative thesis, according to 
which to possess a concept is to be subject — normatively subject — to the norms that fix its place in 
our rational economy, and thereby serve to individuate it.  In the previous chapter I suggested an 
account of Fregean thoughts that directly links the individuation of contents to the norms of 
rationality that govern the thinking of both individual thinkers and intellectual practices.  On such a 
view, the normative thesis that to possess a concept is to be subject to norms that serve to 
individuate it follows directly from the nature of content.19   
                                                 
19 It is important to note, however, that the normative thesis about concept possession can be motivated 
independently of the details of the view of content adopted here.  In general, as long as contents are 
conceived of as ways of carving up logical space (to use a familiar metaphor), they will be individuated in 
terms of their relations to each other.  To the extent that one takes contents to be structured in the 
appropriate sense, these relations will be further resolved into relations among thought-components (or 
concepts).  Moreover, it is natural to think that these relations among contents or among concepts will 
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 The crucial question, of course, is what exactly it takes for the thinking of a subject to be 
subject to the norms constitutive of a particular concept: the normative characterization of concept-
possession does not by itself take us any closer to explaining the possibility of a priori knowledge.  
In broad terms, what it takes for a subject to possess a concept is for her to participate in a 
corresponding norm-governed practice.  In the next section I will make some general remarks about 
what participating in such a practice is; in the section after that I will suggest that this approach can 
help ground an epistemology of a priori knowledge.  I will close by elaborating on some aspects of 
this idea, although the full account will have to wait for a later chapter. 
 
2.  Our starting point is that one can participate in a practice which, as a matter of normative fact, is 
bound (for example) by the classical introduction and elimination rules of negation, and therefore 
one can count as possessing the concept of negation, while lacking the disposition to conform to all 
of these rules.  This is not to deny that there are substantive conditions necessary for membership in 
a norm-governed practice; it is simply to deny the premise of the analyticity strategy, according to 
which possessing a concept entails a fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer in accordance with its 
constitutive norms.   
The spirit of a view of concept-possession along the lines that will be proposed here is 
captured by Timothy Williamson, in the following very suggestive passage: 
What binds together uses of a word by different agents or at different times into a 
common practice of using that word with a given meaning?  This is an instance of a 
more general type of question: what binds together different events into the history 
of a single complex object, whether it be a stone, a tree, a table, a person, a society, a 
tradition, or a word?  In brief, what makes a unity out of diversity?  Rarely is the 
                                                                                                                                                             
correspond to normative relations among propositional attitudes. (This is part of the point of Jackson (2000).  
Jackson somewhat spoils this good point by moving directly from the normative thesis to a thesis about what 
a subject can know in virtue of possessing the corresponding concepts.)  The logical relations between A and 
~~A, for example, correspond to the normative relations between beliefs with A and ~~A as their contents.  
The normative thesis about concept-possession above amounts just to the claim that possessing a concept 
entails being capable of propositional attitudes that stand to each other in the appropriate normative relations. 
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 answer to such questions the mutual similarity of the constituents.  Almost never is it 
some invariant feature, shared by all the constituents and somehow prior to the 
complex whole itself […].  Rather, it is the complex interrelations of the constituents, 
above all, their causal interrelations.  […]  The claim that a shared understanding of a 
word requires a shared stock of platitudes depends on the assumption that uses of a 
word by different agents or at different times can be bound together into a common 
practice of using that word with a given meaning only by an invariant core of beliefs.  
But that assumption amounts to one of the crudest and least plausible answers to the 
question of what makes a unity out of diversity.  In effect, it assumes that what 
animates a word is a soul of doctrine.20 
 
What makes it the case that a group of subjects express the same thoughts by the same form of 
words, in spite of possible disagreements — and even difficult a priori disputes between them — is 
that they all participate in a common practice of using these words with a common meaning, a 
practice which itself is constituted by the different, and often asymmetric, contributions all of its 
participants make.   
 Williamson’s passage concerns specifically words in a natural language, but it can be 
extended to the case of thoughts and concepts as well.  Our disagreeing logicians may, for all we 
have seen, all share the same concept of negation and disjunction.  The explanation, if we assume 
this to be true, would not be that they share a specific set of abilities or dispositions: it would, rather, 
be that they are all members of the same practice, drawing from its “shared stock of thoughts”, as 
Frege would say. 
 So what is the relation between the practice, conceived of as constituted by the totality of the 
dispositions of, and the interactions between, its individual members, and the norms constitutive of 
the stock of thoughts available to its members?  The case of our disagreeing logicians was rather 
exceptional in this respect, for it was assumed that it contained some members who actually had 
knowledge of the relevant norms: the introduction and elimination rules endorsed by classical 
logicians were assumed to reflect the true nature of the concepts involved.  This, however, need not 
always be the case. It is possible for a practice to be subject to certain conceptual norms, even 
                                                 
20  Williamson (2006: 45). 
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 though no members of the practice are able, on the basis of conceptual and theoretical materials 
readily available, to articulate these norms.  Peacocke discusses two alleged such examples, drawn 
from the history of mathematics (whether the examples are historically accurate or not is less 
relevant to the present point than the fact that they seem to illustrate genuine possibilities). 
 The mathematical concept of limit was explicitly defined in an adequate way only by 
Weierstrass in the 19th century; yet since the time of Newton and Leibniz, people who had no 
knowledge of this definition had been able to calculate the limits of specific sequences or functions 
in a more or less stable fashion.  Arguably, according to Peacocke’s view, some or all of these people 
were using the same concept, and were therefore committed to the same norms, even though none 
of them was in a position to articulate the content of these norms.21   
 The concept whole number arguably provides us with another example.  Peacocke suggests that 
our number-thoughts are constituted by the following set of rules: 
(1) ‘is a whole number’ is true of 0; 
(2) ‘is a whole number’ is true of the successor of anything it is true of; and  
(3) nothing falls under ‘is a whole number’ unless it can be shown to do so on the 
basis of rules (1) and (2).22 
 
Yet these rules could not have been formulated without taking into account quite recent 
mathematical developments.  The rationale for the limiting clause in rule (3), for example, would be 
unintelligible independently of the discovery that first-order axiomatic formulations of arithmetic 
can be satisfied by non-standard models, whose domain includes objects other than the natural 
numbers.  Nevertheless, present-day formulations of the rules governing the concept whole number 
                                                 
21 Peacocke (2003: 121-2).  Peacocke actually only claims that Newton and Leibniz themselves possessed the 
concept limit; but evidently the practice they initiated went on independently of them.  Of course, in 
Peacocke’s view, those who shared the concept of a limit actually did know the correct definition, implicitly. 
22 Peacocke (2003: 126). 
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 aim to capture norms arithmetical thought was subject to, even before their articulation was within 
reach. 
 According to the view proposed here, what would settle it that mathematicians throughout 
have been using the same concept of a limit or of a whole number need not be their sharing the 
same dispositions to judge or infer, or their possessing the same implicit knowledge of the correct 
definitions.  In fact, the claim that early mathematicians possessed these concepts need not entail, on 
the present view, that we can non-circularly specify anything very specific that they all shared.  The 
claim — assuming it is well-founded — may be based only on the historical continuity of the 
practice of mathematics. 
 In the discussion so far, I have been taking it for granted that there is always a determinate 
answer to the question of which concepts are operative in a practice.  But I do not think there is any 
reason to rule out from the outset the possibility of indeterminacy here.  We have, for example, by 
now discovered various non-equivalent concepts of limit.  Must it be possible to give a determinate 
answer to the question which one of these concepts was shaping the practice of mathematics and 
physics before such matters even started to become clear?  I do not think it obvious that the answer 
has to be ‘yes’ in every such case.  We are all accustomed to the idea that our thinking about the 
world is infected by vagueness; there is equally no reason to expect perfect sharpness of our thinking 
about thought.23 
 It would be a mistake to conclude from this, however, that we can never give a determinate 
answer as to what conceptual norms a practice is subject to, unless some of its members are able to 
do so too.  I think it is intuitive enough that a practice may be subject to determinate conceptual 
norms which none of the practitioners is in a position to articulate — at least so long as there are 
                                                 
23 Alternatively, one may suggest that early mathematicians determinately used one concept, which however 
was itself vague  (and thus is not to be identified with any one of the modern concepts of limit).  I have no 
reason to dispute that cases of this sort may arise as well.  Exploring such questions at the length they deserve 
simply falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 
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 other aspects of the practice that distinguish between distinct candidates.  The case of thinking 
about whole numbers seems likely to fit this description.  Even though the discovery of non-
standard models of first-order arithmetic is recent, and rules such as Peacocke’s could not have been 
formulated earlier than that, a determinate affirmative answer as to whether the non-standard 
models were ruled out by the practice of earlier mathematicians is plausible — this is why, after all, 
they were called ‘non-standard’ once discovered. 
 It may be helpful to situate my view in relation to Tyler Burge’s interpretation of certain 
relevant aspects of Frege’s notion of sense.24  According to Burge, Frege took sense not to 
supervene even on the totality of the dispositions and abilities of the entire community, specified 
non-intentionally but with the social and physical environment in view.  This is because — 
according to Burge’s account — which Fregean sense is attached to an expression in use must 
always be fully determinate, even in cases where there is nothing about the dispositions of the 
members of the community to distinguish between distinct conceptual alternatives.  On this view, 
even if there were nothing at all in the practice of mathematicians and physicists prior to the 
rigorization of analysis to distinguish between the modern concepts of limit, there would still be a 
determinate answer as to which one of these concepts was operative in that practice (of course, we 
might still not be able to know that answer).25   
 This is a strong view, and I am not sure it should be endorsed.  I think it is plausible that 
sometimes what appears to be merely an articulation of a concept already in use actually constitutes 
a genuine conceptual innovation, or at least a choice between genuinely distinct conceptual 
alternatives.  The history of mathematical thinking about limits may provide an example of this.  If 
we allow for the possibility of indeterminacy about which sense is associated with an expression in 
                                                 
24 Burge (1990).  I will not here consider the question whether Burge is right to attribute this view to Frege. 
25 On Frege’s view, of course, there are no such things as vague concepts, so the alternative envisaged in n. 23 
above is not in play at all. 
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 use we can make sense of such cases.  Moreover, if we reject the view Burge attributes to Frege, 
there is no obvious motivation to deny that sense supervenes on the totality of the abilities and 
dispositions of the community (even if it does not supervene on what any members of the 
community are in a position to articulate). 
 
3.  The questions about vagueness or indeterminacy that arise are important, but I am not going to 
consider them in this dissertation.  The rest of this chapter will focus on the possibility of 
constructing an account of a priori knowledge on the basis of a view of conceptual practices along 
the lines just sketched. 
 This view, as we saw, rejects the premise of the analyticity strategy, according to which 
possessing a concept entails a fixed set of (non-trivial) dispositions to judge or infer.   If we reject 
this premise, however, it may appear that there is no prospect of taking the nature of conceptual 
thought as the basis of an account of a priori knowledge.  This may be the conclusion Williamson 
draws from his employment of arguments from logical deviance, in some respects similar to the 
ones employed earlier in this chapter: 
The strategy […] was to reduce a question in the theory of knowledge to questions in 
the theory of thought and meaning.  If the attempt fails, as it apparently does, then 
this is more evidence for the autonomy of the theory of knowledge with respect to 
the theory of content.26 
 
Williamson does not explain exactly what he means by ‘reduction’ and ‘autonomy’.  It may, 
therefore, be unfair to take him as a representative of the line of thought I am about to reject.  In 
any case, it is not hard to imagine someone reasoning roughly as follows: 
We are looking for an account of a priori knowledge in terms of the nature of 
thinking.  Presumably, part of this account will be to show that it is no accident that, 
if one is a thinker, one is able to acquire the relevant a priori knowledge.  It follows 
that it must be shown that, necessarily, if one satisfies the conditions laid out by our 
account of thinking, one is in a position to acquire the relevant a priori knowledge.  
Yet the argument of the earlier sections, and the conclusion just drawn, show that 
                                                 
26 Williamson (2003: 47). 
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 there are no necessary entailments from concept-possession to being in a position to 
acquire non-trivial a priori knowledge.  It follows, therefore, that no explanation of a 
priori knowledge in terms of the nature of thinking is possible. 
 
I accept the claim that in order to explain a priori knowledge in terms of the nature of thinking one 
must show that the ability to acquire a priori knowledge is not an accident, given the corresponding 
account of thinking.  It is also true that, given the rejection of the analyticity strategy and the 
underlying account of concept-possession, being in a position to acquire a particular bit of a priori 
knowledge is not plausibly entailed by possessing any particular concept.  What I do not accept is 
the inference from the claim that the ability to acquire a priori knowledge is grounded in the nature 
of thinking to the requirement of necessary entailments between concept-possession and being in a 
position to acquire a priori knowledge.  I think that an epistemology of the a priori can be based on 
the nature of thought even without such entailments.   
 In fact, this claim is just an instance of a more general thesis: an explanation in terms of the 
essence or nature of a kind or a capacity does not need to consist in the derivation of necessary 
truths about all members of the kind, or all exercises of the capacity.  Such truths are not generally 
available, and, moreover, insistence on them often misrepresents the sort of explanation at issue.  
Explanations in terms of the nature of a kind or a capacity generally do not work by ruling out 
outcomes incompatible with the explanandum, but by demoting them to the status of defective, or 
abnormal, specimens. 27  The truth of this general thesis, of course, is not the issue here.  In the rest 
of this chapter I give an outline of the positive view I suggest.   
 As we saw, the analyticity strategy appears to go wrong in conceiving of concept-possession 
as a matter of possessing a fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer.  On the view proposed here, 
possessing a concept is a matter of participating in a norm-governed practice.  Rejecting the premise 
of the analyticity strategy entails that membership in such a practice does not require a fixed set of 
                                                 
27 See Thompson (1995) for more on this kind of explanation. 
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 dispositions to judge or infer in accordance with its norms.  But it does not entail that membership 
in such a practice comes cheaply: as I suggest, it is still required that a member of the practice be 
sufficiently reliable, on the whole, in conforming to enough of its norms.  The point to notice here is 
that this constraint is holistic, in the sense that it does not entail that the subject must possess any 
particular fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer.  It is, therefore, immune to the arguments 
against the analyticity strategy considered earlier. 
 This holistic constraint follows naturally from taking concept-possession to be a matter of 
participating in a norm-governed practice.  In attributing a particular content to a particular subject 
we must interpret her total mental state in such a way that it naturally embeds in the corresponding 
conceptual practice.  If the subject’s system of thinking showed no intelligible tendency to conform 
to the norms constitutive of a practice, then we could not make sense of the suggestion that she 
nevertheless is a participant in that practice.  In fact, the harder it is to interpret the subject as 
conforming to the norms of the practice, the more tenuous her claim to be a participant in it 
becomes.  Moreover, it is important to note that the constraint applies to how a subject is disposed 
to judge in future or counterfactual cases as well, and not only to her actual performances.  In order 
for a subject to be a participant in a norm-governed practice not only must she have an adequate 
actual track record, she must also be sufficiently disposed to go on conforming to the norms of the 
practice in a reasonably reliable way.  This, of course, does not mean that she cannot be misled on 
some possible occasions.  Still she must, for a sufficiently broad range of more or less normal 
conditions, be disposed to go on in the right way.28 
                                                 
28  Using the language of possible worlds, we need a notion of “normal conditions” to pick out a set of 
possible worlds in which our subject must have an adequate track record in order to count as a participant in 
the practice in the actual world.  Although this notion of normality is not mere statistical normality, it is 
nevertheless quite intuitive, and in any case it seems necessary for a modal account of pretty much any 
dispositional property. 
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  The constraint is holistic, in the sense that there need be no privileged subset of the norms 
of the practice that the subject has to get right in order to count as competent with some particular 
concept or other.  Errors in some sophisticated, difficult logical questions will not count much 
against our subject’s claim to participate in the practice, if she has a good track record in the more 
basic, simpler cases.  But mistakes even in central and basic norms of the practice may also be offset, 
if they can be explained in a larger context.  On this account, therefore, we cannot decide whether 
our disputing logicians share the same concepts or not independently of a close study of the debate 
between intuitionists and classical logicians, in its historical context.  Even assuming that classical 
logic is correct, and that the deviant logicians genuinely lack some of the classical logicians’ 
dispositions to judge or infer, it still does not follow that their deviance must be attributed to their 
lacking the classical concepts.  The question, on the present view, will need to be decided by 
considering which of the two competing interpretations makes better sense of the debate.  I cannot 
propose a definitive list of rules for resolving such questions here, but neither do I think that the 
lack of such a list renders my claim empty or obscure.  Any account of interpretation must, in any 
case, face these questions in one guise or another. 
 The crucial point for the purposes of this dissertation is that adopting this weaker, holistic 
account does not deprive us of a route to explaining how a subject may be in a position to have 
some a priori knowledge.  Consider the case of a subject who is in a position to know a priori a basic 
logical law.  There is nothing, in principle, to stop us from using the subject’s disposition to 
recognize particular instances of the introduction and elimination rules of the constants involved in 
that law to explain her knowledge of the law.  (Since the question is to explain the subject’s knowledge 
of the law — and not merely her capacity to understand it — we can assume that she has the 
appropriate dispositions.)  Suppose that the classical introduction and elimination rules are indeed 
constitutive of our practice with negation and disjunction.  Then, a subject’s reliable disposition to 
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 recognize inferences in accordance with those rules as correct can — if present — still ground her 
more sophisticated capacity to recognize the rules themselves as valid, and even to employ them in a 
proof of the law of excluded middle.  The fact that some other subject possesses the same concepts 
of negation and disjunction while lacking the appropriate dispositions (and therefore while unable to 
give or to recognize such a proof), does not disturb our subject’s claim to the proof. 
 
4.  Now, admittedly, the holistic constraint on concept-possession proposed here does not on its 
own suffice for giving a full account of our subject’s a priori knowledge.  The reason why it does 
not, however, has nothing to do with the analyticity strategy.  Although this is a point I will expand 
in Chapter 4, I will note here that the reason is simply that being reliable in conforming to a certain 
norm is not yet being able to recognize particular instances of the norm; and it is the latter ability, 
rather than the former, that is the basis of our a priori knowledge.  Even though, as we have seen, in 
the most primitive case one’s recognition of particular instances of the norms manifests itself only in 
dispositions to infer and to judge (as well as to assent to others’ judgments and inferences) in the 
appropriate ways, it is not the case that every disposition to make transitions or form beliefs that 
conform to the relevant patterns manifests any kind of a priori knowledge.  A subject may be 
reliably disposed to make transitions in accordance with the law of double negation, for example, 
but not because she recognizes such transitions as good ones: the disposition may be the result of a 
quirk in the wiring of her brain, and the subject herself may be totally in the dark as to why she is 
disposed to make transitions that follow these particular patterns.  We can even imagine a scenario 
in which she is completely mistaken about the patterns her transitions actually display.  But such 
“blind” dispositions are not sufficient to ground any kind of knowledge — or so I suggest. 
 As long as we lack an account of what it is for a disposition to judge or infer not to be blind 
in this way, therefore, we lack an account of a priori knowledge as well.  Accordingly, the final step 
in my account of a priori knowledge is an account of self-knowledge.  A discussion of self-
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knowledge, together with a fuller discussion of its role in an account of the a priori, will have to wait 
for Chapter 4.  In the next chapter I turn to consider a newly prominent version of the analyticity 
strategy — namely, the two-dimensionalist view proposed by David Chalmers and Frank Jackson. 
 Chapter 3 
TWO-DIMENSIONALISM AND THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF RECOGNITION 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
One version of the analyticity strategy that deserves special discussion — both because of its 
prominence in contemporary debate and because of the picture of the mind it embodies — is to be 
found in the writings of Frank Jackson and — especially — David Chalmers on two-
dimensionalism.  Both of these authors explicitly defend an account of conceptual thinking 
according to which possessing a concept is a matter of a subject’s being in a position to know 
through reflection alone a set of conditional propositions, which concern the concept’s application 
depending on what the world turns out to be like.1  Such knowledge is supposed to be a priori 
precisely because it depends only on the subject’s possession of the relevant concepts. 
Given its reliance on the idea that concept-possession entails knowledge of a fixed set of 
propositions, this account is of course subject to the same sorts of criticism that — according to 
what I argued in Chapter 2 — other versions of the analyticity strategy face as well.  In the present 
chapter I will not repeat the same arguments, but rather focus on the picture of concept application 
implicit in the two-dimensionalist account.  Concept-application in experience depends on the 
exercise of a variety of capacities, many of which can be grouped together under the general label 
“recognitional”: we recognize particulars as instantiating kinds, for instance, or as being identical to 
                                                 
1 The formulation used here is not accidental, but rather explicitly defended in Chalmers (2002a).  I will say 
more about this later. 
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 things we remember from past experience.  But, as I will argue, two-dimensionalism is committed to 
an implausible account of recognition.2 
 
 
 
 
2. THE TWO-DIMENSIONALIST PICTURE OF CONCEPTUAL THOUGHT 
 
 
1.  The two-dimensionalist account is supposed to apply, with appropriate modifications, both at the 
level of thought and at the level of language.  I will only focus on the case of thought here.3  
According to two-dimensionalism, to possess a concept C is to know, or to be in a position to know 
by reflection alone, what I will call its set of application-conditionals — that is, a set of material 
conditionals of the following form: 
D→E(C)  
Here D is supposed to be a variable ranging over exhaustive descriptions of what — given all we 
know independently of experience — the actual world may turn out to be like, and E(C) a 
specification of C’s extension, on the hypothesis that D is true of the actual world.  Given the set of 
world-descriptions W, to every concept corresponds a set of application-conditionals, each of which 
has as its antecedent a member of W and as its consequent a specification of what, if anything, the 
concept applies to under the supposition that the actual world turns out to conform to the 
description in the antecedent. 
                                                 
2 Much work on two-dimensionalism has been published recently.  What follows has points of contact with 
some of it, particularly with Yablo (2002).  I will elaborate on this later on in the chapter. 
3 A note about terminology is in order here.  According to Chalmers’s usage, the term ‘concept’ applies to 
mental representations, that is, mental particulars with semantic properties analogous to those of words (see 
Chalmers (2002c: 3)).  This is somewhat surprising, since on Chalmers’s Fregean view it would be more 
natural to take concepts to be non-mental, abstract entities.  What could be considered as mental is the state 
of grasping a concept; but then, that is most naturally construed as general rather than particular, since it is a 
state many different subjects can be in at many different times.  In what follows I will use the term ‘concept’ 
to refer not to mental particulars, but rather to components of thoughts that can be shared by many subjects. 
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 Continuing in the same spirit, we can define for every concept its “epistemic” (or “primary”) 
intension.4  The epistemic intension of a concept C is a partially defined function from W, such that 
for any D — a member of W — on which it is defined, its value is the extension determined by C’s 
application-conditional with D as its antecedent.  The epistemic intension of a concept should be 
distinguished from its “counterfactual” or “secondary” intension.  The counterfactual intension is 
defined in the way familiar from ordinary (one-dimensional) modal semantics, and determines what 
the concept applies to in counterfactual situations.  Thus, to take a standard example, the 
counterfactual or secondary intension of water is a constant function, whose value is the same stuff 
— H2O — in every world where it is defined (throughout, I use italics to refer to concepts).  By 
contrast, since (for example) we cannot a priori exclude the possibility that it may turn out that there 
is actually no such stuff as H2O, the value of the epistemic or primary intension of water is not always 
H2O.  There are ways the world (the actual world) may turn out to be on which the stuff the concept 
water applies to is not H2O. 
Grasping a concept, knowing or being in a position to know its application-conditionals, and 
grasping its epistemic intension are supposed to be the same state, according to the two-
dimensionalist picture. 
Of course no actual subject is capable of entertaining anything like the exhaustive 
description of the actual world that D purports to be, let alone evaluating any conditional with D as 
its antecedent.  The two-dimensionalist’s claim, therefore, must be not that a subject possessing C 
actually knows any such conditionals (since knowledge intuitively entails understanding), but rather 
something like the following counterfactual: just in virtue of possessing a concept C, a subject 
                                                 
4 My identification of primary and epistemic intensions here follows Chalmers (2006).  In earlier work 
Chalmers took the identity to be something of an open question, to be established by argument (see Chalmers 
(2002a, 166-7)). 
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 possesses all that would be required in order for her to know the corresponding application-
conditionals, if it were not for limitations of memory, computational speed, life-span and the like. 
Now, if D is allowed to involve any concepts we like, then the two-dimensionalist’s claim 
will be rather uncontroversial.  This is because in the absence of any restrictions on the concepts we 
are allowed to draw upon, we can always employ C itself; and in this case, the application-
conditionals will be no more informative than a homophonic specification of C’s satisfaction-
conditions.  But it is relatively uncontroversial that a subject who is minimally reflective, and 
possesses the intentional concepts required to formulate homophonic satisfaction-conditions, will 
normally be in a position to know such conditions for any concept she possesses.  If the two-
dimensionalist claim is to be interesting, therefore, restrictions must be imposed on the concepts D 
is allowed to involve.  At a minimum, we must not be allowed to use C itself, or concepts too closely 
related to it, in the formulation of D.  Chalmers imposes much tighter restrictions, claiming that the 
vocabulary of fundamental physics (or some future refinement thereof), together with purely 
phenomenal concepts, suffice for the formulation of application-conditionals for all of our 
concepts.5  This is obviously an extremely controversial thesis, and I will not be concerned with it in 
this chapter.  I will remain agnostic as to what exactly is allowed in D, requiring only that 
application-conditionals must be more informative than the corresponding homophonic 
satisfaction-conditions.6 
 For present purposes, at least, what is most interesting about this account of concept-
possession are its implications for the epistemology of a priori knowledge.  As we already saw, 
according to this picture possessing a concept C entails being in possession of everything required to 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Chalmers (2001).  Of course two-dimensionalism must offer a different account of what it 
is to possess the concepts included in the basic vocabulary — perhaps by allowing homophonic application-
conditionals for these concepts. 
6 Another requirement is that application-conditionals must use only “semantically neutral” vocabulary — 
they must not, in other words, employ any terms whose content depends on which world is treated as actual 
(see, for example, Chalmers (2002a: 166), Chalmers (2002b: 17, fn 5)). 
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 know its application-conditionals by reflection alone.  Of course we cannot know these conditionals, 
since we are not in a position to entertain the exhaustive world-descriptions in their antecedents.  
Nevertheless, it seems very plausible that this capacity can put us in a position to know a priori a lot 
of more restricted, but still non-trivial propositions: we can, for example, presumably know a priori 
— just on the basis of our possession of the concept water — that the clear, potable stuff that fills 
lakes and rivers is water. 
 
2.  It is clear that two-dimensionalism is committed to a kind of individualism (or internalism) about 
conceptual thought.  Possessing a concept, according to two-dimensionalism, is a matter of 
capacities which are constitutively independent of one’s relations to a physical or social 
environment.  This, as I will suggest, is what is wrong with the view. 
 Two-dimensionalism of course concedes something to externalism, by granting that the 
counterfactual intension of many of our concepts is constant, with its value fixed by the subject’s 
relations to her environment (since it is, as we saw, fixed by the concept’s extension in the actual 
world).  This entails that conditions specifiable at the level of an individual subject will not, in 
general, be sufficient for concept-possession.  A subject who has lived all her life on Putnam’s Twin 
Earth (thus lacking all direct or indirect causal contact with H2O), for example, cannot express the 
same concept by her word ‘water’ as we do, even though all her individualistically specifiable 
dispositions may match those of a subject on Earth.7 
 This concession, however, does not substantially alter the individualistic character of the 
account.  We should remember that possessing a concept is not a matter that directly involves its 
counterfactual intension — it is a matter of knowing, or being in a position to know, its application 
conditionals.  Of course, to the extent that a concept is used — as opposed to merely mentioned — 
in its application-conditionals, a subject’s being in a position to know a specific set of conditionals 
                                                 
7 See Putnam (1975). 
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 implicitly settles which world-description in W is true of the world that is actual for her — it settles, 
in other words, which world is the actual actual world for that subject.  A subject living on Twin 
Earth, for example, is not in a position to know any propositions involving the concept water; a 
fortiori, she is not in a position to know its application-conditionals.  The crucial point, however, is 
that the capacity a subject on Earth would manifest in endorsing — and thereby coming to know — 
the application-conditionals of water, is just the same capacity that a subject on Twin Earth would 
manifest in endorsing the application-conditionals of her concept.  That capacity is the capacity to 
pick out, for each possible world-description, the value of the epistemic intension of one’s concept 
on the hypothesis that it is true of the actual world.  Since the epistemic intension of water is just the 
same as the epistemic intension of the concept they express on Twin Earth by their word ‘water’, 
what it takes for a subject to possess the concept water is just the same as what it takes for a subject 
to possess the Twin Earth concept. 
 The concession, therefore, does not change the fact that possessing a concept is, according 
to two-dimensionalism, a matter of dispositions or capacities constitutively independent of one’s 
environment.  This is the aspect of the view I will be criticizing here. 
 Now, one may wonder whether any fixed set of non-trivially specifiable cognitive capacities 
— over and above, that is, the capacity to think thoughts involving the concept in question, and 
perhaps to know its homophonic satisfaction-conditions — are entailed by possession of any 
particular concept.  This is the objection to the analyticity strategy I raised in Chapter 2, and it 
obviously appears damaging to the two-dimensionalist view.  I do not, however, intend to repeat this 
particular objection in the present chapter.  On the contrary, let us concede for the sake of the 
argument that there is a significant class of concepts possession of which is associated with some 
distinctive, non-trivially specifiable cognitive capacities — even if the association is looser than what 
proponents of the analyticity strategy typically suppose.   
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  It is surely the point of many (though by no means of all) of our concepts that they pick out, 
and thus enable us to classify, things we encounter in our everyday experience.  Concepts otherwise 
very different from each other — such as yellow, round, mountain, cat or chair — all seem to serve such 
a function.8  It is natural to think that, for a certain notion of normality, possessing these concepts is 
normally — even if not always or necessarily —associated with a capacity to correctly apply them in 
the course of one’s experience.  We should expect — and, intuitively, we do expect — that a subject 
who possesses the concept yellow will, under favorable conditions, be able to classify yellow things as 
yellow by sight, and that a subject who possesses the concept mountain will be able to classify 
mountains as mountains, given appropriate information.  Finding a place for this natural thought in 
a plausible account of conceptual thought is, as we have seen, much trickier than proponents of the 
analyticity strategy suppose.  Nevertheless, for the purposes of this chapter, I am going to make the 
assumption that there are some concepts possession of which normally entails a capacity to pick out 
their extension.  My argument will be that two-dimensionalism still needs a very implausible 
conception of such capacities. 
 
 
 
 
3. RECOGNITION AND INFERENCE 
 
 
1.  Consider a concept of this recognitional sort — for example, the concept water.  Combining the 
points of the last section with the two-dimensionalist picture, we get the claim that possession of the 
concept water normally entails having all that one would need to be in a position to know its 
application-conditionals through reflection alone (contingent limitations aside — from now on I will 
avoid explicitly mentioning this qualification). 
                                                 
8 The class of concepts that do not — or do not primarily — serve this function is very diverse, of course.  It 
includes, for example, normative concepts and logical concepts. 
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  Now, in order for this claim to be even remotely plausible, we would need first to exclude 
cases where possession of the concept intuitively does not involve a reliable disposition to correctly 
apply the concept.  We must, therefore, exclude subjects whose grasp of the concept is deferential, 
or who adhere to confused but consistent and not easily refutable theories about water, and the like.  
Assuming this to be possible, the most plausible candidate for a capacity normally entailed by 
possession of the concept is the capacity to recognize water by its manifest qualities in conditions 
ordinary for us — that is, the ability to recognize as water liquid water, snow, ice, steam and the like, 
at least in ordinary environments.  Thus the two-dimensionalist claim must be that possessing this 
recognitional capacity entails being in a position to know the relevant application-conditionals 
through reflection alone. 
 How plausible is this claim?  Clearly, the assumption that a subject possessing the concept 
water normally has the relevant recognitional capacity entails that, given a suitable form of access to a 
world or world-description, she will be able to pick out the water in it.  This, however, is a 
conditional claim about what the subject will be in a position to do or know under certain specified 
conditions.  By itself, it as yet tells us nothing about whether the subject is in a position to know the 
corresponding application-conditional at all, let alone know it by reflection alone.  In order to assess 
this latter claim we need to be more precise about what we take the relevant recognitional capacity 
to consist in. 
 In the following couple of sections I will discuss an account of recognition which, if true, 
would support the two-dimensionalist claim (or at least a reasonable reformulation thereof).  I will 
begin with a rather crude version of the account, which I will subsequently refine.  Still, I believe 
that this whole approach to recognition is very implausible, and in fact evinces a commitment to a 
very unattractive picture of concept-application.  After arguing against it in §3.3, I will sketch an 
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 alternative account of recognition (in §3.4).  That account has no tendency at all to support the two-
dimensionalist claim. 
 
2.  Here is a crude picture of recognition, which nevertheless straightforwardly supports the two-
dimensionalist claim.  To recognize water in a given world-description is, on this picture, a matter of 
discursive reasoning.9  Given the relevant world-description D, our subject brings to mind a 
specification stored in memory of what water is like, couched in the same vocabulary as D.  She then 
goes through D with this specification in mind, figuring out what, if anything, it applies to.  
Accordingly, to have a capacity to recognize water would consist precisely in having stored in 
memory a specification of what water is like, which can be recalled and compared with an 
appropriately described situation (in the case where the situation is directly experienced we can 
assume that recognition will work on an appropriately formulated description derived from the 
experience).10 
 It is clear that on this inferentialist picture the recognitional capacity is also a capacity to 
know the relevant application-conditionals.  In fact, on this picture there is no real difference 
                                                 
9 I use the term “discursive reasoning” for reasoning that can be represented in words, regardless of whether 
the subject who engages in it consciously goes through some kind of internal monologue or not.  I take it as 
obvious that not all reasoning is discursive in this sense.  When considering how to get a large sofa down a 
narrow stairwell, for example, I am definitely engaged in a process of reasoning.  But it is clear that I do not 
need to have any knowledge of the geometrical theory that would be required to formulate and solve this 
problem in a language.  My reasoning, therefore, is not discursive in the present sense. 
10 This account (as well as the refinement of it I will discuss shortly) suffers from an obvious difficulty, which 
for reasons of simplicity I will ignore.  No specification involving only the qualitative properties of water can 
capture the required recognitional capacity, because no such specification discriminates between water and 
twin-water (a substance found only on Twin Earth, a distant but actual planet).  But, intuitively, if a person 
from Earth calls twin-water ‘water’, she has not recognized twin-water as water: she has, rather, made a 
mistake.  Her recognitional capacity has misfired in this case.  The problem is that on the present account no 
mistake can be found in her performance, since she has correctly judged that her specification applies to twin-
water.   
      What we need seems to be a requirement that the object picked out be the one the subject has actually 
interacted with in the past, and from which the stored specification derives.  So the specification would end 
up looking like this (where S is supposed to be a specification involving only qualitative properties): “the x 
such that: (x is S & my past interactions with x are the source of S)”.  These complications will be ignored in 
the text, since there are more fundamental problems facing the proposed account. 
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 between recognizing water and reasoning by modus ponens from the appropriate application-
conditional and world-description.  This crude inferentialism about recognition, of course, is not 
often explicitly defended: it is extremely implausible — just on plain phenomenological grounds — 
that recognition must be a matter of discursive reasoning.  We usually don’t know accurate enough 
discursive specifications of the things we are able to recognize, and, even in the exceptional cases 
where we do, we certainly do not seem to use them in the way this account supposes.  But even if 
the crude account fails, a more refined version of the same idea might still seem tempting. 
 Recognition is, obviously, driven by the way something looks (or, more generally, the way it 
appears to our senses).  This might make it seem that recognition must be a matter of comparing a 
specification stored in memory with what is currently before one’s senses.  If the crude picture is 
misleading, therefore, one might suggest that the reason is that it assumes that the stored 
specification must be discursive.  But this assumption is not compulsory: the stored specification 
might be something more like a mental image which the subject cannot fully put into words, for 
example. 
 How would this admission affect the two-dimensionalist claim that possessing the 
recognitional capacity puts a subject in a position to know the relevant application-conditionals 
through reflection alone?  Unless the claim is reformulated in some way, it would seem that such an 
admission would undermine it.  As Steven Yablo points out, a lot of our concepts — our 
“observational concepts”, as he collectively calls them — require for their application an exercise of 
our sensible capacities.  Even in cases where the application is only hypothetical — cases in which 
we are trying to work out what the concept would apply to, on the hypothesis that such-and-such 
turns out to be the case — we need an “offline”, imaginative exercise of our sensibility.11 
                                                 
11 Yablo (2002: 441-92). 
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  One of the cases Yablo discusses in detail is that of a certain family of oval figures, called 
“Cassinis”.12  The shapes can be defined algebraically as the sets of points on the Cartesian plane 
satisfying equations of a certain form.  But, as Yablo points out, knowing its algebraic equation is 
not enough to know that a Cassini is oval: the only way to know that is to actually plot the figure, 
either in one’s imagination or on a piece of paper.  But neither of these methods, according to 
Yablo, qualifies as knowledge through reflection alone.  Knowing that Cassinis are oval, as he puts 
it, requires “peeking”.  Thus, even if it is true that a subject who possesses the concept oval (and the 
relevant mathematical sophistication) is in a position to know the conditional “if something is 
Cassini-shaped, then it is oval”, she is not in a position to know it through reflection alone.   
 This argument is convincing as far as it goes, but it doesn’t go far enough.  There is no deep 
reason, I think, why an inferentialist about recognition cannot build “peeking” into her account.13  
More generally, one could state the inferentialist view in a way that avoids commitment to any 
particular account of how the relevant specification is stored and compared to what is currently 
before one’s senses.   
 What the refined inferentialist account should require is just the following.  Suppose that, in 
a specific experiential context, one knows a proposition by recognition (this proposition might be an 
identity proposition, such as “this is Fred”, or a proposition subsuming something under a kind-
concept, such as “this is oval” — where “this” is a perceptual demonstrative).  Then, one’s grounds 
for that knowledge must consist in the cogency of an argument, whose premises include: (i) a 
formulation in the appropriate phenomenal vocabulary of a specification stored in the subject’s 
memory, and (ii) a description of her current experience, formulated in the same phenomenal 
vocabulary.   
                                                 
12 Yablo (2002: 467-9).  As Yablo notes, not all Cassinis turn out to be oval; but, like Yablo, I ignore the point 
here. 
13 This would seem to be Chalmers’s own response: “given the phenomenal information […] about 
appearances (in a pure phenomenal vocabulary) ‘peeking’ comes for free”. See Chalmers (2002a: 185). 
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  The crucial point here is that, in order for the grounds of one’s recognitional knowledge to 
consist in the cogency of this argument, one need not actually arrive at the knowledge by thinking 
through the argument itself.  Of course, in order for the inferentialist account to be true, recognition 
should involve on the part of the subject some form of ability to reason on the basis of her stored 
specification and her current experience to the recognitional proposition.  However, the details of 
any particular process of recognition need not be relevant to the truth of the inferentialist account, 
as long as an argument of the above form captures its epistemic thrust.  If this is correct, then two-
dimensionalism should also be allowed to help itself to the same unspecified sort of process as the 
relevant way of coming to know the application-conditionals of one’s concepts.  As Chalmers puts 
it, peeking may come for free. 
 Nevertheless, as I will argue in the next section, we have reason to reject even this refined 
account: recognition is not to be construed as a matter of inference at all.  To recognize an object is 
to non-inferentially identify an object presented to one with an object one has encountered in the 
past.  To recognize an instance of a kind — such as oval or water — is, analogously, to non-
inferentially identify something in one’s environment as an instance of that kind.  If this is right, 
then recognitional capacities offer no support to the two-dimensionalist claim, even in its more 
relaxed version.14 
 
3.  Consider again the case of the concept oval.  I take it that oval is what we may call a “manifest 
shape” concept.  It is a concept that picks out certain geometrical shapes, but it does so in virtue of a 
correlation with the way they appear to us.  Thus oval is not to be identified with any concept 
formulated in exclusively mathematical terms (and not just because of vagueness).  Suppose, now, 
                                                 
14 Even though Yablo does not distinguish between inferentialist and non-inferentialist accounts of 
recognition, some of the things he says suggest he has a non-inferentialist account of recognition in mind.  
See, primarily, the argument in Yablo (2002: 473-4; also 464-5).  If his intention is indeed to argue against the 
inferentialist conception of recognition or concept-application in general, then his argument about peeking is 
not sufficient. 
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 that possessing the concept oval consists in having the capacity to recognize oval-shaped things as 
such, and that recognition is conceived inferentially — recognizing something, that is, is a matter of 
matching its current appearance with a stored specification.  Now, we can certainly imagine world-
descriptions in which, for whatever reason, some things whose contours approximately satisfy circle 
equations systematically appear oval to us.  We may suppose, along with Yablo, that a world-
description in which dimes appear oval to us is true of the actual world.  Would that be a case in 
which dimes turn out to be oval, instead of round? 
 It seems clear that it would not: the existence of such a glitch in our visual system should, 
intuitively, have no effect on the manifest shape of dimes.  Whether dimes are oval or round 
depends only on their geometrical properties.  If we accept the inferentialist account of recognition, 
however, it seems that we have to deny that.  Since recognition is a matter of the fit between a 
stored specification and an appearance, on the hypothesis that the way dimes actually appear 
matches the specification, they are genuinely recognized as oval.  Given the factiveness of recognition, 
dimes turn out to be oval. 
 Conversely, if we make the supposition that some oval-shaped things — for example, the 
dining-room table — do not look oval in the actual world, should we say that on that supposition 
they turn out not to be oval?  Again, that seems false: in order for the table not to be oval it has to 
have different geometrical properties; it’s not enough that the way it looks to us be different.  Just as 
before, however, if recognizing something as oval consists in matching a specification with an 
appearance, we have to wonder whether we can avoid the conclusion that the table turns out not to 
be oval. 15 
                                                 
15 On this point, I have encountered the objection that, whatever capacity a subject has to recognize manifest 
shapes (and oval among them), it is retained when she considers other hypothetical scenarios as actual.  Thus, 
it is objected, when the subject considers the specified hypothesis as actual, she can tell that dimes are round 
and not oval, and accordingly she can discount her appearances on that supposition as misleading.  As a point 
about the evaluation of conditional claims of the relevant form this appears to be all right: after all, we do 
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  This might not be a problem if the subject had other resources, additional to her perceptual 
appearances and her stored specification, sufficient to rule out the false positives or negatives on the 
relevant hypotheses.  I do not think the resources two-dimensionalism allows are in general 
sufficient for that, however.  Consider how this would be supposed to work in the first of the above 
examples.  In this case, the issue is to rule out the result that our subject recognizes something as 
oval when it is not, in fact, oval.  Our subject has in her possession, we are supposing, a complete — 
matters of manifest shape aside — description of the world, including both the geometrical 
properties of things, and how shapes appear to her and to others.  Could some of this collateral 
information tip her off that, despite the match between her appearance and the stored specification, 
she should not apply the concept oval to dimes?   
 If the distortion affects only a small subset of our subject’s appearances (perhaps only 
approximately dime-shaped round things tend to appear as oval to her) then that very fact might 
alert her that something is going wrong.  The subject, we may assume, knows that whether oval 
applies to an object or not depends only on its geometrical properties; since she knows that the 
geometry of dimes is similar to that of other things that appear to her round rather than oval, she 
might reason that her dime-appearances are distorted.  Thus she would withhold her application of 
oval to dimes.  Even if all of our subject’s shape-appearances are systematically distorted, she might 
                                                                                                                                                             
intuitively judge that dimes are not oval on the relevant hypothesis.  Nevertheless, the question here is to 
account for our ability to apply the concept oval, whether hypothetically or not (and thus also for our ability to 
evaluate the relevant conditionals).  This is precisely the feature of two-dimensionalism we are in the process 
of evaluating.  We cannot, therefore, simply assume that the ability to correctly apply the concept oval carries 
over to the hypothetical scenario.  Instead, we must examine whether the resources available to two-
dimensionalism really do amount to a capacity to correctly apply the concept hypothetically. 
     The point may be illustrated by considering a simple attempt to capture the epistemic intension of oval by a 
description.  Consider the following biconditional: ‘x is oval if and only if x looks oval in the actual world (to 
normal subjects and in normal conditions)’.  Such a biconditional seems to be in the spirit of two-
dimensionalism (general doubts about the coherence of introducing concepts by means of such 
biconditionals are not relevant here).  This biconditional makes it clear that, on the hypothesis that dimes 
normally look oval in the actual world, dimes are oval.  The analogous result might be right for so-called 
“response dependent” concepts, such as the concept cool (as in “cool haircut”, not “cool weather”).  But, 
intuitively, such concepts lack a kind of objectivity that concepts of manifest shape possess. 
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 still be able to reason her way out of the problem as long as we assume that the distortion is 
statistically abnormal among her peers. 
 Consider, however, how things would be if we assumed instead that the glitch has a 
systematic effect on all of a statistically normal subject’s visual perceptions.  The way dimes appear 
to our subject in this case is not statistically abnormal at all: this is just how one would expect dimes 
to look to our subject, given how everything else looks both to her and to her peers.  Now, what 
could tip our subject off that her dime-experience is not veridical?  In order for our subject to figure 
this out, she must be capable of figuring out how dimes ought to appear.  But how could she do such 
a thing?  By hypothesis, actual appearances are not going to be of any help: as we have assumed, the 
way things appear to her is systematically distorted, so that round things appear to her oval instead 
of round.  But neither would her otherwise complete description of the world suffice.  For one 
thing, the description of the world available to her must be free of manifest shape concepts 
(otherwise the two-dimensionalist claim we are evaluating becomes trivial).  But neither can she rely 
on the appearances of her peers, since they are — as we are assuming — systematically distorted in 
just the same way as her own.  Since neither her appearances nor the description of the world she is 
considering can be of any help, our subject has no resources that would suffice for her to figure out 
that her dime-experiences are not veridical.   
   
4.  The kind of difficulty discussed in the last section does not depend on the specific features of the 
examples employed.  It rather results from some central features of the two-dimensionalist position.  
In the next paragraph I will describe where I think the problems stem from.  I will then suggest a 
different view of recognition, which avoids such difficulties. 
 The concepts I have been concerned with are associated with recognitional capacities.  
Given such a concept, it is always an a posteriori matter what (if anything) is in its extension — 
what, if anything, it applies to in the actual actual world.  That is not something that can be settled by 
 78 
 
 
 reflection alone.  This, I take it, is uncontroversial.  According to two-dimensionalism, however, this 
further implies that the connection between the recognitional capacity and the concept’s extension is 
not constitutive, but only contingent.  This follows from the fact that, when determining the 
epistemic intension of a concept, the only things we are supposed to hold fixed across every possible 
world-description are those that can be settled by reflection alone.  If, however, the recognitional 
capacity were constitutively linked to an extension, then that link, even though not knowable by 
reflection alone, would settle the value of the concept’s epistemic intension for every world-
description.  This, I suggest, is why two-dimensionalism requires an inferentialist account of 
recognition.  (In §3.5 I will provide an additional argument, to the effect that two-dimensionalism 
cannot shed this commitment.)  On this account, recognition consists in matching a specification 
stored in one’s memory with one’s current appearances.  Since it is surely contingent which things 
cause appearances that match the specification, the contingency two-dimensionalism requires is 
thereby secured.  But this is also just what leads to the unacceptable results of the last section. 
 Accordingly, the problems are avoided if recognition is not a matter of matching a stored 
specification with an appearance.16  Denying the inferentialist model of recognition does not amount 
to denying the obvious fact that recognition is driven by the way an object appears to us, and 
therefore that it requires information about the object’s appearance to be stored in us in some way.  
The point is simply that the process by means of which the stored specification is compared to the 
present experience is not to be construed as having the epistemic structure of an inference.  This 
process may be, for all that the phenomenology of recognition requires, just a sub-personal, neural 
process, not to be construed as a cognitive act of the subject herself at all. 
                                                 
16 Strictly speaking, denying inferentialism is not the only way to avoid the problems of §3.3.  There seems to 
be room for an externally constrained inferentialism, according to which what oval applies to is held constant, 
even though recognition still operates inferentially (the possibility of this hybrid view was suggested to me by 
John McDowell).  This view is still not acceptable to two-dimensionalists for just the reasons explained in the 
text: it requires us to hold fixed something that is not knowable by reflection alone. 
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 So what would the non-inferentialist account of recognition look like?  Consider first the 
case of recognition of a particular object o.  According to the present account, recognizing o in one’s 
perceptual environment is to non-inferentially know a proposition of the form “this is o” (where 
‘this’ is an appropriate perceptual demonstrative mode of presentation of o).17  To have a capacity to 
recognize o will, accordingly, be to be able to non-inferentially know that o is identical to an object in 
one’s perceptual environment, if it is presented to one under an appropriate appearance.   
One thing to immediately note is that, on this view, recognitional knowledge does not 
depend on attributing any particular appearance to o.  For all that the present account requires, the 
subject need not be able to think of the way o appears at all, except perhaps by using the very same 
perceptual demonstrative — as in “o looks like this”.  One derives propositions about how o appears 
from one’s recognitional knowledge, rather than the other way round.  (On the other hand, the 
specification of a recognitional capacity must make reference to a specific appearance.  This reflects 
the intuition that, for example, two people who have known Fred in two completely different 
periods of his life — perhaps one knew him as a young child and the other as an old man — will 
have distinct recognitional capacities with respect to the same person.) 
The case of recognition of kinds can be treated in an exactly parallel fashion.  Suppose that 
‘this’ expresses a demonstrative mode of presentation of an item in one’s present perceptual context.  
To recognize that item as belonging to a kind k will be to non-inferentially know the proposition 
“this is a k”.  To have a capacity to recognize k will be to have the capacity to non-inferentially 
know of instances of k, presented to the subject under an appropriate appearance, that they are 
instances of k.  Again, the way the kind looks to the subject is relevant to the individuation of the 
recognitional capacity, but the knowledge the subject acquires by recognizing instances of the kind is 
                                                 
17 I am assuming here that states of knowing are individuated more finely than reference is, so that the 
knowledge described in the text does not collapse to knowledge of the proposition that o is o. 
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 not derived from prior knowledge that something with that appearance is present in her 
environment. 
If this non-inferentialist account of recognition is correct, then the two-dimensionalist claim 
must be false.  I will argue for this explicitly in the next section, but the reason why should be 
intuitively clear: on the present account, recognitional capacities are individuated in part in terms of 
what they pick out in the subject’s environment — in the actual actual world.  If, on the hypothesis 
that the world turns out to be otherwise, the subject happens to pick out something different, that is 
just a mistake: on that hypothesis, the subject’s recognitional capacity simply misfires.  According to 
two-dimensionalism, on the other hand, the extension of a concept cannot play a constitutive role in 
individuating the capacity that possessing that concept consists in.  This, as we saw, is why two-
dimensionalism leads to the unacceptable results of §3.3. 
 
5.  We have seen an argument against the inferentialist conception of recognition, which  I suggested 
two-dimensionalism is committed to.  I will now argue in a more detailed way that this commitment 
is not optional.  I will do this by arguing that a hybrid view combining the main two-dimensionalist 
thesis with a non-inferentialist account of recognition does not result in a coherent account of 
concept-possession. 
 It might be suggested (although I do not think it actually has been suggested) that, even 
though there is no specification the subject employs in order to pick out what her concept applies 
to, there still is a specification which describes her non-inferential recognitional capacity.  After all, 
assuming that the subject has such a capacity, one could define a function from ways the world may 
turn out to be to items of the appropriate category for the concept to apply to, such that for each 
way the world may turn out to be such an item is the value of the function if and only if it is what 
the subject would pick out if the world turned out to be that way.  (I will call this function the 
‘recognition-function’.) 
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 It is very questionable whether the disposition captured by the recognition-function can 
correctly be described as a disposition to know the application-conditionals, even assuming that it 
may capture a disposition to merely conform to them.  The two-dimensionalist claim is that possessing 
a concept puts one in a position to know its application-conditionals through reflection alone.  But if 
the capacity to apply the concept through recognition of its instances is non-inferential, then that 
capacity does not entail that the subject herself has any direct cognitive access to the conditions 
under which the concept applies.  On the non-inferentialist picture, therefore, it is more plausible 
that a subject is only able to know the application-conditionals of her concepts a posteriori, through 
a course of experience in which those concepts are employed. 
 But this is not the objection I want to push here.  An even more fundamental problem with 
the proposal to combine two-dimensionalism with a non-inferentialist account of recognition is that 
the proposed recognition-function cannot even capture a disposition to conform to the application-
conditionals, on pain of rendering the two-dimensionalist account of concept possession incoherent.  
This argument gives us even more reason to think that two-dimensionalism must be committed to 
inferentialism about recognition in concept-application. 
 Now, if there is any plausibility in the idea that the recognition-function captures a 
disposition to conform to the application-conditionals for a given concept C, it must be that for 
every world-description, the value of the recognition-function for a subject who possesses C is the 
same as the value of C’s epistemic or primary intension for that world-description.  But the 
epistemic intension of a concept fixes what it applies to for every world-description, on the 
supposition that the description is true of the actual world.  Thus if the subject’s recognition-
function for a concept C is guaranteed to match its epistemic intension, then the subject is 
guaranteed to never be mistaken in her application of the concept. 
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  This, however, is not a coherent account of concept possession.  To possess a concept is to 
be subject to a normative standard for one’s performances — this seems to be one of the few 
uncontroversial lessons of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.18  But we cannot make sense of a 
state’s placing its subject under a normative standard if the state is simply defined so as to make every 
performance of the subject count as correct.  This, however, is precisely what we have done by 
stipulating that the epistemic intension must match the subject’s recognition-function. 
 To return to Yablo’s example, there are possible world-descriptions in which a visual glitch 
makes our subject see dimes as oval.  Supposing one of these to be true of the actual world, she will 
pick dimes out as items to which the concept oval applies.  The intuitive response is that this will be a 
mistake on her part: dimes do not stop being round simply because our subject takes them to be 
oval.  But on the present account no mistake has been made: the concept our subject uses has an 
epistemic intension that is guaranteed to match her recognition-function; thus, if on the hypothesis 
that the above world-description is true of the actual world she is disposed to pick dimes as falling 
under her concept, then dimes do fall under her concept on that hypothesis. 
 Perhaps one might object here that, in the spirit of two-dimensionalism, the recognition-
function should not have been defined in terms of the subject’s mere disposition to pick out a 
certain item, but rather in terms of her disposition to pick out an item only after ideal reflection.  If the 
definition of the recognition-function is thus qualified, the response would go, then the 
identification of the recognition-function with the epistemic intension would be rendered harmless: 
since no actual subject is capable of ideal reflection, mistakes will be made just to that extent.   
 This response, however, simply misses the point.  The account we have been discussing is 
supposed to incorporate the non-inferential account of recognition.  If this is so, then the distinction 
between ideally reflective and ordinary concept-application cannot do the work it is supposed to do.  
                                                 
18 Wittgenstein (1958).  The idea is also at the heart of Kripke (1982). 
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 If the way a concept is applied in experience is non-inferential, then — intuitively — we must make 
room for mistakes that are not errors in reasoning of any sort.  I take something to be oval, and I 
turn out to be wrong.  Since my application of the concept is not the product of a process of 
reasoning, my error is not an error in reasoning either.  It may be simply a “brute” error (as opposed 
to a “procedural” one) in the sense that, no matter how finely we analyze the process leading up to 
it, the error may not be due to anything that I did wrong at any particular step of the way.  Since 
brute error is not due to anything the subject does wrong in the first place, granting her ideal powers 
of reflection should do nothing to shield her from brute error.  It follows that even ideally reflective 
concept-application cannot be infallible.  But since, on the present proposal, two-dimensionalism 
identifies a concept’s epistemic intension with what the subject applies the concept to under ideal 
reflection, ideally reflective concept-application has to be infallible.  The possibility of error, 
therefore, is still not properly accounted for. 
 As I already said, I do not think this type of account has been explicitly defended by any 
proponent of two-dimensionalism.  Perhaps Jackson comes closest, in a discussion of Gareth 
Evans’s non-inferentialist account of recognition.  Jackson’s claim in that context is that 
recognitional capacities can be assimilated to capacities for descriptive identification, even though 
recognition itself remains non-inferential.  According to Jackson, this is because “being disposed to 
be recognized by a subject as a such-and-such is a descriptive property of something that can and 
does serve to pick it out from other things”.19  Of course this is a descriptive property that can serve 
to pick out certain things; but it cannot be the property, or the concept, of a “such-and-such”, for in 
that case the subject would be rendered infallible in her judgments about which things the concept 
applies to: if she feels disposed to call something a such-and-such, then that very fact makes the thing 
                                                 
19 Jackson (1998: 66).  See Evans (1982: 287-289). 
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 a such-and-such.  An attempt to qualify this by appeal to ideal reflection will fail, in the way just 
discussed. 
 
6.  One might perhaps accept the argument so far, and the non-inferentialist account of recognition 
that is its upshot, but still wonder whether the non-inferential character of recognition might be just 
an accident, due to contingent limitations of our cognitive apparatus.  Perhaps we humans need 
non-inferential, hard-wired recognitional skills to overcome limitations of computational power: 
recognition in us works much faster and perhaps more reliably in the non-inferential fashion than it 
would if it had to rely on reasoning.  But we can certainly imagine beings equipped with much more 
computational power.  Perhaps such beings either have no need for non-inferential recognitional 
capacities, doing instead all the recognitional work through reasoning, or, while still relying in 
practice on non-inferential recognitional capacities, they are also capable of having personal-level 
attitudes to the information employed by their sub-personal recognitional systems.20  It is arguable 
that such beings would be able to know the application-conditionals of their concepts through 
reflection alone. 
 Perhaps this may be thought not to matter, since it may be claimed that the concepts these 
beings use are different from the ones we use, due precisely to the different cognitive capacities used 
in their application.  Suppose, for example, that these beings have a concept — call it schmoval — 
that classifies shapes using the very same appearances our concept oval uses.  If this concept is used 
inferentially, then it will differ from our concept oval for the reasons outlined in §3.3 above: on the 
hypothesis that our beings’ visual system has a glitch that makes dimes appear oval to them, dimes 
                                                 
20 If concept-application is inferential all the way down, then, plausibly, there must be some basic concepts 
that are applied on the basis of only trivial inferences.  Such inferences will consist in detaching from a 
homophonic statement of the satisfaction-conditions of a concept, on the basis of an experience described 
using the concept in question itself.  (See also n. 5 above.) 
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 will be schmoval, but they will still not be oval.  Thus schmoval and oval are not the same concept, 
since their epistemic intensions differ. 
 It is not, however, essential to the spirit of the current proposal that the supposed beings 
apply their concepts in this simple inferential way.  Perhaps some externally constrained form of 
inferentialism is true of these beings: perhaps schmoval always tracks the manifest shape oval by 
means of appearance, even in worlds where the associated recognitional capacity fails to pick that 
shape out.  From this it follows that two-dimensionalism is still false of schmoval, since its epistemic 
intension is a constant, with its value fixed by the property it picks out in our beings’ actual actual 
world (see also n. 16 above).  Nevertheless, it may be worth considering the proposal for its own 
sake, even though it cannot help save the letter of two-dimensionalism. 
 Now, let us imagine beings of whom this externally constrained inferentialism is true, and 
who are moreover able to infer both ways between the algebraic equation a figure satisfies and the 
way it appears to them.  They are able, just by looking at (or visually imagining) a plane figure, and 
with the help of background knowledge concerning their visual capacities, to infer to the algebraic 
equation it satisfies.  Conversely, given an appropriate algebraic equation, they have no trouble 
inferring from it and the relevant knowledge about their visual capacities to what the corresponding 
figure would look like to them.  Such creatures would not need to rely on non-inferential responses 
in order to group together the things we call oval: they would be able to achieve that classification 
inferentially, by means of explicit reasoning.21  Still, it does not seem altogether out of place to say 
that their concept schmoval is just the same concept as the concept oval that we use.  After all, these 
concepts group together the very same shapes, and they do so by means of the very same 
                                                 
21 As already noted, at the most basic level this reasoning will simply involve applying a concept on the basis 
of its homophonic satisfaction-conditions and an experience described using that very concept.  I am 
assuming here (as I have been doing throughout) that manifest shape concepts are not basic in this sense — 
that is, I assume that on the two-dimensionalist view there will be non-trivial application-conditionals that one 
must be in a position to know in order to possess these concepts. 
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 appearance.  But now, the argument goes, if such beings are indeed possible, couldn’t we idealize 
away from the non-inferential character of our recognitional capacities, regarding it as just one more 
of the contingent limitations we in any case have to idealize away from?22 
 I think this argument should be resisted.  The kind of idealization proposed here is 
significantly different from the one that was built into the two-dimensionalist account from the start.  
That idealization involved abstracting from contingent limitations on information storage and 
processing capacities; crucially, it did not involve a fundamentally new source of information.  But 
this is precisely what the present proposal involves.  According to the non-inferentialist account of 
recognition (which is accepted as true of us by the present proposal), the information driving our 
recognitional capacities is not available to us through reflection; it is available to us only through 
ordinary empirical investigation.  The proposed idealization invites us to lift that limitation.  In 
effect, it invites us to consider what we would be in a position to know through reflection, if we 
suppose that a lot of information that, for us, is available only through empirical investigation, were 
available to us otherwise.  There is no reason to think that the answer to this question is relevant to 
what we can and cannot know a priori. 
 
7.  For these reasons it is, I think, clear that we should reject the two-dimensionalist picture of 
conceptual thought, and the corresponding account of a priori knowledge.  As I have been 
suggesting, it seems reasonable to attempt to ground the epistemology of the a priori in an account 
of conceptual thought.  According to the two-dimensionalist version of this idea, the link is 
especially direct: possessing a concept just becomes a matter of being in a position to know by 
reflection alone a large number of non-trivial propositions.  This, of course, is one version of the 
analyticity strategy — namely, the attempt to explain cases of non-trivial a priori knowledge by 
appeal to dispositions to judge or infer entailed by concept-possession.  The argument against two-
                                                 
22 This kind of response was suggested to me by Cian Dorr. 
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dimensionalism therefore reinforces the arguments against the analyticity strategy presented in 
Chapter 2. 
 As I already suggested in Chapter 2, however, these arguments do not affect the prospects of 
the more general project of giving an account of a priori knowledge based on an account of 
conceptual thought.  I ended Chapter 2 by suggesting a starting point for such an account.  In the 
following chapter I will attempt to complete that account. 
 
 
 Chapter 4 
BASIC A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE OF ONE’S OWN MIND 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In this chapter I will complete the positive account of a priori knowledge that has been my goal 
throughout this dissertation.  So far I have argued for the starting point of this account.  I began 
with the idea that, on a plausible view about the individuation of contents (or Fregean “thoughts”), 
contents are individuated in terms of the norms that govern the thinking of individual subjects or 
entire communities.  But since contents are what may be the case, knowledge about their nature is 
knowledge about the shapes reality can take.  Thus knowledge of the norms of thinking can lead to 
substantive knowledge — knowledge about what is or may be the case, and not just knowledge 
about how we happen to represent the world in thought or language. 
 In an earlier chapter I began to develop my approach by contrasting it to some of its closest 
relatives — namely, the views that follow what I called the “analyticity strategy”.  Such views 
attempt to explain the possibility of a priori knowledge on the basis of dispositions to judge or infer 
that are supposedly entailed by concept-possession.  As I argued, however, it is very implausible that 
possessing any particular concept entails any fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer; thus the 
analyticity strategy cannot get off the ground.  Nevertheless, as I also argued, an epistemology of the 
a priori can be based on a more relaxed, holistic view of concept-possession, which does not require 
such entailments. 
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  On this view, concept-possession is a matter of being subject — normatively subject — to the 
norms that serve to individuate the corresponding concepts.  Normally, one is subject to such norms 
in virtue of participating in a conceptual practice.  But one would not count as participating in such a 
practice — and thus as capable of drawing on its shared stock of concepts — unless one were, on the 
whole, sufficiently reliable in conforming to enough of the norms constitutive of the practice.  This 
constraint is holistic, in the sense that there need not be any fixed set of cases that the subject must 
be disposed to get right in order to count as capable of thinking any particular thought, or as 
possessing any particular concept.  Nevertheless, in the cases where the subject is in fact reliable, we 
can take her reliable dispositions as a starting point for an account of a priori knowledge. 
 As I also suggested, however, this by itself is not sufficient as an account of a priori 
knowledge.  Simply being reliable in inferring in accordance with the law of double negation does 
not by itself guarantee recognizing its instances as good inferences (I am assuming, again, classical logic 
to be correct).  One might be reliable in conforming to the law of double negation simply because of 
some random quirk in one’s brain, while having no idea that such inferences are good ones.  
Intuitively, such “blind” dispositions cannot ground a priori knowledge.  Thus, until we have a less 
schematic account of what it is for dispositions to judge or infer not to be blind in this way, we are 
still short of an epistemology of the a priori. 
 In §2 of this chapter I will try to make explicit the epistemological outlook that will inform 
my account.  This will provide the framework for the substantive account, which I develop in the 
rest of the chapter.  That account will be based on the idea (which I have already floated at various 
points) that, in order to fully realize the present approach to a priori knowledge, we need to connect 
it with a proper account of the self-awareness characteristic of conceptual thought. 
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2. THE QUESTION OF JUSTIFICATION 
 
 
1.  Once again, it will be helpful to begin by contrasting my approach to that of proponents of the 
analyticity strategy.  Consider the question of how we can come to know a priori that the law of 
double negation is a valid rule of inference (assuming for the sake of the argument that classical logic 
is correct).  As I suggested already in Chapter 2, it seems intuitive that coming to know this fact is a 
two-stage process.  In the first stage one is able to conform one’s thinking to particular instances of 
the law: if one is committed to ~~p, in other words, one is thereby disposed to either commit to p 
or revise one’s commitment to ~~p.  In a second stage, and given the required competence in meta-
logical concepts, one recognizes that these patterns depend only on the logical form of the premise 
and the conclusion, and thus one can come to know that the law of double negation is a valid (truth-
preserving) rule of inference.  This two-stage picture — perhaps give or take a few details — seems 
to be generally accepted by proponents of the analyticity strategy as well.1   
 Given this picture, the important question is how to understand the ability manifested in the 
first stage of our example.  How are we to explain a subject’s ability to conform her thinking to the 
law of double negation, independently of her already knowing that the law of double negation is a 
valid rule of inference?  It is clear that not just any disposition to make transitions that match the law 
of double negation is going to be relevant here: a random quirk in our subject’s brain might lead to 
such a disposition, but that would not count as our subject’s being able to conform her thinking to 
the law of double negation.  Being able to conform to the law of double negation is a rational ability, 
subject to questions of justification.  The question, for the analyticity strategy as well as for the 
account I have been suggesting, is to give an account of the relevant kind of justification.   
                                                 
1 Boghossian (2000); Peacocke (2003). 
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  One typical move proponents of the analyticity strategy make here consists in appealing to 
the thesis that the relevant transitions are justified because they are “meaning-constituting” — 
because it is in virtue of being disposed to make the relevant transition that the subject possesses the 
concepts in question, or is capable of thinking the thoughts in question.  Here is how Paul 
Boghossian puts the point: 
If it is true that certain of our inferential dispositions fix what we mean by our logical 
words (in the language of thought), then it is very plausible that we should be entitled 
to act on those inferential dispositions prior to, and independently of, having 
supplied an explicit justification for the general claim that they are truth-preserving.2 
 
Since the antecedent of this conditional is simply a statement of the central thesis of the analyticity 
strategy, Boghossian is happy to assert its consequent.  A similar view is endorsed by Christopher 
Peacocke: 
 A thinker who meets the possession-condition for conjunction [i.e., a thinker who is 
disposed to find inferences of certain forms naturally compelling] does not need 
examples of an impossible kind that somehow determines [sic] a unique correct 
application in a new case.  Nor does he need to have surveyed in advance all the 
correct applications.  He just has to find certain transitions compelling in a certain 
way, and his finding them so has to have a particular explanation.3 
 
Presumably, when Peacocke talks about what the thinker “needs” or “does not need” to do here he 
is talking about conditions of justification: if the subject is disposed to make the transitions 
mentioned in the possession-condition for conjunction, then nothing else is required in order for 
her to be justified in making those transitions. 
                                                 
2 Boghossian (2000: 250).  Boghossian’s use of the term “inferential disposition” is not without problems.  
Boghossian here is speaking of dispositions that are prior to — and indeed constitutive of — a subject’s 
understanding of the propositions involved.  But it is questionable whether transitions that are not the result of 
understanding deserve to be called inferences.  In what follows I will avoid Boghossian’s usage.  In fact, 
criticizing Boghossian’s view on this point would be another way to press the same sort of concern that I will 
be pressing later on.  (I thank John McDowell for pointing this out to me.) 
3 Peacocke (1992: 13)  Peacocke’s later view of implicit conceptions (2003) introduces further complexity into 
the picture, but it does not protect his view from the argument in the text, since he seems to positively 
envisage the possibility that the relevant states might be sub-personal, and thus in principle not accessible to 
reflection.  On the other hand, since on the implicit conception view these dispositions are the result of 
understanding, this view is not — at least not directly — subject to the objection to Boghossian’s formulation 
mentioned in n. 2. 
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  Now, even bracketing the arguments I gave in Chapter 2 against the idea that concept-
possession entails a fixed set of dispositions to judge or infer, we should wonder whether this really 
is a good answer to the question of justification.4  Just why is it supposed to be the case that the fact 
that transitions that match certain patterns are meaning-constituting makes the subject justified in 
conforming her thinking to these patterns?   
 On the face of it, the possession of meaning-constituting dispositions seems at most to 
guarantee that the subject will not go wrong in her transitions; but it is not evident that this is 
sufficient for her to be justified in making those transitions.  In general, it is doubtful whether the 
fact that a judgment or transition results from a reliable disposition is, by itself, enough to justify that 
judgment or transition, independently of the subject’s own beliefs or other propositional attitudes.  
More specifically, in the case of a priori knowledge, I suggest that the basic capacity on which a 
priori knowledge depends is a capacity to conform one’s thinking to a certain rule because one 
recognizes the correctness of its instances, rather than just a reliable disposition to make correct 
transitions.  But the mere fact that certain dispositions are meaning-constituting for a subject — 
although sufficient for reliability — is not sufficient to guarantee that the subject recognizes the 
correctness of anything. 
 This line of criticism echoes Boghossian’s own criticism of externalist views that would 
impose no condition on the relevant dispositions other that that they be reliably correct.  As 
Boghossian observes, such views go wrong because they would count a subject justified in making a 
particular judgment or transition even though, intuitively, the subject’s thinking is epistemically 
irresponsible on the corresponding occasion: there is nothing in the subject’s thinking that justifies her 
                                                 
4 Of course there is a way of taking the idea of meaning-constituting disposition which would be all right, 
even in the context of the holistic view of concept possession suggested in Chapter 2.  The argument against 
the view explicitly discussed in the text would apply to this view as well. 
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 in trusting her dispositions — even though they are, in fact, reliable.5  In effect, what I am now 
suggesting is that Boghossian’s own positive view still fails to satisfy this requirement: if the subject 
does not know that her judgments or transitions result from meaning-constituting dispositions, how 
is the situation any different from simple reliabilism?   
 
2.  In the background of this criticism lies a thesis about epistemic justification which is, admittedly, 
quite controversial, and which Boghossian himself explicitly challenges.  Although this is not the 
place to defend the thesis in its full generality, I will try to at least respond to Boghossian’s challenge.   
 The thesis is that, for a judgment or inference to be justified for a subject, it must be justified 
from the subject’s point of view: its justification must only depend on facts about it that are, at least 
normally, accessible to the subject upon reflection.  There is an intuitive connection between 
rationality, responsibility and the subjective point of view that would seem to be violated if we 
allowed justification to depend on facts that are outside the subject’s ken.6 
 Now, there are ways of developing this thought that lead to overly strong, and — to my 
mind — implausible, views.  But it is important to note that a rather weak form of this principle is 
both plausible in its own right, and sufficient to explain the inadequacy of the view that the mere 
fact that some dispositions are meaning-constituting justifies the judgments and transitions that issue 
from them.  Suppose that a subject is justified in believing a proposition p.  Suppose, further, that q 
deductively follows from p.  The question is, then, under what conditions is the subject justified in 
                                                 
5 Boghossian (2003: 228). 
6 This is almost equivalent to the thesis Boghossian calls “access internalism” (Boghossian (2003: 228)).  The 
difference lies in that, while Boghossian’s access internalism requires facts about justification to be always 
available to the subject, I think it will do if we simply insist on such facts being normally available to the 
subject.  Although this is not a topic I can discuss here at length, I doubt that the stronger kind of thesis is 
plausible for any kind of fact (see Williamson (2000: ch. 4)).  But this should not discourage the idea that we 
have privileged access to some kinds of fact: it should, rather, make us more careful in spelling out what 
privileged access involves. 
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 inferring q from p?7  The thesis I want to defend is that, whatever those conditions turn out to be, 
they must be reflectively available to the subject herself.  This is to be distinguished from a stronger 
— and I think unacceptable — thesis, namely the thesis that such justification must consist in facts 
which the subject can use in a cogent argument in support of her judgment or inference.   
 On the sort of view I want to defend here, a subject in a situation as described above is only 
justified in making the inference if she recognizes that p is conclusive reason for q (of course what this 
recognition consists in will have to be explained; this will be my main task in this chapter).  But this 
recognition is not to be construed as a premise in an argument of the following form: “if x is 
conclusive reason for y, and I am justified in believing x, then I ought to believe y; but p is conclusive 
reason for q, and I am justified in believing p; therefore, I ought to believe q”.  Such an argument 
clearly appeals to the same ability to conform one’s thinking to the laws of deductively valid 
inference.  Therefore, appealing to it at this point would be hopeless: as Boghossian notes, such an 
appeal faces a circularity problem akin to the one famously identified (in a different context) by 
Lewis Carroll.8  But there is no need to appeal to this — or any other — argument here, for this is 
                                                 
7 This question must be distinguished from the question of the justification the subject has for the conclusion 
— that is, for q itself.  If all goes well, then the subject’s justification for q is just her justification for p: good 
deductive inference transmits justification from its premises to its conclusion (to use a useful term introduced 
in Wright (1985)).  But in order for justification to be transmitted in this way, being justified in believing that 
p is not sufficient.  If, for example, the subject believes that q on the basis of a completely mistaken view of 
the rational connection between it and p, we should not count her justification for believing p as successfully 
transmitting to her belief that q.  The question in the text concerns precisely the conditions necessary for 
justification to transmit from the premise to the conclusion of a deductively valid inference.   
8 The example Boghossian is working with is the following (2003: 225): 
I’m in the mood for some music; what, I wonder, is on offer today in Carnegie Hall? A quick 
check of the schedule reveals that Martha Argerich is scheduled to play on the 20th. As a 
result, I come to believe that: 
(1) If today is the 20th, then Martha Argerich is playing 
today in Carnegie Hall. 
A glance at the calendar reveals that in fact: 
(2) Today is the 20th. 
With these two beliefs in place, I move immediately to the conclusion 
that: 
(3) Martha Argerich is playing today in Carnegie Hall.  
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 not the role that recognizing the rational connection between p and q is supposed to play.  The point 
is just the following: if I believe that q on the basis of an inference from p, then that entails that I 
believe that q, and I recognize that I do so for the reason that p.  It is not at all clear why an 
argument concerning how I ought to match my first order beliefs to my beliefs about what is a 
reason for what might be thought to be relevant here. 
 Normally, one’s recognition that a set of propositions R that one believes constitutes a 
reason for p makes a difference to what one believes directly: if I believe that R, and I recognize that 
R is a (strong enough) reason for p, I thereby believe that p.  At least in non-pathological cases, no 
further process is relevant.  For example, if I recognize that my firmly held beliefs that G. W. Bush is 
a Republican and that he is president of the United States together constitute good reason to believe 
that a Republican is president of the United States, I thereby believe that a Republican is president of 
the United States.  No further process is required to put the latter belief in place, or in order for it to 
count as inferentially grounded in the former.  Thus Boghossian’s charge of Lewis Carroll-style 
circularity gets no traction. 
 Of course there may be pathological cases in which I have to do some work to convince 
myself of p, even though I both firmly believe every member of R and recognize that the members 
of R collectively constitute strong enough reason for p.  If believing p would be very painful to me, 
for example, then I might need to do work in order to accept p, despite recognizing that I have 
strong reasons for it.  Higher-level reasoning might be useful here — just as it might be if I were 
attempting to convince someone else of the correctness of an inference that she failed to accept.  
But such cases are clearly not the norm, and therefore they give us no reason to doubt that, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Boghossian — surely correctly — observes that it would be hopeless to attempt to give an epistemological 
account of this modus ponens inference by appeal to an argument of the following form: “(1) and (2) would 
offer conclusive reason for (3), and I am justified in believing (1) and (2); but if x is conclusive reason for y, 
and I am justified in believing x, then I ought to believe y; therefore, I ought to believe (3)” (Boghossian 
(2003: 233-235)).  Clearly, the sort of ability manifested in this latter argument is just the ability to conform 
one’s thinking to the rule of modus ponens that we were seeking to explain in the first place.   
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 normally, recognizing that R is strong enough reason for p is all that is required in order to believe 
that p for the reason that R. 
 Is there something inherently implausible about the claim that a subject can recognize the 
rational connection between — for example — ~~p and p?  Boghossian in a footnote suggests, 
without explaining why, that “rational insight” into facts about justification is “unimaginable”.9  If 
Boghossian has in mind a special-purpose faculty that is not part of the basic structure of conceptual 
thought, then perhaps he is right to simply dismiss the idea.  But as I am going to argue, an ability to 
recognize facts about justification follows from some fundamental features of conceptual thought.  
And, in any case, in ordinary experience it surely seems that we can very often tell what is a reason 
for what, just on the basis of understanding the relevant propositions. 
 Of course doubts about this view cannot be dispelled until we have a positive view of what 
the ability to recognize such facts consists in.  What matters for now is that, at least prima facie, it 
does not seem implausible, and it clearly satisfies the reflective availability constraint — at least if 
that constraint is not interpreted as requiring that justification must consist in facts the subject can 
use as premises in a cogent argument.  
 
 
 
 
3.  OVERVIEW 
 
 
1.  So how are we to give an account of our ability to conform our thinking to norms constitutive of 
our concepts that respects the constraint of reflective availability?  The holistic constraint on 
concept-possession I defended in an earlier chapter explains why subjects conform to enough of the 
norms constitutive of their concepts, but — like the analogous stronger claim of the analyticity 
strategy — it does not yet show this conformity to be due to any sort of recognition on the subjects’ 
                                                 
9 Boghossian (2003: 236, n. 16). 
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 part.  I suggest, however, that this is only because we have so far not taken into account another 
fundamental feature of conceptual thought — namely, its characteristic self-awareness.  If we 
combine an account of the self-awareness of conceptual thought with the holistic constraint, we do 
get an account of our capacity to recognize instances of the norms constitutive of our concepts. 
 In a nutshell, the idea is as follows.  Part of what our rationality consists in is that we 
normally are in a position to know both what we believe or judge, and the reasons why we do so.  
This is not to say that our first-order judgments always need to be accompanied by second-order 
beliefs about our reasons (although they often are).  The point is, rather, that belief and judgment 
themselves are “reflexive”, in a sense that I will explain later on.   
 Of course, there is no guarantee in any specific case that our beliefs are based on good 
grounds: a subject’s reasons for any particular belief can be, objectively speaking, as bad as we like.  
Thus a subject may be aware (in the relevant, non-second-order sense) that she believes that p for 
the reason that R (a set of propositions), and thus (by the same token) take it that p follows from R,  
while failing to be in a position to know that p follows from R — because p does not in fact follow 
from R.10 
 However, the holistic constraint above entails that, on the whole, a subject’s pattern of belief 
must conform to enough of the norms constitutive of her concepts.  Thus it must be the case that, 
in a sufficient number of cases, when our subject believes that p for the reason that R, that belief 
exemplifies a norm that is indeed constitutive of the concepts involved.  Moreover, given the point 
about self-awareness, the subject is aware (in the relevant, non-second-order sense) that she believes 
that p for the reason that R, and thus she takes p to follow from R.  But in these cases she is in fact 
reliably correct in taking p to follow from R.  Thus, in these cases, her believing that p for the reason 
                                                 
10 Of course, it may happen that the subject’s awareness that her belief that p is based on R leads her to retract 
her belief rather than judge that p follows from R.  But in this case the subject no longer believes that p for 
the reason that R.  Thus such cases do not disturb the general point; if anything, they reinforce the 
connection between rationality and self-awareness. 
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 that R is, intelligibly, describable as based on her recognizing that p follows from R.  If she then goes 
on to judge that p follows from R, then that judgment can count as knowledge, based on her 
recognition of the normative relations among contentful states.  Judgments of this sort constitute 
our basic a priori knowledge. 
This, of course, is not to say that all knowledge of what is a reason for what is a priori.  
Consider the following example.  I hear voices behind a closed door, and I conclude (truly, let’s say) 
that there is a class going on behind the door.  I know I believe that there is a class going in behind 
the door, and I take my perceptually grounded belief that there are people talking behind the door to 
be good reason for this belief.  But this is only correct if I have further empirical knowledge — for 
example, that the room behind the door is a classroom, that today is not a school holiday, that the 
time is not past regular school hours, and so on.  Outside this context, it does not follow from my 
belief that there are people talking behind the door that there is a class going on, and thus I cannot 
know that it does.  The reason provided by the perceptual belief is, in terms borrowed from Crispin 
Wright, information dependent.  In general, my belief in a set of propositions R gives me information 
dependent reason for a proposition p just in case: (i) R gives me a reason for p and (ii) there is a set 
of background propositions I that I believe and which is such that, were I not to believe some 
member of I, R would no longer give me a reason for p (at least not without other compensatory 
changes in my total cognitive state).11  No doubt this formulation is vague at various points; but it 
surely captures a genuine phenomenon.  The crucial point for present purposes is just the following: 
if, in a case of information dependence, I do know what is a reason for what, my knowledge may still 
not count as a priori, since it is partly grounded in background knowledge, which may (as in the case 
just described) be empirical. 
                                                 
11 Wright (2003: 58-59). 
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 Such cases contrast with cases where what is a reason for what is determined by norms 
constitutive of the contents involved.  There is, of course, a sense in which even in the case where I 
infer p from ~~p I must rely on background knowledge: for, in order to infer p from ~~p, my 
reasons for ~~p must be stronger than any independent reasons I might have to doubt p.  But this 
case is still not at all similar to the one discussed above.  Here the role of the background knowledge 
is not to secure that p follows from ~~p, or that I know that it does.  The nature of negation alone 
guarantees that if I believe ~~p then I had better believe p, or reconsider my belief in ~~p.12  If I am 
reliable in conforming to this rule, and if — on the basis of the self-awareness of belief — I come to 
judge that p follows from ~~p, my judgment is not based on any potentially empirical background 
knowledge.  Thus, it is basic a priori knowledge. 
 A lot needs to be said about every step of such an account, of course.  Most of the rest of 
this chapter is devoted to this task.  Before getting to the details, in the next section I will make a 
few comments about its general structure. 
 
2.  First, note that there is no ambition here to provide a list of informative necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a subject to be in a state of recognizing the normative relations among contentful 
states.  The goal is to provide an account of some of the capacities involved in conceptual thought 
which will make it intelligible that, normally, subjects are in a position to recognize such things.    
 The situation is not unlike what we find in other cases of non-inferential knowledge, such as 
perception.  An account of perception, I think, can only hope to explain why it is the case that, 
normally, if it perceptually appears to me that p, then I perceive — and thus am in a position to know 
— that p.  It does not look plausible, however, that we can informatively spell out a full set of 
                                                 
12  If one were inclined, in a Quinean spirit, to expect a reduction of rational relations to conditional 
dispositions to assent or dissent, then one would naturally be very suspicious of the distinction between 
rational connections secured by the nature of concepts and rational connections secured via background 
knowledge.  But the account of content suggested earlier in this dissertation is not congenial to such a project; 
nor is there independent reason to commit to it. 
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 necessary and sufficient conditions for a case of having it appear to one as if p to be a case of 
perceiving that p.  At this point — in the epistemology of perception just as much as in the 
epistemology of the a priori — we need to appeal to intuitive judgments about interpretation. Our 
attribution to a subject of states of knowledge has to be part of a total interpretation of her cognitive 
state that makes sense of her interactions with her environment; such attributions, therefore, will be 
sensitive to a huge number of factors, which we cannot hope to spell out in a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. 
 This might prompt the worry that the present approach is just a cosmetic improvement on 
the views criticized earlier: the present view, one might object, does not respect the reflective 
availability constraint — it only seems to do so.  We can begin by considering the following rough 
attempt to state the worry.  If it is admitted that no necessary and sufficient conditions for a priori 
recognition are forthcoming, it follows that no necessary and sufficient conditions the subject herself 
can apply are forthcoming.  But if the subject has no criterion that settles it whether she is in a 
genuine recognitional state, rather than in a state of mere seeming recognition, isn’t the reflective 
availability constraint violated?  
 The worry as stated is confused.  On the present view, it is the recognitional state itself, 
rather than knowing that one is in that state, that justifies one’s basic a priori knowledge.  If the 
relevant sort of justification were inferential, then the lack of a criterion (a set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions) that a subject could apply in order to distinguish genuine recognitional states 
from states of merely seeming to recognize would damage the prospects of recognitional states 
playing a role in justification.  But since the relevant sort of justification is not inferential, it is not 
clear that the lack of such a criterion is a problem.  The situation is again instructively analogous to 
the perceptual case.  If perceptual justification were inferential, then my seeing that the sun is 
shining could not justify my perceptual knowledge that the sun is shining, since I normally have no 
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 independent criterion — i.e., no criterion that I can apply without already knowing that the sun is 
shining — to guarantee the premise that I can see that the sun is shining.  Any argument that relied 
on this premise would beg the question.  But perceptual knowledge is not inferential, and therefore 
this problem does not arise.13 
 In order to respond to the worry in its more general form, it may be useful to compare the 
present view to “intuitional” views of basic a priori knowledge — for example, the view developed 
by George Bealer.14  Such views might, I think, be open to the charge that they merely seem to 
conform to the reflective availability constraint, while in reality violating it.  According to such views, 
our basic a priori justification derives from “intuitions”, or intellectual — as opposed to sensory or, 
more broadly, imagistic — seemings: most people, for example, would be said to have the intuition 
that 1+1=2, although of course they do not picture that 1+1=2 (whatever that might mean).  
Crucially, on this view, intuitions provide prima facie, defeasible support for the propositions intuited.  
Assuming, for example, that one has an intuition that it cannot be the case that ~~p while it is not 
the case that p, one is thereby prima facie justified in believing that p follows from ~~p.15   
 Now, on the intuitional view, it is clear that one may have an intuition that p even if p is not 
the case: there is no intrinsic connection between it seeming to one in intuition that things are a 
certain way and things being that way.  But then, it seems reasonable to think that the mere fact that 
one has an intuition that p cannot be what really justifies one in conforming one’s thinking to p, 
independently of the specific credentials of that intuition.  Bealer, of course, does provide an 
                                                 
13  The view of perceptual knowledge sketched here follows McDowell (1998a).  This is not to deny that 
normally we do know that we are in a perceptual or recognitional state; it is only to deny that this knowledge 
needs to be independent of the corresponding perceptual or a priori knowledge.  I will make some remarks 
about this kind of self-knowledge near the end of this section. 
14 Bealer (1999; 2002). 
15  Putting the point in this way would seem to leave Bealer’s view open to Boghossian’s charge of Lewis 
Carroll-style circularity: for it is not clear how one would apply one’s intuition that p follows from ~~p to any 
particular case, unless one also intuited that the particular case falls under the general rule.  Bealer does not 
(to my knowledge) discuss the point, but I think an answer along the lines suggested earlier would be available 
to him. 
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 account of what the credentials of particular intuitions consist in.  In a nutshell, the view is that 
intuitions are veridical insofar as they result from “determinate understanding” — a mode of 
concept-possession that goes beyond ordinary competence.16  But then, it is hard to avoid the 
impression that what really does the justificatory work on Bealer’s view are not the intuitions, but 
rather facts about their aetiology: it is because intuitions tend to be produced by states of 
determinate understanding that they give one prima facie justification to conform one’s thinking to 
them.  Intuitions are mere symptoms of the facts that do the real justificatory work.  But, of course, 
these latter facts — facts about the aetiology of one’s intuitions — are not normally reflectively 
available to one.  Thus the intuitional view would seem to only superficially respect the reflective 
availability constraint, while in reality violating it. 
 The view I propose here, on the contrary, is not open to this objection.  The relevant 
conscious justificatory states on this view are supposed to be states of recognition.  But states of 
recognition are factive, and thus we have no reason to doubt that they can play the justificatory role 
assigned to them.17 
 Admittedly, it remains fair to request of a proponent of an account of a priori knowledge 
along the present lines to offer an account of how we know that we are in a state of genuine 
recognition.  The analogous request can fairly be made of proponents of accounts of perceptual 
knowledge along the parallel lines.  The point of the above considerations was simply to make it 
clear that this request — fair though it may be — is a request for something extra, over and above 
the immediate concerns of an account of basic a priori or perceptual justification.  There is, 
                                                 
16 Bealer (1999: 45; 2002: 101-107).  I criticized Bealer’s introduction of the notion of determinate 
understanding in Chapter 2.  For present purposes, I will not challenge the notion itself, but only question 
whether it can help with the particular epistemological problems at issue here.   
17 For the role of factive states in knowledge in general see McDowell (1998a; 1998d) and Williamson (2000: 
ch. 1-3). 
 103 
 
 
 moreover, no reason to think that this request cannot be met.  I cannot here offer a full discussion 
of the many delicate details of this issue, but I will offer a suggestion. 
 What seems to make the situation difficult is that, as we have agreed, the subject lacks a 
criterion that would allow her to distinguish between a genuine recognitional or perceptual state, and 
a state of merely seeming to recognize or perceive.  But I think we have no reason to accept that such 
knowledge would have to be based on the application of such a criterion (either explicitly or 
implicitly).  On the contrary, I suggest that one’s knowledge that one recognizes a rational connection, 
or that one perceives that p, is simply derivative of one’s having the corresponding ground-level 
perceptual or a priori knowledge.  This is not to say that the self-knowledge here is based on the 
cogency of an argument from the perceptual or a priori knowledge.  Just as there is no need to cash 
out in terms of inference the sense in which one’s perceptual knowledge that p is based on one’s 
perceiving that p, there is no need to cash out in terms of inference the sense in which one’s 
knowledge that one perceives that p is derivative of one’s perceptual knowledge that p.  One’s 
knowledge that one perceives that p, in a situation where one perceptually knows that p, is non-
inferential, but it is attributed to the subject on just the same basis as the ground-level perceptual 
knowledge is.  Similarly, in the case of a priori knowledge, one’s knowledge that one is in a genuine 
recognitional state is non-inferential, but it is attributed to the subject on just the same basis as the 
corresponding basic a priori knowledge is. 
 A fuller treatment of this topic falls outside the scope of the current project.  I think that a 
proper account of our capacity to acquire knowledge by perception shows it to involve not just the 
reliability of the subject’s sensory faculties, but moreover enough capacity for reflection to make it 
intelligible that, normally, when we attribute to her perceptual knowledge in such a situation we 
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 should also take her to be in a position to know that she has that perceptual knowledge.18  Similarly 
the account of basic a priori knowledge developed here should help make it intelligible that, 
normally, when we take a subject to genuinely recognize the normative relations between two 
contentful states, we should also be prepared to take her to be in a position to know that she does so 
(I make some further remarks about this in n. 29 below). 
 Let us now turn to the details of the connection between basic a priori knowledge and the 
self-awareness characteristic of conceptual thought. 
 
 
 
 
4. BASIC A PRIORI KNOWLEDGE AND SELF-AWARENESS 
  
 
1.  We are normally in a position to know what we think.  This knowledge is surely non-inferential.  
But it is even more direct than that: it is, to use a term loosely adapted from Anscombe, non-
observational.  For our purposes, we can define non-observational knowledge as a kind of non-
inferential knowledge that is, in a sense, inseparable from the fact known.19  By this I do not mean 
that in all possible worlds where the fact obtains it is also available to be known; I mean, rather, that 
if it is available to be known, then such knowledge is (epistemically) grounded in nothing further 
than the fact itself.20  This contrasts with observational non-inferential knowledge, which, for the 
                                                 
18 Williamson (2000: ch. 5) argues that there must be cases where one knows that p while failing to be in a 
position to know that p.  His example concerns perceptual knowledge.  Nevertheless, although Williamson’s 
argument is persuasive against the thesis that, necessarily, if one knows that p one is in a position to know 
that one knows that p, it does not establish that cases where one lacks self-knowledge are not exceptions, 
rather than the norm.  I think there are good intuitive and theoretical reasons to believe that this is the case (I 
discuss this point, and how it can be made compatible with Williamson’s argument, in my “Apriority, 
Contingency, and Knowledge from Fallible Sources”).  Given the holistic nature of attributions of mental 
states in general, and states of knowledge in particular, we should in any case not expect exceptionless 
generalizations in the area.   
19 This definition would match most of the central uses of the term in Anscombe (2000).  It would not, 
however, match them all.  But Anscombe exegesis is not to the point here. 
20 Williamson (2000, ch. 4) argues that only trivial conditions are “luminous”, in the sense that, necessarily, if 
they obtain we are in a position to know that they do.  What I say in the text does not contradict Williamson’s 
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 purposes of the present distinction, can be understood as knowledge (partly) grounded in some sort 
of contingent epistemic relation between the subject and the fact known.  In the paradigm case this 
relation is sensory perception (although memory or testimony may also be examples): if my 
knowledge that p is by visual perception, for example, then it is grounded in my seeing that p, not just 
in the fact that p.  Our knowledge of our own minds is in this respect characteristically direct or un-
mediated, as it is sometimes put.21 
 If conceptual thinking is open to non-observational knowledge, then there must be 
something about its nature that explains why having a thought normally puts one in a position to 
know that one is having that thought.  In what follows I will suggest an explanation based on the 
centrality to conceptual thinking of the act of judgment, or of making up one’s mind what to 
believe.22  Judgment, as I will argue, requires that our beliefs be essentially reflexive, in the sense that 
believing that p partly consists in taking oneself to do so, and for certain reasons. 
                                                                                                                                                             
point: my claim is that there is a kind of knowledge such that, for any bit of knowledge of that kind, it is 
grounded in nothing more than that the fact known obtains.  I do not claim that, necessarily, such facts can 
be known to obtain whenever they do.  Take Williamson’s own example, namely, the condition of feeling 
cold (2000: 96-8).  Williamson argues that one is not in a position to know that one feels cold whenever one 
feels cold.  This, however, does not contradict the claim that when one does know that one feels cold, one’s 
knowledge is grounded in nothing other than just feeling cold.  In fact, it is hard to see what else it could be 
grounded in. 
21 This is not to deny that there are features of our mental states that we do need observation to know about.  
Ernest Sosa invites us to consider cases where we consciously represent complex images or entertain complex 
propositions.  He then points out that some of that complexity may not be available to us, except through 
some kind of observation (BonJour (2003: 122-134)).  One of his examples concerns representing arrays of 
dots.  Suppose we have two arrays, of which the first contains, say, 11 dots, while the second contains 12.  It 
is quite plausible that most subjects would fail to distinguish between their visual representations of these two 
arrays without counting the dots.  But if one has to count, then one does not know in the direct, unmediated, 
non-observational way I have been describing.  Such cases do not disturb my main point, since they have no 
tendency to show that non-observational self-knowledge does not exist.  Where I disagree with Sosa is in his 
taking these cases as paradigms, around which an account of self-knowledge is to be constructed.  What 
Sosa’s account seems to me to miss is what I argue for in §7: self-knowledge should not be construed as a 
near-perfectly reliable add-on to our capacity to judge, but rather as an essential feature of that capacity itself. 
22 Judgment in this sense does not have to be a conscious act of making up one’s mind: a lot of our judging 
happens without our consciously paying attention to it.  On the other hand, I also do not want to commit to 
taking any belief, no matter how acquired, to be the product of judgment.  We can imagine scenarios in which 
one is completely passive in relation to some of one’s beliefs — perhaps they are implanted by means of a 
surgical manipulation of one’s brain, for instance.  Beliefs acquired in this way are not the products of 
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  What exactly this ‘taking’ consists in will have to be explained further as the account 
develops.  For present purposes, I will just note two things.  First, this ‘taking’ is not as such a 
second-order judgment: a subject may count as taking herself to believe that the sun is shining 
because she can see that it is, even though she does not believe that she believes that the sun is 
shining (even if there is something incoherent about believing that p without believing that one 
believes that p, that is not a consequence of my account of self-awareness).  Nevertheless, this 
‘taking’ is the backdrop against which full-blown cases of second-order belief and self-knowledge 
must be understood.  The second thing to note is that by taking oneself to believe that p for the 
reason that R, one thereby also takes it that R objectively is a reason for p.  This commitment is not a 
belief about what is a reason for what; it is, rather, one aspect of the self-awareness involved in the 
first-order belief itself.  This aspect of self-awareness is essential to our capacity for a priori 
knowledge. 
 
2.  But why should we take the capacity to judge to require reflexivity in this sense?  Intuitively, the 
capacity to judge is the capacity to make up one’s mind what to believe: it is the capacity to review, 
revise and add to one’s cognitive state.23  Now, my claim is that one cannot possess a capacity to 
judge understood along these lines, unless one is — normally, at least — aware of one’s own beliefs 
and the way they hang together in an interlocking and mutually supporting system.  Believing that p 
                                                                                                                                                             
judgment.  Such beliefs, moreover, may fail to be available to non-observational knowledge; but such 
pathologies are not to the point here. 
23 This should not be taken to imply that judgment is a kind of intentional action, with knowledge (or perhaps 
just truth) as the subject’s intended aim: this would be hopeless for many reasons, not least because it would 
seem to require us to take intention to be intelligible independently of belief or judgment.  There is, 
nevertheless, a sense in which we can say that knowledge is the “constitutive aim” of judgment; but what this 
should be taken to mean, I suggest, is that in attributing a capacity to judge to a being, we are constrained to 
interpret its total cognitive state in a way that, on the whole, maximizes knowledge.   
    A more traditional constraint on the attribution of judgment or belief to a being involves the maximization 
of truth, rather than knowledge (see, for example, Davidson (1974, 1983)).  For a defense of knowledge, 
rather than truth, as the constitutive aim of judgment or belief see Williamson (2004).  It is worth pointing 
out that even defenders of the former idea should be willing to grant the point I want to get out of this 
characterization of judgment — namely, that a capacity to judge requires a certain form of rational control 
over one’s total system of commitments. 
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 involves taking oneself to believe that p, both in that one must recognize p to be part of the 
commitments one will rely upon in the future, and in that one must hold oneself responsible for 
reassessing one’s commitment to p in the light of further judgments.24 
 The starting point here is that judgment, or making up our mind, is our way of exercising 
rational control over our mental state.  We cannot make sense of the idea that a being possesses a 
capacity to judge, unless that being is capable of adjusting some of its cognitive states in the light of 
other such — actual or possible — states.  Spelling out what this requires, in turn, shows judgment 
to essentially depend on reflexivity.   
 Consider the following elementary piece of reasoning.  Fred believes that Mary will be at a 
certain meeting tonight.  In the meantime, however, he learns that Mary is sick with a fever.  
Accordingly, he revises his old belief that Mary will be at the meeting, and now believes that she will 
not be there.  Even such elementary reasoning, I suggest, is unintelligible independently of the 
reflexivity of belief. 
 First, it is clear that Fred does not simply add to his mental state the belief that Mary will not 
be at the meeting (not, at least, in a non-pathological case).  What happens is that Fred revises an 
older belief, in the light of new information that undermines its grounds.  This shows, at the very 
least, that Fred must have some capacity to assess the grounds for his beliefs, and to replace beliefs 
that are no longer justified with others that are.  This is not yet enough to show that Fred’s first-
order capacity for belief is itself reflexive, since his capacity to assess his beliefs might be a separate, 
second-order faculty, which periodically scans his first order beliefs for weak points and 
inconsistencies.  If that were so, then neither his original belief that Mary will be at the meeting, nor 
                                                 
24 As the formulation in the text makes clear, one should not conceive of the reflexivity of the capacity to 
judge atomistically: the reflexivity of the capacity to judge concerns the way in which judgments form an 
interlocking, mutually supporting system.  Incidentally, this serves indirectly to respond to a challenge raised 
by Sosa (see BonJour (2003: 135-136)).  The challenge is to explain our knowledge that we lack a certain 
belief.  Since the reflexivity of the capacity to judge concerns the meshing of our judgments into a system, it 
can also serve as the basis of our knowledge that a certain belief is not part of that system. 
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 the later judgment that she will not, need themselves involve self-awareness.  Fred detects their 
presence, and their incompatibility, through the employment of his second-order faculty.   
 I do not wish to deny that we may indeed possess such a second-order faculty, and 
occasionally use it in just this way.  But it is extremely implausible that this is what is involved in 
Fred’s reasoning.  For, on this picture, Fred first judges that Mary will not be at the meeting, and only 
then — in virtue of an exercise of his second-order faculty of assessing his first-order beliefs — does 
he give up the belief that Mary will be at the meeting.  But this cannot be right: intuitively, Fred never 
believed both that Mary will be at the meeting and that Mary will not be at the meeting.  But even if 
one insisted that the operation of the second-order faculty is instantaneous, so that there need not 
be any temporal interval during which both beliefs are present in Fred’s mind, the point remains 
that, on this view, we explain Fred’s reasoning by attributing to him belief in — or, if beliefs (as 
states) cannot be instantaneous, an instantaneous belief-like relation to — a contradictory pair of 
propositions, and the ability to remove the contradiction.  But this would seem too complex a 
picture of what is an elementary piece of reasoning.   
 I think it is more plausible to hold that Fred’s judgment that Mary will not be at the meeting 
just is his giving up of the belief that Mary will be at the meeting (excluding, again, pathological 
cases).  To put it in a slightly metaphorical way, the first-order judgment itself involves awareness of 
the place the new belief must rationally occupy in Fred’s web of belief, and makes room for it 
accordingly.  When Fred originally believes that Mary will be at the meeting, his belief involves his 
being aware both that he believes that Mary will be at the meeting, and also that this opinion is 
grounded in a number of other considerations — including perhaps that she said she would be, that 
she seemed to be healthy enough yesterday, and so on.25  When Fred finds out that Mary is sick with 
                                                 
25 More minimally, Fred may just be aware that any one among a number of considerations will speak against 
Mary’s being at the meeting.  This point does not make a difference for anything in the text, as it still entails 
that Fred’s beliefs involve his being aware of rational relations. 
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 a fever, this directly undermines the belief that Mary will be at the meeting, since it directly 
undermines some of the considerations Fred acknowledges as its grounds.  Thus his abandoning the 
belief that Mary will be at the meeting and his adopting the belief that Mary will not be at the 
meeting are just two sides of the same coin: they are not two distinct mental acts.  Clearly, what 
makes this reconstruction of Fred’s reasoning possible is taking his first order beliefs to be reflexive. 
 
 
3.  None of the above is meant to deny that there can be a system in some ways functionally similar 
to a full-blown cognitive system like ours, but which does not involve such reflexivity.  We can 
imagine a system whose output is controlled by the contents of certain specially designated registers 
— its “belief-box” — and whose input is used in such a way as to simultaneously maximize certain 
desirable parameters characterizing the contents of the belief-box.  If, for example, one of the 
contents in the system’s belief-box is a representation of the proposition that the table is red, but 
subsequent input makes the proposition that the table is orange more likely to be true, then — other 
things being equal — the representation of the first proposition is replaced by a representation of 
the second, and the rest of the contents in the belief-box are modified accordingly.  Such a system 
evidently displays some form of control, and even rational control, over the contents of its belief-
box.  But, I suggest, it still does not manifest a capacity to judge, because — having left reflexivity 
out of the picture — the control it displays is not of the right kind. 
 Of course something goes out of the belief-box and something else comes in, in accordance 
with certain rational rules; but that is not something our system does, in the sense of ‘doing’ involved 
in expressions such as “making up one’s mind” that illustrate the relevant conception of judgment.  
Unless our system takes itself to be committed to the content that the table is red, and subsequently 
takes itself to be committed to the content that the table is orange instead (and thus to making the 
corresponding adjustments elsewhere), it is not properly reassessing and revising the contents of its 
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 belief-box.  To the extent that our system lacks a special perspective on its own contents, it lacks a 
certain kind of subjectivity required by a genuine capacity to judge. 
 We can make all this a bit more precise, in terms of an intuitive necessary condition of 
possessing a capacity to judge.  In order for someone to possess a capacity to judge, some of her 
states that we are otherwise inclined to count as beliefs must be open to a special kind of 
explanation.  Suppose that F(S,X) is a schematic relational predicate, signifying that a subject S 
stands in a relation either to a proposition or a set of propositions that we are inclined to count as 
belief.  Then, for some such relations, statements of the following form must be true: 
 F(S,p) because F(S,R) 26   
The ‘because’ in this schema clearly does not designate just any causal relation.  If an instance of our 
schema is true of a subject, then it must specify our subject’s reason for believing that p.  Consider, for 
example, the following intuitive instance of the schema: “Fred believes that Mary will not be at the 
meeting because he believes that she is sick with a fever”. The crucial point is that, when we take the 
latter case to be an instance of our schema, Fred’s attitude towards his own attitude and its 
explanation plays a central role.  If it is true that Fred believes that Mary will not be at the meeting 
because he believes she is sick with a fever, then — pathological cases aside — Fred himself must be 
disposed to accept both that he believes that Mary will not be at the meeting, and that he does so 
because he believes that she is sick with a fever.  If he is not disposed to accept the explanation, then 
this is serious grounds to suspect that the explanation is not true of Fred after all.   
                                                 
26  This way of making the point follows Rödl (2007: ch. 3).  More generally, the discussion in the text echoes 
discussions of self-awareness in action, inspired by Anscombe’s account.  
     One might worry that the schema in the text is unduly restrictive, since many of our beliefs seem to be 
justified otherwise than by other beliefs: my belief that the sun is shining, for example, is justified by my 
perceptual state, rather than by another belief.  It is true that a creature which had only beliefs justified by 
contentful states other than beliefs would seem to be ruled out, without argument, by the formulation in the 
text.  But, since I think a creature of this sort seems intuitively unlikely, I would rather not mess with the 
simplicity of the principle in the text just in order to make room for it.  The point of the principle in the text 
is not to give pride of place to belief as a justifying state, but rather to stress that belief is the sort of thing that 
both stands in need of justification and justifies.     
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  The truth of explanations in terms of our schema, therefore, is highly sensitive to whether 
the subject of the explanation is prepared to endorse the explanation herself.  But it is a necessary 
condition of possessing a capacity to judge that enough of one’s performances are explainable by 
means of our schema.  Thus, it follows that possessing a capacity to judge requires having some 
degree of sensitivity to one’s own beliefs and one’s reasons for them — in particular, a degree high 
enough to allow some such explanations to be true. 
 This gives us a way to formulate what the system described a few paragraphs back lacks.  
Correct explanations of that system’s transitions between states involve no dependence on a special 
kind of attitude to what goes in and out of its belief-box (the system doesn’t even have any 
provisions for such an attitude).  Thus, they are not subject to explanations of the appropriate form.  
Even if we added a special set of second-order registers that reliably tracked the changes in the 
contents of its first-order registers, the explanations of those first-order changes would still not be 
sensitive to the system’s second-order contents.  This entails that the system’s transitions between 
first-order states are not made for reasons, even though (as judged from the outside) they may be as 
rational as we like.  But this entails that our system lacks a capacity to judge. 
 
4.  Even though the epistemic life of ordinarily mature and reflective subjects involves a significant 
amount of higher-order belief, as I have been insisting the reflexivity of belief as such is not a 
capacity for second-order belief.  The “taking oneself to believe” that is involved in judging is not a 
second-order judgment or belief, and it does not necessarily issue in one.  It is a form of awareness 
more basic than that, which forms part of the background against which second-order belief is to be 
understood.   
 A subject may be able to exercise her capacity to judge by treating her existing beliefs as 
giving her reasons for new judgments, and her new judgments as giving her reasons either to retain 
or to revise old beliefs, without thinking of herself as a subject of beliefs.  This seems clear, even if 
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 we consider the above case.  What was important about Fred’s thinking was that it was subject to a 
certain kind of explanation, which Fred himself could endorse.  But explanations of this kind do not 
assign an explanatory role to second-order beliefs as such.  Of course, believing the explanation would 
itself be a second-order state; but the reflexivity of judgment does not require one to actually believe 
true explanations of the appropriate form, but only to be disposed to do so.  This disposition is 
grounded, as I have been suggesting, in a feature of first-order belief itself. 
 Thus full-blown self-knowledge is not guaranteed by the reflexivity of belief alone, since the 
latter does not need to involve any beliefs about one’s own mental states, and (full-blown) 
knowledge entails belief.  But the reflexivity of belief offers the necessary background against which 
a capacity for second-order judgment, and thus full-blown self-knowledge, can be understood.  
Similarly, as I will argue in the next section, the reflexivity of belief by itself does not suffice for full-
blown a priori knowledge; but it provides a piece of the necessary background against which a priori 
knowledge must be understood.27 
 
                                                 
27  The question naturally arises whether one needs to be at least capable of such second-order judgment and 
belief in order to be capable of reflexive first-order beliefs.  In other words, does one need to have something 
like our concepts of belief, judgment, and reason in order to have reflexive first-order beliefs?   
     On the one hand, it seems a bit disingenuous to insist that a creature with a fully reflexive first-order 
cognitive faculty — a creature that is aware of its own first-order beliefs and its reasons for them — might 
nevertheless lack the concepts of belief or reason.  What more should we require as evidence that it possesses 
them?  It seems odd to say that our creature is capable of being aware of itself as believing for reasons, but 
nevertheless it lacks the concepts of judgment and reason.  The distinction between having a capacity to be 
aware of something as an F and possessing the concept of an F seems obscure.  On the other hand, we can find 
intuitively plausible examples of creatures that have a capacity to judge, but do not seem to have a capacity 
for second-order thought.  Arguably, something like this might actually be the case with young children or 
non-human animals.  Unless we take these cases to bring the point about the reflexivity of belief itself in 
question, shouldn’t we take them to prove that we must make room for pre-conceptual capacities for self-
awareness? 
     I will not attempt to resolve this issue here.  Let me note, however, that I do not think that it is altogether 
implausible to take the capacity to judge — at least our capacity to judge — to be an acquired rather than an 
innate skill, so that subjects count as full-blown judgers only at the end of a developmental process.  This 
would entail that we do not share the same capacity to judge with creatures that lack the necessary reflective 
concepts.  But it need not entail that we do not share something more generic with them: perhaps the 
capacity to have an intelligent, and adaptive, take on the world around us.  (See McDowell (1994: Lecture 
VI).) 
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 5.  As I suggested early on in this chapter, the account of self-awareness just given combines with 
the holistic account of concept-possession to show that a judging subject must not only be 
sufficiently reliable in conforming to the norms of her practice; she must, moreover, be sufficiently 
reliable in recognizing particular instances of those norms.  This, I take it, is the fundamental capacity 
on which our full-blown capacity for a priori knowledge is based. 
 According to what I have been arguing so far, a mature subject’s thought is reflexive, in the 
following sense: if our subject believes p for reason R, then she normally is aware — even if she 
does not judge — that she believes p for reason R, and thus — by the same token — she takes R to 
be (objectively) reason for p. 
 Now, of course, on occasion the subject’s reasons for a certain belief will be bad; and in that 
case the normative judgment she is disposed to make — namely, that R objectively is reason for p — 
will be false, and thus not a candidate for knowledge at all.  Moreover, in some of the cases where R 
really is a reason for p, this will be so only contingent on further, empirical background knowledge.  
For example, the fact that Fred’s belief that Mary is sick with a fever gives him good reason to 
believe that she will not be at the meeting depends on Fred’s background knowledge — for 
example, his knowledge that normally one has to be reasonably healthy to participate in the meeting, 
that being present at the meeting is not of life-and-death importance to Mary, and so on.  Thus, 
although Fred knows that his belief that Mary is sick gives him good reason to believe that she will 
not be at the meeting, his knowledge is empirical, not a priori. 
 On the other hand, given the holistic constraint of concept possession, it must be the case 
that, for a sufficiently broad and central range of the norms constitutive of her concepts, the subject 
is reliably disposed to conform to them.  But, now, the account of self-awareness we have 
guarantees that this is no longer a mere claim of reliability: dispositions to judge or infer are no 
longer blind.  Suppose that our subject is in fact reliably disposed to infer in accordance with the rule 
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 of double negation.  This, on the present account, entails that, on the occasions where she does infer 
in accordance with it, she is aware that she believes that p for the reason that ~~p; thus she takes it 
that ~~p is a good reason to believe that p.28  But, given this context, there is a perfectly intelligible 
sense in which this awareness is a case of our subject’s recognizing the correctness of an instance of 
the law of double negation.  In a perfectly intelligible sense, therefore, our subject now can be said 
to infer in accordance with the law of double negation because she recognizes the correctness of its 
instances.  If she explicitly goes on to judge such an inference to be correct on this basis, this is a 
case of knowledge.  This, as I have been suggesting throughout, is our fundamental capacity for a 
priori knowledge.29 
 
6.  The question I have been trying to answer in this chapter was how to account for a subject’s 
justification in conforming her thinking to norms which, as a matter of fact, are constitutive of her 
concepts.  The answer I gave focuses on the self-awareness characteristic of conceptual thought: a 
subject is, at least in a broad and central enough range of cases, justified in conforming her thinking 
to those norms because she recognizes the correctness of their instances. 
                                                 
28 As noted earlier, there is a sense in which this inference too depends on — possibly empirical — 
background knowledge: the subject’s reasons for ~~p must be stronger than whatever reasons she may have 
to reject p.  But the case is not at all like the empirical case discussed in the text: the rational connection 
between ~~p and p, and Fred’s recognition of it, do not themselves depend on background knowledge, as the 
connection between Fred’s belief that Mary is sick and his belief that she will not be at the meeting did.  It is 
only what Fred is entitled to do with his recognition that depends on empirical knowledge. 
29 Would our subject also be in a position to know that she knows that p follows from ~~p?  Normally, I 
think she would.  Consider what the situation would be like if she did not.  Our subject knows that p follows 
from ~~p.  Presumably she also knows that she judges p to follow from ~~p.  If this is so, then what is there 
to stop her from arguing “I judge p to follow from ~~p; and p follows from ~~p; therefore, I don’t 
mistakenly judge that p follows from ~~p”?  But it seems intuitive that our subject cannot use such an 
argument to reassure herself about her a priori judgments.  (A similar point is widely, though not universally, 
acknowledged in the case of perception.  (See Cohen (2002), Davies (2004), Pryor (2000; 2004) and Wright 
(2004) for different takes on the issue.)  I suggest that the problem with such arguments is precisely that, 
normally, if we attribute to a subject a priori knowledge that p follows from ~~p, we also — and thereby — 
take her to know (or to be in a position to know) that she knows this fact.  Given that, on the present view, 
basic a priori knowledge is attributed on the basis of a self-conscious capacity to judge, such self-knowledge 
should not be surprising. 
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  Now, of course, the overall aim of this dissertation has been to give an account of a priori 
knowledge in general, and the interest in this question was generated only because, intuitively, it 
appeared that the capacity to conform one’s thinking to the norms constitutive of one’s concepts is 
somehow fundamental to a priori knowledge in general.  Indeed, I think that it is.  I will close this 
chapter by revisiting the question of how to get full-blown a priori knowledge out of exercises of 
this capacity. 
 Recall our example of a subject’s coming to know that the law of double negation is a valid 
rule of inference (assuming, of course, that classical logic is correct, and therefore that this is 
something we can know).  Intuitively, it seems that if anything interesting is knowable a priori, basic 
logical laws are.  As I suggested earlier, it is intuitively plausible that at the basis of any account of 
how one comes to know that a basic law of logic is valid there must be an account of how one 
recognizes particular instances of the law.  In one way or another, one’s knowledge that the law of 
double negation is valid depends on one’s being able to recognize the validity of particular 
inferences in accordance with that law.   
 As I have been trying to argue, this latter ability is to be explained in terms of the reflexivity 
of belief.  In the first instance, of course, the reflexivity of belief explains how, when we actually do 
infer in accordance with — for example — double negation, we are justified in doing so: we are 
justified because we recognize the inference as a good one.  But the same ability can plausibly be 
exercised “offline”, when one is not in the business of actually making inferences, but rather simply 
in the business of evaluating them (perhaps one is doing a piece of logic homework).  Thus the same 
sort of capacity that justifies the subject in making an inference in accordance with the law of double 
negation can be exercised when the subject merely entertains, for the purposes of evaluation, the 
same inference. 
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 There is, of course, more to be said about how one moves from the ability to evaluate 
particular inferences to knowledge that the law of double negation is a valid inference rule.  I will not 
go into this question here in any detail.  But it seems plausible that, if one is capable of correctly 
evaluating particular instances of the law, then one may also — given sufficient background 
knowledge — figure out that the inferences work because of the logical form of the premise and 
conclusion.  Supposing our subject to be capable of explicitly theorizing about the validity of her 
inferences, it is plausible that she is in a position to recognize that in any particular case the validity 
of an inference in accordance to the law of double negation is due to the distinctive contribution of 
negation to the relevant propositions, rather than to any particular feature of the case: thus she can 
tell that, no matter what proposition p is, if one believes that ~~p, then one also ought to believe 
that p.  But then, she is now in a position to know that the law of double negation is a valid rule of 
inference. 
 Appendix A 
ON THE INDIVIDUATION OF FREGEAN THOUGHTS 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Throughout this dissertation I rely on a Fregean conception of thoughts.  I introduced this 
conception in Chapter 1, by contrasting it to Russell’s conception of propositions.  Although both 
Russellian propositions and Fregean thoughts are conceived of as the objects of intentional mental 
states and acts, the availability to the mind of Russellian propositions is, in a sense, merely an 
accident: nothing about their nature follows from the nature of thinking.  The nature of Fregean 
thoughts, by contrast, is not similarly independent of the nature of thinking: Fregean thoughts are 
individuated by reference to the same principles of reason that govern our thinking.  This is not just 
an epistemological claim, concerning the criteria we apply in practice to attribute content to people; 
it is a metaphysical claim, concerning what Fregean thoughts are.  In this Appendix, I will elaborate a 
bit further on the question of the individuation of Fregean thoughts. 
 
 
 
2. A LINGUISTIC APPROACH 
 
 
Frege’s notion of thought is a descendant of his earlier notion of “conceptual content” (begrifflichen 
Inhalt).1  As such, it is meant to capture, from the perspective of the subject of a mental state or act, 
that feature or aspect of it that is relevant to its truth or falsity.  In thinking a thought we represent 
                                                 
1 Frege (1967: 6). 
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 things as being a certain way, and in judging it we take them to be this way.  Our mental states or 
acts, of course, usually also have features which are not relevant to how they represent things as 
being; these features, according to Frege, do not belong to the conceptual content of the mental 
states or acts — they are not features of the relevant thoughts.   
Crucially, thoughts are the sort of thing that can be communicated in language.  This means 
neither that all thoughts must be capable of being communicated in this way, nor that natural 
language provides an ideal vehicle for just any thought.  Nevertheless, in a core of central cases, 
sentences in natural language not only express thoughts, but also exhibit a syntactic structure that 
corresponds to the structure of the thoughts themselves.  The thought in these central cases is the 
sense of the sentence, and the constituent parts of the thought are assigned as senses to the 
corresponding constituent parts of the sentence.  The sense of a linguistic expression is, in general, 
the “mode of presentation” of its referent or “meaning” (Bedeutung) — that is, the way the referent is 
thought of by one who understands the expression.2  On Frege’s official exposition the referent of a 
singular term is an object, while that of a predicative expression is a “concept” — a function, that is, 
from the set of objects (or n-tuples of objects) to the set of truth-values.  Sentences are conceived of 
as complex singular terms, with truth-values as their referents.3 
 The connection between language and thought makes it natural to look at language for clues 
concerning the individuation of thoughts.  More specifically, one might hope for a principle for the 
                                                 
2 It is sometimes assumed that the Fregean sense of names at least must be something like a cluster of definite 
descriptions which are known (or at least believed) to hold uniquely of its referent.  If that were so, then the 
question of the individuation of at least these senses would be quite easy to answer.  But I think there is no 
compelling reason to take the sense of names to consist in such descriptions.   
     In fact, given Frege’s equation of grasping the sense of a referring expression with understanding that 
expression, and the compelling arguments to the effect that understanding a name does not consist in coming 
to know — or at least believe — a definite description, it seems that we have good reason to avoid attributing 
to Frege that view. 
3 Frege (1997b; 1997e). 
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 individuation of linguistic senses, in the hope that this will take us some way towards a principle for 
the individuation of thoughts in general. 
 It is possible (although not mandatory) to extract from Frege’s essay ‘On Sense and 
Reference’ the following simple proposal for the individuation of linguistic senses, which I will call 
the Intersubstitutability Criterion: two expressions in a language L have the same sense only if they 
are intersubstitutable without change in truth value in all contexts.4 
As Frege’s discussion makes clear, the relevant contexts for present purposes are the ‘that’-
clauses of indirect speech attributions of propositional attitudes.  Frege presents this proposal as an 
application of Leibniz’s Law, which — in the formulation that is of relevance here, at least — states 
that expressions have the same reference only if they can be substituted for each other in every 
context.  At first sight, the contexts generated by the ‘that’-clauses of indirect attributions of 
propositional attitudes seem to generate counterexamples to this principle.  We are inclined to 
accept that: 
(1) Jones believes that Phosphorus is a planet 
may differ in truth-value from: 
(2) Jones believes that Hesperus is a planet 
even though, as we (unlike Jones) know, ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ both refer to the planet 
Venus.  According to Frege, however, such pairs of sentences are not counterexamples to Leibniz’s 
Law, for expressions used in the ‘that’-clauses of indirect attributions do not refer to the referents 
they have in ordinary contexts, but rather to their senses.  Taking ‘believes’ in this context to express a 
                                                 
4 The Intersubstitutability Criterion as formulated gives us a necessary condition for identity, but not a 
sufficient one.  In fact, no equally simple sufficient condition of the identity of sense can be formulated in the 
same spirit.  This is because, prior to an exhaustive examination of the expressive resources of L, we have no 
guarantee that for every two expressions with distinct senses there will be a sentence of L such that 
substituting one expression for the other in it will result in a change in truth-value.  The Intersubstitutability 
Criterion, therefore, can be strengthened to a biconditional only on the assumption that we are dealing with a 
rich enough language.  Since the points I want to make concerning the Intersubstitutability Criterion do not 
hinge on having a sufficient condition for identity, I will ignore this complication in what follows. 
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 two-place relation between a subject and a thought, the conclusion Frege draws from the possibility 
that (1) and (2) may diverge in truth-value is that the sense — the thought — expressed by 
“Phosphorus is a planet” differs from that expressed by “Hesperus is a planet”.  Given that we take 
the sense of both of these sentences to be uniquely determined by the senses of their constituent 
expressions, it follows that this difference must be attributed to a difference in sense between 
‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’, since all their other constituents are common to both sentences.  If we 
generalize this intuitive line of thought, the result is the Intersubstitutability Criterion. 
 It is not, as I already suggested, entirely clear whether Frege ever subscribed to the 
Intersubstitutability Criterion.  In fact, I think it is easy to see that the principle as stated above is not 
satisfactory.  The intuitive idea motivating the Intersubstitutability Criterion is that thoughts give us 
a subject’s perspective on the world, and therefore that the principles of individuation of thoughts 
should be sensitive to the way in which we attribute intentional mental states to each other.  Even 
though there is something clearly right about this, it is not adequately captured by the 
Intersubstitutability Criterion.  This, I believe, is because this criterion is too closely tied to the way 
linguistic expressions of propositional attitudes function.  But there is no guarantee that linguistic 
usage is systematic enough to provide an adequate ground for a theoretical account of the 
individuation of thoughts. 
We can see this by considering some counterexamples that have been proposed in the 
literature, and the ways in which the Intersubstitutability Criterion might be defended in the face of 
them.  I hope it will become clear that the criterion is not viable, as it requires us to make 
distinctions between senses that, intuitively, are not well-motivated.  This, I take it, constitutes 
evidence that the individuation of thoughts cannot be simply read off from the behavior of 
propositional attitude expressions in natural language. 
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 Consider the case of an English-speaking subject who does not know that the words ‘furze’ 
and ‘gorse’ are different names for the same plant (the example is discussed by Kripke5).  Since it is 
common knowledge that furze and gorse are the same plant, the case is significantly different from 
Frege’s case of ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’:6 ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ are intuitively synonyms in English, 
whereas there is no similar pressure to take ‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ as synonymous — certainly 
not prior to the relevant astronomical discovery.  If Jones is not party to this common bit of 
botanical knowledge, however, it would appear possible that the sentences: 
(3) Jones believes that furze is spiny 
(4) Jones believes that gorse is spiny 
may differ in truth-value.  According to the Intersubstitutability Criterion, this should lead us to 
conclude that ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ differ in sense. 
The defender of the Intersubstitutability Criterion, therefore, would have to insist that, even 
though ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ intuitively express the same sense for most people, nevertheless they 
express different senses in the mouth of our ignorant subject.  Moreover, she should add, when we 
evaluate a sentence which includes an intentional verb governing a ‘that’-clause, we should be careful 
to take the expressions within the ‘that’-clause to refer not to their ordinary senses, but to the senses 
attached to them by the person denoted by the grammatical subject of the verb.  Of course it may 
turn out that the two senses are identical; but we cannot assume this at the outset.   
This move is effective against our puzzle, but it is not clear that the defender of Fregean 
sense should be happy with it.7  Sense is supposed to be an objective and, for the most part, shared 
                                                 
5 Kripke (1979). 
6 Frege actual examples are ‘the Morning Star’ and ‘the Evening Star’; but since these expressions look, 
grammatically, like definite descriptions, it may be better to use the unstructured expressions I use in the text. 
7 Kripke briefly considers such moves in response to his puzzle, but he quickly dismisses them as implausible.  
I think the reason he dismisses them, however, is just that he assumes that sense must be something like a 
cluster of descriptions associated with a linguistic expression.  But, as I suggested earlier, there seems to be no 
compelling reason for that assumption. 
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 aspect of language.  Of course Frege did envisage co-referential names that differ in sense, and 
therefore we should certainly expect our principle of individuation to allow for such cases.  We 
should, in other words, expect no guarantee that ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ will never differ in sense, in the 
mouth of any English-speaking subject who uses both to refer to the same plant, no matter what 
their individual histories and the state of their botanical knowledge.  The problem is not that the 
Intersubstitutability Criterion demands making such distinctions at the level of idiolects; it is, rather, 
that it demands making them far too easily, regardless of any intuitively relevant contextual details.   
As we already saw, in any case where (3) and (4) intuitively differ in truth value the 
Intersubstitutability Criterion will classify ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ as Jones uses them as differing in sense.  
But further details of the case might make this hard to accept.  Jones, for example, might have 
picked up the word ‘furze’ only recently, just from someone else’s conversation concerning a plant 
that grows in dry areas.  Intuitively, we would say that she has only a limited understanding of its 
sense.  If she is reasonable, she will presumably agree with our judgment, and therefore we may 
suppose that in her use of ‘furze’ she will intend to defer to people who know more about it 
(perhaps to the people she picked the word up from).  Given this description of the case, it may be 
appropriate to judge that (3) is false while (4) is true: Jones herself, for instance, would in all 
probability refuse to assent to (3), given how shaky her understanding of ‘furze’ is.  If this is right, 
the Intersubstitutability Criterion would require us to classify ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ as differing in sense 
for Jones.  Intuitively, however, the word ‘furze’ in Jones’s mouth has just the same sense as in the 
mouth of the people she intends to defer to; and, by hypothesis, that sense is not different from the 
sense of ‘gorse’, as both Jones and the more knowledgeable subjects use it. 
Moreover, the proposed maneuver is not going to work in general, for there are examples 
involving embedded attitude ascriptions, which do not rely on the subject’s ignorance of the relevant 
synonymies.  Consider, for example, Smith, who is a botanical sophisticate — at least to the extent 
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 of being party to the knowledge that furze and gorse are the same plant.  It is thus implausible that 
the words ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ will differ in sense as she uses them.  Nevertheless, it is still plausible 
that the following will differ in truth-value: 
(5) Smith believes that everyone believes that all furze is furze 
(6) Smith believes that everyone believes that all furze is gorse 
If Smith is minimally reflective, (5) will plausibly be true and (6) will be false, since she will realize 
that not everyone is as competent in her use of the words ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ as she is — she may 
know that her friend Jones, for example, is not. But if this is right, then by the Intersubstitutability 
Criterion ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ should again differ in sense in Smith’s mouth.  Since our assumption 
was that they don’t, this tells against the criterion itself. 8 
 
 
 
 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
 
 
1.  The source of trouble here, I believe, is that we have rested too much weight on linguistic 
considerations concerning the way propositional attitude attributions work in English.  It would be 
convenient if a simple formal criterion were forthcoming through such considerations.  But the 
examples we have considered so far seem to suggest that the linguistic practice of psychological 
attribution does not by itself permit the formulation of such a criterion. 
                                                 
8  This is a version of Mates’s puzzle, discussed in Burge (1978).  Frege’s view of an hierarchy of senses 
significantly complicates the case.  On a view that embraces the hierarchy, the point must be that the second-
level sense of ‘furze’ must differ from the second-level sense of ‘gorse’ in Smith’s mouth.  Since higher-order 
sense is determined by one’s take on another’s thinking, this is not nearly as implausible as taking Smith’s first-
level senses to differ.  Still, such cases show that combining the Intersubstitutability Criterion with Frege’s 
hierarchy of senses is pretty much guaranteed to have the result that no two words can have the same second 
(or higher) level sense, for any minimally reflective subject.  It is not clear that a proponent of the hierarchy 
should be comfortable with this. 
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 If this suggestion is right, then we evidently need a different approach to the individuation of 
thoughts.  The approach I am going to suggest is motivated, just as the Intersubstitutability Criterion 
itself was, by the idea that the identity of Fregean thoughts is fixed by their place in our rational 
economy.  We can spell this out somewhat by observing that an account of the individuation of 
thoughts should combine with an account of the propositional attitudes to give us the resources to 
understand people as rational thinkers.9  On the present proposal, however, it is not assumed that 
the way propositional attitude attributions work in English (or any other natural language) is always a 
perfect guide to the nature of these attitudes (or, at least, to the most interesting or central among 
them).  Instead, we need to develop our account by specifying explicit, intuitive constraints on the 
sorts of attitudes that are central to the individuation of thoughts. 
We can begin by considering the following principle suggested by Evans in his interpretation 
of Frege (the formulation is adapted in order to eliminate reference to sentences): 
The Intuitive Criterion of Difference: A thought T must be different from the 
thought T’ if it is possible for someone to understand both at a given time, while 
coherently taking mutually exclusive attitudes towards them, [e.g.] accepting one 
while rejecting, or being agnostic about, the other. 10 
 
It is clear that the criterion as stated here is quite rough.  For one thing, it does not in general apply 
to thoughts expressed by sentences containing indexical expressions.  For example, Frege famously 
held that each person has a unique way of referring to herself, expressible by the first-person 
pronoun ‘I’.  It follows that two sentences uttered by two different individuals, both of which 
involve the use of ‘I’, must always express different thoughts.  Yet it is not possible for anyone to 
rationally hold contradictory attitudes to these two thoughts, not because doing so would be 
irrational, but rather because there is no one person who can hold any attitude to both of these 
                                                 
9 See McDowell (1998b). 
10 See Evans (1982: 18-9).  This principle is explicitly appealed to by Frege in a number of places.  See, for 
example, Frege (1997b: 156; 1997c: 332-333; d: 128). 
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 thoughts.11  I will not here try to formulate further criteria to take care of these cases, since the 
points I want to make can be made without reference to them. 
 Evans’s criterion, as well as the proposal I will go on to make in a similar spirit, are attempts 
to spell out the idea that thoughts are individuated in terms of their role in the mental economy of 
rational subjects.  They depend, therefore, on psychological notions, and primarily on the 
propositional attitudes.  The crucial difference between this approach and the one that led to the 
Intersubstitutability Criterion is that the present approach is much less dependent on linguistic 
considerations: the relevant propositional attitudes are specified by means of explicit constraints, 
thus minimizing reliance on the vastly complicated conventions governing the use of verbs like ‘to 
believe’.  Giving a full account of how expressions for propositional attitudes work in a natural 
language is a difficult problem; the present approach aims to sidestep it as much as possible.  
What, on the contrary, will need to be addressed in later sections is the nature of the 
constraints imposed on the attitudes relevant to the individuation of thoughts.  The crucial notions 
used in the Intuitive Criterion of Difference are those of understanding and — in effect — of the 
rational incompatibility between attitudes.  These are notions that need to be explicitly discussed.  
Much of this Appendix is devoted to this task.  But before getting to the discussion of these notions, 
we need to examine some more basic reasons why we cannot be fully satisfied with the Intuitive 
Criterion of Difference. 
 
2.  The Intuitive Criterion of Difference as formulated above gives us only a sufficient condition of 
difference (or, alternatively, a necessary condition of identity) between thoughts.  Could we 
                                                 
11 The problem here is not formal, since the Intuitive Criterion of Difference as formulated does not purport 
to give a necessary criterion of difference, only a sufficient one.  The problem, rather, is that such first-personal 
indexical thoughts are altogether outside the reach of the Intuitive Criterion, and therefore something further 
has to be said about their principles of individuation. 
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 strengthen it to a biconditional, so as to get a necessary condition as well?  We could not.  For 
consider the thoughts expressed by the following two sentences: 
(7) Jones is Jones 
(8) Smith is Smith 
It is intuitively clear that these are two different thoughts, yet it is also clear — even without a 
theoretical account of understanding or rational incompatibility — that no one could understand 
both while rationally taking incompatible attitudes towards them.12  One could rationally doubt 
either (7) or (8) only by questioning the law of identity (I am assuming that there is such a thing as 
rationally doubting a fundamental logical law; if this is thought to be problematic, the argument in 
the next paragraph would still apply).  But if a subject questions the law of identity in one of the two 
cases, it would obviously be irrational for her not to question it in the other.  Thus, for a rational 
subject the thoughts expressed by (7) and (8) stand or fall together, even though they are — 
intuitively — distinct.  
 A parallel problem would arise for the biconditional version of the Intuitive Criterion of 
Difference in the case of thoughts which cannot be comprehendingly endorsed (or rejected), on pain 
of irrationality.  If we strengthen the Intuitive Criterion of Difference to a biconditional, then that 
will have the result that there can be only one thought such that, if one understands it, one rationally 
has to endorse it, and only one thought such that if one understands it one rationally has to reject it.  
It is clear that if one wanted to defend the existence of thoughts such that understanding them 
rationally requires endorsement (or rejection), then one could not accept this consequence.  It is, of 
course, controversial whether there are any thoughts such that understanding them is incompatible 
                                                 
12 The possible failure of either Jones or Smith to exist might complicate the picture, at least on some views 
of non-referring names.  But if we stick with Evans’s view, if either ‘Jones’ or ‘Smith’ fail to refer, the 
corresponding sentence expresses no thought, and therefore there is no such thing as understanding it.  Thus 
the formulation in the text is correct, even if questions of existence are allowed to bear on the case. 
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 with either rejecting or endorsing them; but this should not be ruled out by merely formal 
considerations concerning the individuation of thoughts. 
 Returning to (7) and (8), it is easy to see why the biconditional version of the Intuitive 
Criterion of Difference fails.  The Intuitive Criterion of Difference is not explicitly sensitive to the 
internal structure of thoughts; yet it is clear that what differentiates the thought expressed by (7) 
from the thought expressed by (8) is that in (8) ‘Smith’ has been substituted for ‘Jones’.   
It is, in any case, independently intuitive that thoughts should be treated as functionally 
composite, in the sense that they are uniquely determined by their parts and the ways in which these 
parts are combined.  This gives us a necessary condition of difference between thoughts (and, 
conversely, a sufficient condition of identity): 
Compositional Criterion: If two thoughts are distinct, then they must differ either in 
their components or in their mode of composition.13   
Now, of course, this principle cannot take us very far, unless we can say something about the 
individuation of thought-components and modes of composition.  From a Fregean perspective, 
however, this is not such a straightforward matter.  Supposing that we had access to the internal 
structures of thoughts, as well as criteria of identity for thought-components and modes of 
composition, then we could of course move back up and formulate criteria for the identity of 
thoughts in terms of their composition from those more basic elements.  Given Frege’s “context 
principle”, however, this direct route is not available to us: as I already stressed in Chapter 1, 
                                                 
13 The converse does not straightforwardly hold, since — as Frege repeatedly emphasized — thoughts can be 
decomposed in many different ways: the thought ‘Fa’, for example, can be seen to consist of the first-level 
concept expressed by ‘Fξ’ predicated of a, or, alternatively, of the second-level concept expressed by ‘Φa’ 
predicated of the first-level concept expressed by ‘Fξ’.  To formulate a condition both sufficient and necessary 
for the identity of thoughts, therefore, we need the set of all possible decompositions of a given thought. 
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 according to Frege it is only through their contribution to whole thoughts that thought-components 
and modes of combination are individuated.14   
Even independently of Frege’s letter, it is in any case hard to see how an appeal to 
independent criteria for the individuation of thought-components and modes of composition could 
be warranted at this point.  Thoughts are the objects of our propositional attitudes — they are the 
things we judge, believe, question, anticipate, and so on.  Thought-components and modes of 
composition, by contrast, are available to us only in virtue of second-order thinking about thoughts 
themselves.   
 As has been noted by many commentators on Frege, we get access to the internal structure 
of thoughts not by narrowing our focus, as it were, so as to look at the interior of thoughts, but 
rather by expanding our view to encompass a whole system of thoughts and attitudes.15  To 
determine the internal structure of a thought we need to see that thought in rational relations — for 
example, relations of logical entailment or inconsistency — with other thoughts. 
 To see how this would work in the context of the present proposal, consider first a simple 
example along the lines of those discussed in the previous section.  Consider the following 
sentences: 
 (9) Hesperus is Hesperus 
 (10) Hesperus is Phosphorus 
How are we to determine whether these express the same or different thoughts in the mouth of an 
astronomically ignorant subject, Jones?  Well, if we have evidence that our apparently rational and 
generally competent subject is disposed to assent to (for instance) ‘Hesperus is a planet’, but shows 
no disposition to infer from this to the sentence ‘Phosphorus is a planet’, then we have some 
                                                 
14 The principle is first formulated in Frege (1980) that is, before Frege develops his conception of sense and 
reference.  It is natural, however, to take Frege to have held the analogous thesis for thoughts and their 
components. 
15 For a very useful discussion of the topic, see Ricketts (forthcoming). 
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 pressure to take ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ to express different senses in her mouth, and hence 
some pressure to take (9) and (10) to express different thoughts.  Of course this pressure may be 
counteracted — if, for example, Jones is a logician notorious for her rejection of Leibniz’s Law, then 
we may have reason to think otherwise.  But the point is not to decide this particular case: the point 
of the present example is just to show how taking into account a system of propositional attitudes, 
rather than considering them one by one, gives us access to the components of thoughts, and thereby 
helps fix the individuation of whole thoughts. 
 Once again we see that it is necessary to appeal to the same idea of the rational combinability 
of attitudes that was central to Evans’s Intuitive Criterion of Difference.  Some of the rational 
combinations of attitudes and thoughts we need to consider will be governed by formal deductive 
principles, like Leibniz’s Law in the previous example.  Others, although still relying on deductively 
valid inferences, may not be possible to capture in a formal system.  Thus the truths of arithmetic 
may be plausibly constitutive of our thoughts involving numbers, but they cannot all be proved in a 
consistent formal system. 
Also relevant may be relations which are neither deductive, nor can be plausibly traced back 
to one or another particular concept, or even to relations between a fixed set of concepts.  It is often 
remarked that a constraint upon interpretation is that we should, as far as possible, interpret a 
subject’s thinking by attributing to her concepts that capture “natural kinds” in her environment.16  
Normally, we would interpret a subject as thinking emeralds to be green rather than grue — or, 
rather, a 21st century analogue of grue — for example, precisely because the former predicate is 
suited to our inductive practices.  If so, then principles of inductive inference are constitutive of a 
hugely significant — though open-ended — class of concepts. 17 
                                                 
16 See Lewis’s “eligibility constraint”, in Lewis (1999). 
17 It is worth pointing out that the approach to the individuation of thoughts I have outlined here is 
compatible with truth-conditional approaches in semantics.  The idea of this compatibility was (arguably) 
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4. UNDERSTANDING AND PROPOSITIONAL ATTITUDES 
 
 
1.  As I pointed out earlier, the move away from the details of the linguistic practice of propositional 
attitude attribution has a point only if combined with explicit theoretical constraints on the 
propositional attitudes relevant to the individuation of thoughts.  This enables us to cut through the 
enormously complex system of conventions governing the use of propositional attitude expressions 
in natural language.  In this section, as well as the ones that follow, I will be considering the nature 
of such constraints. 
 The examples above all turned on intuitive judgments about interpretation.   But it should be 
emphasized that the thesis about individuation I am proposing is not a verificationist one, to the 
effect that thoughts are individuated in terms of the judgments we — or a suitably idealized version 
of ourselves — would make if placed in the position of the interpreter in the corresponding 
scenario.  The thesis concerns which combinations of attitudes and thoughts are rationally available 
to a subject, regardless of how — or even whether — anyone recognizes them to be so.  Of course 
what a particular subject is disposed to say or do constitutes part of the evidence we rely on in 
identifying her thoughts.  But this evidence is supposed to concern an independent subject-matter, 
                                                                                                                                                             
already present in Frege, and has been developed more recently by McDowell and Evans in the framework of 
the Davidsonian project of semantics for natural languages (Evans (1982: ch. 1); McDowell (1998b)).  In a 
Davidsonian theory of meaning, material biconditionals specifying the truth-conditions of sentences in the 
target language are supposed to be derivable as theorems in a recursive theory of truth, whose axioms specify 
the reference of the simple expressions of the language and whose recursion clauses specify its primitive 
modes of combination.  But what qualifies a given recursive theory of the right form as, first, specifically a 
theory of truth for the target language, and, second, as the one among the many extensionally equivalent 
theories of truth that captures the speakers’ intended meanings?  According to McDowell and Evans’s 
approach, the answer must be that the thought that the sentence on the left-hand side of a T-theorem would 
express in the mouth of the native speakers is the same as the thought expressed in the meta-language by the 
sentence used on the right-hand side.  Such an approach to truth-conditional semantics evidently requires an 
account of the individuation of thoughts (as well as an appeal to a pragmatic theory for utterances in the 
target language, which I am here ignoring). 
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 which is neither exhausted by the totality of evidence we can possibly have about it, nor constituted 
by the judgments we make based on that evidence. 
 This serves to deflect a kind of Quinean objection that might surface here.18  I have 
suggested above that certain inferential patterns are constitutive of our concepts.  It is, for example, 
constitutive of the concept green that the attitude of believing “x is green” is incompatible with the 
attitude of rejecting “x is colored”.  A Quinean might object to this view by challenging its 
proponents to give an account of which patterns are constitutive of the concept.  As the Quinean 
would point out, we may find that our subject’s inclination to assent to the sentence “x is Fred’s 
favorite color” conditional on her assent to “x is green” is just as strong as her inclination to assent 
to “x is colored”, conditional on her assent to “x is green”.  Assuming that dispositions to assent to 
or dissent from sentences are all we have to go on when we attempt to identify our subject’s 
thoughts, the Quinean would then deny that we have any reason take the latter pattern to be 
privileged over the former. 
 From the present perspective, however, this challenge may simply be dismissed.  The former 
pattern is not constitutive of the concept green, simply because it is not true that believing that x is 
green stands in any interesting relation to not believing that x is Fred’s favorite color.  A relation 
between the two could only hold because of some further attitude — for example, our subject’s 
believing that green is Fred’s favorite color.  The pattern involving all three of these attitudes might 
have something interesting to teach us about some of the concepts involved, but there simply is no 
interesting pattern involving just the first two.  The fact that no amount of observation of the 
subject’s inclinations to make the relevant transitions suffices to distinguish them in status is simply 
irrelevant here. 
                                                 
18 The style of objection I am imagining follows Quine (1980). 
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 Of course, in giving this response I am making use of my understanding of the term ‘green’; 
thus I am not respecting the Quinean’s restriction of admissible evidence to the subject’s 
dispositions to assent or dissent.  But even in a radical case, where we — as interpreters — do not 
yet understand our subject’s words, what matters for the identity of their thoughts is not their 
dispositions to assent to or dissent from sentences, but rather which combinations of attitudes are 
available to them.  Perhaps our only hope to get to those is through close observation of their 
dispositions to assent to and dissent from sentences which we do not as yet understand.  Perhaps, 
too, this will enable us to make only the crudest distinctions among the thoughts expressed by these 
sentences.  But this, from the present perspective, says nothing at all about the rational relations 
among our subjects’ attitudes, or — accordingly — about the identity of their thoughts. 
 
2.  Thus the notion we need to consider is that of the rational availability of certain combinations of 
attitudes to a subject.  This is the notion that, as we saw, is central to the proposal developed in §3.  
We can begin by considering the question whether one could rationally take contrasting attitudes 
towards the thoughts expressed by the following sentences, while understanding both of them:19 
(12) Furze is spiny 
(13) Gorse is spiny 
It seems that one could believe one of them while being unsure of, or even rejecting, the other.  All 
that is required for this to be the case is a bit of botanical ignorance: one may, for instance, not 
know that furze is the same plant as gorse, and be unsure whether furze is spiny or not.  We would 
normally take such ignorance to impugn neither one’s rationality nor one’s understanding of the 
                                                 
19 I am assuming that we understand which attitudes are, intuitively, “contrasting” in the relevant sense: for 
example, endorsing and rejecting, or being agnostic, are contrasting attitudes in the present sense.  This does 
not mean (as will become evident in the ensuing discussion) that it is impossible for a subject to hold such 
attitudes in respect to the same thought — even without irrationality.  I think that we can help ourselves to an 
intuitive understanding of this notion: if one knows what belief is, then one normally also knows that it 
contrasts (in our sense) with disbelief. 
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 relevant terms.  If we accept these intuitive judgments, then it should follow that (12) and (13) 
express different thoughts, at least in the mouth of the botanically ignorant subject.  This is a direct 
consequence of Evans’s Intuitive Criterion of Difference.  Yet, to the extent that we take this 
ignorance not to impugn our subject’s understanding of either ‘furze’ or ‘gorse’, (12) and (13) do not 
express different thoughts. 
 The difficulty is that, although (12) and (13) express the same thought, a subject who 
understands both sentences need not know that they do.  Insofar as this is possible, our criteria are 
not guaranteed to give the right results, for if the subject does not know that it is the same thought 
she is considering twice over, then it may not be a failure of rationality on her part to take 
contrasting attitudes towards it.  Thus, if we are to employ the notion of the rational availability of 
combinations of attitudes to a subject in determining questions about the identity of thoughts, we 
must rule out the possibility that the subject may fail to recognize that two distinct episodes of 
conscious thinking involve the same thought, through no failure of rationality or understanding. 
 It is frequently assumed that Fregean sense is transparent, in the following sense: if one grasps 
a sense then, on every occasion when it is occurrently present in one’s consciousness, one must be 
in a position to recognize it as the same (at least barring failures of memory, attention, and the 
like).20  There is evidence, however, that Frege rejects the transparency of sense.  As his account of 
the role of definition and logical analysis in mathematics shows, recognizing a correct analysis is 
often a significant cognitive achievement: 
                                                
But how does one judge whether a logical analysis is correct?  We cannot prove it to 
be so.  The most one can be certain of is that as far as the form of words goes we 
have the same sentence after the analysis as before.  But that the thought itself 
remains the same is problematic.21 
 
20 See, for example, Dummett (1975: 131); Levine (1998:433).  A notable exception is Burge (1990).   I think 
this view is in part responsible for the common assumption that a Fregean theory of sense must be 
incompatible with externalism about content, since the latter is plausibly taken to entail that content is not 
transparent. 
21 Frege (1979: 209-10). 
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Frege suggests that it is possible to doubt the truth of a correct analysis of a simple term only to the 
extent that one is not perfectly clear on its sense:   
How is it possible, one may ask, that it should be doubtful whether a simple sign has 
the same sense as a complex expression if we know not only the sense of the simple 
sign but can recognize the sense of the complex one from the way it is put together?  
The fact is that if we really do have a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign, then 
it cannot be doubtful whether it agrees with the sense of the complex expression.  If 
this is open to question […] then the reason must lie in the fact that we do not have 
a clear grasp of the sense of the simple sign.22 
 
But, crucially, this lack of clarity is not an impediment to ordinary competence, or even considerable 
expertise, with the term. This is clear, for Frege attributes such lack of clarity concerning the sense 
of ‘number’ to prominent mathematicians of his time.  These mathematicians all attach the same 
sense to ‘number’, but they are in no position to know this fact, since they propound incompatible 
analyses of that sense.     
More precisely, Frege’s argument is the following.  The mathematicians’ lack of the capacity 
to re-identify the sense of ‘number’ is manifested in their inability to either give a correct analysis of 
it, or to recognize the correct analysis as such when they see it.  But this inability does not prevent 
them from doing important mathematical work.23  Thus, the lack of clarity Frege accuses them of 
does not entail that they do not grasp the sense of ‘number’ — in fact, he would probably have 
admitted that no one else (other than himself, of course) had a better grasp of that sense. 
Moreover, it is not the case that each of the mathematicians assigns a different sense to 
‘number’.  For if that were the case, then: 
The arithmetics of these mathematicians must be quite different.  A sentence from 
the first mathematician must have a quite different sense from the equivalent-
sounding sentence of the second mathematician.24   
 
                                                 
22 Frege (1979: 211). 
23 Frege (1979: 222). 
24 Frege (1979: 215). 
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 Frege presents this as a consequence that is patently absurd.  Arithmetic is but one science, and 
therefore all of the mathematicians attach the same sense to ‘number’ — even though they do not 
know it: 
Or is not the explanation rather that we have really to do with the same science; that 
this man does attach the same sense to the word ‘number’ as that man, only he 
doesn’t manage to get hold of it properly?  Perhaps the sense appears to both of 
them through such a haze that when they make to get hold of it, they miss it.25 
 
According to Frege, therefore, the thoughts these mathematicians think are not transparent to any of 
them.  The identity of their thoughts is fixed independently of their own opinions on the matter, by 
the unity of their science itself.  This makes it possible for them to hold attitudes which are, in fact, 
inconsistent, without being in a position to recognize the inconsistency.  Given all this context, it is 
natural to withhold the charge of incoherence or irrationality in these cases.  This is a challenge to 
the notion of the rational availability of combinations of attitudes to a subject we need to address.26 
 
3.  It is clear that we need to impose some sort of further constraint on the epistemic situation of the 
subject, if we are going to draw conclusions concerning the identity of her thoughts based on which 
combinations of attitudes are rationally available to her.  In order to see how this would work, we 
can focus on trying to revise Evans’s Intuitive Criterion of Difference.  As explained above, Evans’s 
principle is not fully satisfying in any case, as it only gives us a sufficient condition of difference and 
cannot be straightforwardly strengthened so as to give us a necessary one as well.  Nevertheless, 
since the points I want to make here do not rest on a necessary condition of difference, in the rest of 
                                                 
25 Frege (1979: 217). 
26 Cf. Burge (1990).  Although Burge throughout insists on Frege’s rejection of the transparency of sense, he 
does not seem to recognize the consequences of this point for the Intuitive Criterion of Difference, which he 
appears to endorse in a footnote.  Remarking that correct analyses appear to the mathematician as 
discoveries, and so can be doubted by one who does not doubt the corresponding self-identities, he remarks: 
“so by Frege’s test for the identity of senses, the senses of the explicans and the explicandum would be 
different.” (Burge (1992: 265, fn. 16))  But as Frege says about his own case (in the passage quoted in the 
text), one who has a fully clear grasp of the sense cannot rationally doubt the correct analysis, precisely 
because the two senses flanking the biconditional are identical.  Thus the Intuitive Criterion only gives the 
correct result in the case where the subject does not suffer from such lack of clarity. 
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 this section I will be using the Intuitive Criterion of Difference as my target for revisions.  The same 
considerations would apply directly to the identification of thought-components and modes of 
combination. 
 Returning to (12) and (13), one obvious move would be to require that the subject not only 
understand the sentences and be rational, but further that her grasp of the sense be clear enough to 
make it possible for her to re-identify it on every occasion it is occurrently present in her 
consciousness.  The revised principle, formulated in terms borrowed from Evans’s original 
formulation, would look something like the following: 
A thought T must be different from a thought T’ if it is possible for someone whose 
understanding of T and T’ satisfies a suitably high standard to rationally take 
contrasting attitudes towards them at the same time. 
 
Here, of course, the ‘suitably high standard’ of understanding must be sufficient to avoid opacity.  
As Frege’s discussion shows, satisfying this high standard of understanding is not an easy matter: if 
even leading mathematicians lack this ability with respect to central terms of their science, ordinary 
understanding certainly does not guarantee that the criterion applies.  This, however, gives us no 
grounds on which to object to it, since our search was not for a principle easily applicable in 
practice, but rather for a principle that would show us what to make of the very idea of Fregean 
thoughts. 
 Nevertheless, there is good reason to object to this formulation.  The reason is that it leaves 
it quite unclear what the required standard of understanding consists in, or how we could recognize 
— even in principle, if not in practice — whether a person satisfies it or not.  In one sense, of course, 
the answer to either of these questions is easy: one satisfies this standard with respect to a thought T 
if one is capable of identifying it whenever it is occurrently present in her consciousness.  But we 
cannot be satisfied with this answer, for if this is the only grip we have on the relevant kind of 
understanding, our criterion will end up saying little more than just that two thoughts are distinct if 
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 and only if someone with the ability to tell them apart can tell them apart.  This is obviously true, 
but it provides no insight into the nature of thoughts. 
 Thus if we have no independent grip on what it takes for a subject to avoid opacity in a 
certain case, we also have no non-vacuous account of the identity of the corresponding thoughts.  
On the other hand, the prospects of giving a general non-trivial account of the kind of 
understanding required in order to avoid opacity seem extremely dim: the sheer diversity of intuitive 
examples of opacity makes it doubtful that there even is such a thing as a non-trivially specifiable 
state of understanding such that, for every thought whatsoever, opacity is avoided only if one is in it.  
For example, a different case of opacity that seems to come up in Frege concerns thoughts 
expressed by sentences containing temporal indexicals.  Frege claims that a thought I expressed 
yesterday using “today” may be expressed today using “yesterday”.  Yet it is clear that, if I have lost 
track of time, I might fail to keep track of the identity of that thought too.27  But the lack of clarity I 
suffer from in this case is obviously very different from the lack of clarity that was behind the opacity 
in the case of Frege’s mathematicians.  Why should we suppose that there is a non-trivially 
specifiable standard of clarity that will be sufficient to avoid all cases of opacity?  This problem 
shows, I believe, that the revised version of the Intuitive Criterion of Difference is not acceptable. 
 The difficulty can, however, be avoided if we broaden our view to encompass not just an 
individual subject and her attitudes, but rather the whole of the practice she participates in and the 
relevant features of her environment.  If we take this wider view we can avoid the need for a general, 
non-trivial specification of what it takes to avoid opacity.  This move is actually made by Frege 
himself in his account of the disputing mathematicians: his argument was that opacity infected the 
mathematicians’ grasp of the sense of ‘number’, precisely because it was clear that all of the 
disputing mathematicians were practitioners of the same science.  What sense each of them attached 
                                                 
27 Frege (1997c: 331-332).  See also Evans (2002b); McDowell (1998c). 
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 to ‘number’ was not to be discovered by examining each individual mathematician in isolation, but 
rather by taking them collectively as participants in the science of mathematics.   
 Looking back at the ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ example, it is easy to see that here too the problem 
lies in the way in which our criteria so far have been restricted to specifying conditions on the 
attitudes of an individual subject.  What makes it the case that ‘furze’ and ‘gorse’ express the same 
sense, on the contrary, are facts about communal usage and about the interactions the community 
has had with the relevant plants — not facts about the dispositions of any individual subject 
considered in isolation.  Once such communal facts are taken into account, it becomes clear that a 
subject who takes incompatible attitudes to (12) and (13) above is either suffering from opacity, or 
else is being irrational.  This is because (as we are assuming, at least) there are no relevant differences 
in the community’s practice with the two words, nor do they derive from systematically different 
interactions with the plant. 
 Frege himself never discusses the possibility that the identity of thoughts may depend on 
facts about the physical environment.  In fact, it is commonly assumed that his account of sense is 
incompatible with this possibility.  Nevertheless, what he explicitly says about the sense of ‘number’ 
suggests he was well aware that sense is in general not fixed by any individual’s opinions or 
dispositions.  For this reason, I think he could have easily accepted the dependence of sense on the 
physical environment as well.28  In any case, the point here is not to remain faithful to Frege’s letter, 
but rather to sketch an account of content in Fregean spirit. 
 The crucial point that emerges from the discussion of cases of opacity, therefore, is that the 
standpoint from which the identity of thoughts is to be settled is not necessarily the standpoint of 
the subject who thinks them.  The reason is, as we have seen, that the identity of thoughts depends 
                                                 
28 This view has been explicitly argued for by Evans (1982; 2002b) and McDowell (1998b; 1998c).  For 
arguments against it see Burge (1979).  Frege’s own brief remarks on indexicals in Frege (1997c), however, 
indicate that he was aware of such context-dependent thoughts, and believed they did not pose a fundamental 
problem to the notion of sense.   
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 on all kinds of contextual factors to which that subject need have no privileged insight.  To credit 
the subject with the ability to re-identify her thoughts is often to credit her with knowledge that goes 
far beyond ordinary competence, or even expertise, in the relevant areas.  Thus the standpoint from 
which the identity of thoughts is to be settled should rather be that of a Davidsonian interpreter: the 
standpoint of a subject who rationally interprets another subject, equipped with sufficient access to 
all of the relevant contextual facts.29  As we saw, such an interpreter will sometimes find that 
attributing to her subjects some degree of ignorance about the identity of their own thoughts 
enables her to make better overall sense of them. 
 Incorporating these considerations, the criterion would look something like the following: 
A thought T must be different from a thought T’ if, given full knowledge of all the 
relevant facts about a context C, it is possible to interpret a subject S in C by 
attributing to S mutually exclusive attitudes towards T and T’ without thereby 
attributing to S lack of understanding, failure of transparency, or incoherence. 30 
 
                                                 
29 Here I am assuming the interpreter’s contextual knowledge to include mastery of the interpreted subject’s 
language; so the interpretation envisaged is not radical in Davidson’s sense (see Davidson (1973)). 
30 In §2, I objected to the linguistic criterion for the individuation of senses (the Intersubstitutability 
Criterion), on the grounds that it made it too easy to attribute distinct senses to co-referential terms.  One 
might wonder whether the new criterion, incorporating as it does the possibility of non-transparent senses, 
might not make it too hard: what reasons could we have to assign distinct senses to co-referential words, if 
we can always avoid doing so by attributing instead opacity to the subjects who use them?  I do not think this 
worry is justified, however.  In practice, the decision to make distinctions between senses  will face the 
decision to attribute opacity in an interpretative tradeoff of a kind we are in any case used to.   
     We can consider some examples to see how such tradeoffs might be resolved.  To begin with, consider 
once again the case of Jones, our botanically ignorant subject.  Although Jones has used the word ‘gorse’ all 
of her life, she only recently picked up the word ‘furze’ in conversation, and all she knows about it is that it 
refers to a plant that grows in dry areas.  Thus, it is intuitive to take her to defer in her use of ‘furze’ to people 
who understand it better than she does.  We should not, therefore, attribute to her an idiosyncratic sense for 
‘furze’; it is much more plausible to attribute to her opacity about its sense.  Now consider the case of 
‘Phosphorus’ and ‘Hesperus’ for contrast.  Consider, more specifically, the usage of an astronomer prior to 
the discovery that the appearance of a bright star visible in the morning and of a bright star visible in the 
evening are both due to the same planet.  We have, in this case, no reason to attribute to our subject any lack 
of clarity concerning the senses of the two words.  Thus we should agree with Frege’s judgment that our 
subject does not use ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ with the same sense.  Of course other cases will not be as 
simple as these toy examples; but this is not to say that we cannot, in general, make principled decisions 
concerning the identity of senses. 
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 By “context” here I mean the totality of social and environmental facts that may be relevant, 
including facts about the nature of the subject’s practices she and every other actual member of 
these practices may be ignorant of.31 
 
4.  The account just sketched naturally meshes with the holistic constraint on concept-possession 
that was suggested in Chapter 2 — in fact, it provides a rationale for it, grounded in the nature of 
Fregean thoughts.  I will close this Appendix by revisiting the example discussed in that chapter, in 
light of the present account. 
 On the present account, part of what fixes the identity of the concept of negation is that 
there are some characteristic relations of incompatibility among attitudes in which it figures — in 
particular (assuming, once again, classical logic to be correct) attitudes of acceptance towards any 
thought of the form ‘~~A’ are incompatible with rejecting or being agnostic about ‘A’.  Other 
things being equal, if one believes ‘~~A’ one should not reject or be agnostic about ‘A’ (unless one 
is also thereby led to reconsider ‘~~A’, of course).   
 Now, as we have seen, this is not to say that on every occasion a rational subject who 
understands the concept of negation will be disposed to conform her thinking to this principle.  For 
one thing, in a particular context it might be better to attribute to the subject opacity concerning the 
thought that replaces ‘A’ in our schema, rather than either a misunderstanding of negation or 
irrationality.  But cases of genuinely logical error can be accommodated by the present view as well, 
without the attribution of misunderstanding or irrationality.   
                                                 
31 It follows that there will, in general, be a limit to how much we can know about the identity or distinctness 
of thoughts available in a given context.  This limit is not ad hoc, but simply reflects the fact that we often — 
perhaps always — do not have full knowledge of all the relevant aspects of the context.  The existence of 
such a limit does not deprive our criterion of a point, of course: the point was to say something informative 
about the identity and distinctness of thoughts, not to provide a decision procedure capable of making 
perfectly sharp distinctions in practice. 
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 To return to the example I have been using throughout, a non-classical logician may fail — 
because of opacity — to recognize in a classical logician’s explicitly stated rules of inference her own 
concept of negation (she may even fail to recognize in them a coherent concept at all).  In such a 
case, we may still attribute the concept of negation to her.  We would do this not because we would 
hypothesize that she must possess some hidden or suppressed disposition to infer in accordance 
with the rules of inference she explicitly rejects, but rather because her overall outlook is that of a 
competent enough member of our conceptual practice.  What that would require, of course, is her 
continuing reliability in enough of the rest of the norms of that practice.
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